BIOREGIONAL PLANNING IN SOUTHEASTERN TANZANIA: THE SELOUS-NIASSA CORRIDOR AS A PRISM FOR TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents Mr. Noel Athanasio Pallangyo and Mrs. Perpetua Luluma Pallangyo who taught me hard work and perseverance that continues to be the wind beneath my wings.

Declaration

I, **Christine Noe**, declare that this thesis has been generated as a result of my own original research on *Bioregional Planning in Southeastern Tanzania: The Selous Niassa corridor as a prism for Transfrontier Conservation Areas*. I confirm that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution. Where I have consulted the published work of others, it is clearly acknowledged and the source is provided. With the exception of quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.

Signed: ……

Date: ……

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Abbreviations

AA	Authorised Association
ABCG	African Biodiversity Collaborative Group
ADMADE	Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
CAMPFIRE	Communal Area Management Program for Indigenous Resources
CAWM	College of African Wildlife Management
CBC	Community Based Conservation
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resources Management
CITES	United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Flora and Fauna
DC	District Commissioner
DfID	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
DGO	District Game Officer
DNRO	District Natural Resources Officer
DOAG	German Company for Colonization
DPG	Tanzania Development Partners Group
EAC	East African Community
FFI	Fauna and Flora International
GCA	Game Controlled Area
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GLTP	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
GTZ	German Technical Agency
GTZ-IS	German Technical Agency-International Services
InWent	Capacity Building International, Germany
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
IUCN	World Conservation Union
KfW	German Development Bank
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MtDC	Mtwara Development Corridor
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NGR	Niassa Game Reserve
OFC	Overseas Food Cooperation

PPF	Peace Parks Foundation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCP	Selous Conservation Program
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SGR	Selous Game Reserve
SNWC	Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor
STC	Southern Tourism Circuit
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks
TBNRM	Trans-boundary Natural Resources Management
TBPA	Trans-boundary Protected Area
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
TFP	Transfrontier Park
TNR	Tanganyika Notes and Records
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
WCS	World Conservation Society
WCST	Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania
WMA	Wildlife Management Area
WRI	World Resource Institute
WWF	World Wild Fund

Abstract

This thesis uses the Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor as a lens through which the process of constructing bioregions can be understood and the effects of that process on society properly evaluated. It specifically investigates the corridor as a cog in the creation of a bioregion in southeastern Tanzania, namely, the Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area. The study was motivated by claims that the creation of bioregions across international borders places the protection and conservation of biodiversity at the appropriate scale, and that bioregions of this type are beneficial for nature conservation and society. Though the study appreciates the ecological rationales for trans-border conservation, its focus is on the social side of the process. The main social claims for bioregions in general, and transfrontier conservation in particular, are that the establishment of cross-border protected areas, including transfrontier conservation areas, leads to the removal of colonial borders which disrupt ecological systems and local communities. Social science research has challenged transfrontier conservation areas for their negative consequences on states and local communities such as economic inequalities, loss of communal lands and state sovereignty. Yet, the process that created conditions for these consequences have not been adequately investigated hence the need for this study. The premise of this study is that an adequate understanding of the process leading to the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas is a precondition for a proper analysis of the effects that these areas have on society.

The study draws on conceptual insights from bodies of work on scale and borders, which are central to the social narratives of transfrontier conservation and to the broader process of the construction of space. As literature has shown, scale construction alters the geometry of power - strengthening the power and control of some actors while disempowering others. As such, scale construction is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space and the creation of space, in turn, implies setting of new borders. Border studies support further that when space and borders are created across frontiers, governance functions associated with them change thus reorganizing border communities. Literature on scale and borders is used in this study to facilitate the investigation of the process that creates the Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area and the implications of that process on the state and local communities on Tanzanian side.

Methodologically, the study adopts the realist approach for its appropriateness to research seeking to understand and explain complex processes of the social world. It explores three methodological avenues, namely, the use of iterative abstraction, triangulation and the grounded theory. Iterative abstraction allowed the identification of bioregional processes, real essence, power and mechanisms of that process. Triangulation was used to differentiate between intensive methods by which the operation of the causal processes can be understood and extensive methods that establish empirical regularities between issues. Grounded theory was used as both a method for doing research and as a mode of data analysis. As a research method, grounded theory was to complement iterative abstraction in search for causal processes. As a data analysis model, grounded theory was used on the basis that in searching for causal process and effect, the gathered information should be refined to determine the type of information to be collected in different stages of the research. Thus through the grounded theory data collection and analysis were interwoven throughout the research process.

The significant findings of the study are that Wildlife Management Areas play a pivotal role in the creation of the ecological corridor on which the bioregion is anchored. They are the scale at which there is a high concentration of activities, and are the place where the social consequences of the Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area are mostly felt. They demonstrate the significance of the local scale in the network of scales since these areas are directly linked with trans-border plans, which have the backing of non-governmental organizations, governments, donors, scientists and the private sector. Supported by new maps that describe new wildlife areas and the qualitative data collected during fieldwork, this thesis argues that, contrary to the transfrontier conservation idiom of removing borders, the creation of the Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area has created more borders in southeastern Tanzania. These borders reflect the emerging forms of nature protected areas in communal land and have resulted into the reallocation of rights and powers over wildlife. This way, the WMA process in Tanzania has empowered the central government and private sector actors while disempowering indigenous people by denying them access and use of land and wildlife resources in such areas.

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CHAPTER ONE: BIOREGIONAL PLANNING AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the background for this study and specifically focuses on the theoretical orientation of the study and the methodologies that were used. The research is informed by discussions on conservation ideas underpinning bioregional planning. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section introduces bioregional planning perspectives and how they are adopted to support transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs), especially in southern Africa. The second section presents the statement of the research problem, the main aim and objectives of the study and the research questions. The section also highlights the contribution of the study to knowledge. Section three introduces the study area while section four presents the general research methodology and the summary of chapters.

1.1 Background to the research

Over the past decade vast tracts of land throughout the world have been brought under the sway of large-scale regional planning and investment initiatives following the need to sustain society and biodiversity (Noss, 1983, Miller, 1996, Brunckhorst, 2002). The main objective behind large-scale regional planning is to protect biodiversity wherever it is found, from parks to farms, commercial forests, coastal zones, fishing areas as well as in people's backyards (Batisse, 1993, Breckwoldt, 1995). In order to do so, scientists and natural resource managers have suggested a redefinition of the scale at which biodiversity would appropriately be protected and managed. They promote the use of regions as the scale at which planning for biodiversity can take place and bioregions established. There are two contrasting views on how these bioregions should be established and what their areal extent might be.

On the one hand, bioregions are conceived as areas of land or water whose limits are set by the geographical distribution of biophysical attributes, ecological systems and human communities (Brunckhorst, 2000). This definition supports bioregions that cut across scales, international borders, and necessitate collaboration between states, the private sector and local communities (World Conservation Union (IUCN),

1994, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1996, Brunckhorst, 2000). Accordingly, bioregional planning emphasizes the integration of social, economic and ecological factors thereby allowing for variously defined and tenured areas of land or sea to be nested together. This notion leads to the development of bioregions, which support the idea that '*bigger is better'*. On the other hand, calls have been made that bioregions should be defined by local residents who have knowledge of local conditions that enable them to manage their natural resources successfully (Miller, 1996, Aberly, 1999). This view suggests also that bioregional borders should be defined by nature (life forms, topography and biota) rather than legislature (human dictates). It favours the notion of '*small is beautiful*'. The two types of scalar narratives are, therefore, associated with the notion of bioregions.

Bioregional planning as applied in TFCAs focuses on harmonizing the management of protected areas that are in close proximity and yet separated by international borders (De Villiers, 1999, Van der Linde et al., 2001, Tarner, 2004). In the contemporary practices, planning tends to be scaled up by linking conservation areas and other land use types across the borders of two or more countries to create a higher order collage of protected areas variously known as transfrontier nature reserves (Thorsell, 1990), trans-border parks (Kenney, 1990), cross-border parks (McNeely, 1993), TFCAs and Peace Parks (Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), 2002, Ali, 2007). In this way, bioregional planning constructs new conservation scales and governance in their wake, which hold potential impacts on state sovereignty, local people and their environment.

1.2 Bioregional planning in the southern African context

Different perspectives have been used to explain the emergence of large-scale conservation in Africa. Most of these are informed by theories of environmentalism, globalization and glocalization (Zbicz and Green, 1997, Westing, 1998, Duffy, 2006, McAfee, 1999, Vreugdenhill et al., 2003, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Ramutsindela, 2004a). In particular, the concept of market environmentalism is used to emphasize the ways in which the commodification of nature is a practical means for generating funds for protected areas while, at the same time, contributing to poverty alleviation. This implies that the market can regulate resources and in so doing both economic

development and nature conservation are enhanced. However, there are opposing views that markets empower transnational networks of technocrats and professionals who maintain influence over environmental protection and utilization thereby affecting human rights, development and food security (Levi-Faur, 2005, Bakker, 2005, Ingham, 2008, Harvey, 2001, Shleifer, 2005, Shivji, 2006, Castree, 2008, Adams et al., 2004, McAfee, 1999). Nevertheless, tourism market expansions in developing countries where states lack the resources have become the focus of business that sells across state borders. Thus, tourism has largely accounted for the growing support for cross-border conservation. Against this background, theories of globalization and environmentalism use economic development as a common reference point.

Environmentalists have used the notion of bioregions to advance TFCAs as a panacea for socio-economic, political and ecological problems in southern Africa. It is argued that TFCAs hold the potential to restore ecological connectivity which was previously disrupted by colonial borders and fences; foster economic integration; and promote peace and cooperation through the encouragement of inter-state collaboration (De Villiers, 1999, Tarner, 2004, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002, PPF, 1997). It is also suggested that TFCAs constitute a means of re-establishing cultural integrity and the unity of divided ethnic groups (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Baldus et al., 2003). These arguments raise questions about colonial borders and the claim that these borders should be removed through TFCAs. Indeed, TFCAs have been promoted as a means of re-establishing socio-economic and ecological links (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), 1997, Smith, 2003, Westing, 1998). This way, TFCAs have become an appropriate way of acquiring land for the expansion of protected areas with the help of states, the private sector and local communities (Wolmer, 2003a, Spierenburg and Wels, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2004b).

Cross-border protected areas are not new in Africa. The first was the Albert National Park, which was established in 1925 across the Rwanda-Burundi international border. The Albert National Park was established by the Belgian colonial regime for the purpose of conserving cross-border natural resources (Tarner, 2004, Van der Linde et al., 2001). Following the independence of the two countries in the early 1960's, the Rwandan portion became Volcanoes National Park and the Burundi

portion Virunga National Park (Wilkie, 2001). These attempts were renewed with vigour in the early 1990's, with South Africa taking the lead in the establishment of TFCAs in the African continent. The resurgence of interest in TFCAs in southern Africa can be ascribed to dramatic political changes in the region. Firstly, South Africa was emerging from apartheid rule, and the government was looking for a popular movement to improve its international image (Draper et al., 2004, Ramutsindela, 2004a). Secondly, Mozambique's civil war was an obstacle which came to an end in 1992 following the signing of Peace Accord with South Africa. Thirdly, Zimbabwe's government, like South Africa's, needed a means of regaining its international image due to its conflict over land use and ownership (Wolmer, 2003a). Finally, the South African National Parks (SANParks) management was struggling to deal with environmental challenges related to elephant over-population, especially in the Kruger National Park (Wolmer, 2003a, Ramutsindela, 2004a, Draper et al., 2004). Since South Africa is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Flora and Fauna (CITES) which observes rules on the ban of ivory trade, culling was not an ecological tool for managing elephant populations. The TFCAs was thus to help alleviate the problem of elephant over-population.

In 1999, the establishment of Kgalagadi transfrontier park (TFP) between Botswana and South Africa marked the first successful experiment on TFCAs. The Kgalagadi TFP brought together the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park of South Africa and the Gemsbok National Park of Botswana. It was followed by the establishment of the Great Limpopo TFP (GLTFP) in 2002, comprising of the Kruger National Park (South Africa), Limpopo National Park (Mozambique) and the Gonarezhou National Park (Zimbabwe). However, the process is underway to develop a far larger area to include Zinave and Banhine National Parks in Mozambique (South African National Parks (SANParks), 2006). Since the establishment of the Kgalagadi and GTFPs, major TFCA projects have been implemented in southern Africa (Table 1.1). In addition, processes are underway for the establishment of fifteen other TFCAs in the region (Appendix 1) (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002). Once the identified TFCAs are fully established, they will cover an area of over 120 million hectares that includes protected areas, private and communal lands across

international borders (Figure 1.1) (www.peaceparks.org). This study investigates the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

Table 1.1 Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa

No.	Name	Countries involved	Status
1	Kgalagadi TFP	South Africa and Botswana	Treaty signed May 2000
2	Great Limpopo TFP	South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique	Treaty signed in 9 December 2002
3	Lubombo TFCA	South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland	Trilateral Protocol signed on 22 June 2000
4	Ai/Ais-Richtersveld TFP	South Africa and Namibia	Treaty signed on 1 August 2003
5	Maloti-Drankesberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area	South Africa and Lesotho	Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 11 June 2001
6	Limpopo-Shashe TFCA	South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe	MoU signed on 22 June 2006
7	Malawi-Zambia TFCA	Malawi and Zambia	MoU signed on 13 August 2004
8	Selous-Niassa TFCA	Tanzania and Mozambique	MoU signed on 29 March 2007
9	Iona-skeleton Coast	Angola and Namibia	MoU signed on 1 August 2003
10	Okavango-Upper Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Zone	Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe	MoU on 7 December 2006
11	Chimanimani	Mozambique and Zimbabwe	MoU signed in June 2001
12	Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas Transfrontier Marine Park	Mozambique and Tanzania	Conceptual phase
13	Liuwa plain-Mussuma	Angola and Zambia	Conceptual phase
14	Lower Zambezi-Mana pools	Zambia and Zimbabwe	Conceptual phase

Source:(www.sadc.int/fanr/naturalresources/transfrontier/index.php), (www.peaceparks.org)

Figure 1.1 Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa

Source: (www.maps.ppf.org.za)

1.3 Research problem

The contested relationship between large-scale conservation areas and ecological integrity, economic development, political cooperation and cultural reunification underpins contemporary environmental debates. Although the debates are informed by different theoretical orientations - ranging from globalization, environmentalism, regionalism and developmentalism – the mismatch between theory, practice and effects remains inconclusive and under-theorised. On the one hand, the establishment of TFCAs has been supported by technocratic approaches mostly based on consultancy work. On the other hand, research in social science has questioned the motives for TFCAs and is concerned with the negative consequences of TFCAs on states and local communities as exemplified by economic inequalities, loss of communal lands and state sovereignty (Ramutsindela, 2004b, Wolmer, 2003a, Dzingirai, 2004, Draper et al., 2004, McCarthy, 2005, Spierenburg and Wels,

2006, Ferreira, 2006). This critical literature is nevertheless thin on the processes conditioning the negative consequences of TFCAs at both the theoretical and empirical levels. This study attempts to fill these gaps. It proceeds from the premise that appreciating the ways in which bioregions are created is a useful starting point for understanding conditions that create inequalities in TFCAs. The study draws on conceptual insights from bodies of work on scale and borders, which are central to the social narratives of transfrontier conservation and to the broader process of the construction of space. As literature has shown, scale construction alters the geometry of power - strengthening the power and control of some actors while disempowering others. As such, scale construction is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space and the creation of space, in turn, implies the setting of new borders. Border studies support further that when space and borders are created across frontiers, governance functions associated with them change thus reorganizing border communities. Understanding issues of power, control and access to cross-border areas and related resources is thus central to the research seeking to explain inequalities in such areas.

The Selous-Niassa TFCA aims to incorporate Selous Game Reserve (SGR) in southeastern Tanzania and the Niassa Game Reserve (NGR) in northern Mozambique into a bioregion of some sort. This plan depends on the establishment of the wildlife corridor that extends over 8,000 km^2 of communal land (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Baldus et al., 2003), which is currently settled by twenty nine villages with 'approximately 70,000 people' (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWent) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2007: 18). Since the Selous-Niassa is the first terrestrial TFCA initiative that involves Tanzania, less is known about what the process of its establishment entails and how local communities in the area of the corridor are treated. This knowledge is crucial for understanding the effects of TFCAs in general, and in Tanzania, in particular.

1.4 Aim of the study

The study investigates the process by which bioregions are constructed, the manifestation of that process in Selous-Niassa TFCA in southeastern Tanzania and the implication it has for the state and local communities.

1.4.1 Research objectives

The study has two specific objectives. These are; firstly, to identify actors and analyze their interests and roles in the creation of bioregions and, secondly, to explain the implications of the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state and local residents.

1.4.2 Research questions

In order to achieve the objectives of the study the following questions guided the entire research for this thesis; why and how are bioregions created? How is the process of creating bioregions adapted to support the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA? Who is involved in the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA and why? And, what are the consequences of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state and local communities in Tanzania?

1.5 Significance of the study

Theoretically, the study presents scale and border narratives as alternative perspectives for analyzing TFCAs and their outcomes. Although there is considerable discussion about the relevance of scale to political ecology and the contemporary scale debate in human geography, only a few studies on TFCAs have paid attention to the issue of scale and borders (See for instance, Ramutsindela, (2007) and Fall, (2003) respectively. A large portion of the literature has neglected how scale construction relates directly to the establishment and impacts of TFCAs. To date, no empirical work has been done to demonstrate how the construction of bioregional scale is accomplished by different actors engaged in environmental conservation agendas. Yet, it is in the tradition of any geographical research to describe the spatial pattern of events, and explain that pattern by way of the actual mechanisms which have generated it (Harvey, 1968). Thus this study contributes to this knowledge by demonstrating how the construction of a bioregional scale is accomplished by the rearrangement of spatial borders thereby creating new power geometries. At the practical level, the study is useful for planners and decision makers who are responsible for the establishment of TFCAs and for state governments, which are entrusted as guardians of natural resources and people's welfare in their sovereign territories.

1.6 The selection of the study area

The Selous-Niassa TFCA was selected for this study due to its significance as the first bioregional experiment in Tanzania. As Figure 1.2 indicates, the Selous-Niassa TFCA is found in Tanzania's southern region in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts, and the Niassa province in northern Mozambique. The SGR was first established as a hunting reserve in 1905 (Baldus, 2001). In 1922 the status of the area was upgraded to that of a game reserve. Thereafter it was designated a World Heritage Site in 1982 on UNESCO's criteria ix and x (representing significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity) (IUCN, 1982). Currently, the SGR forms the largest protected area in Tanzania covering about six percent of the total land mass and is said to contain the largest elephant population in Africa (Baldus and Hahn, 2004). As it is for Selous, the NGR is acknowledged for its large animal concentration and representation of pristine wilderness of Africa (Baldus and Hahn, 2004). The NGR was first established in 1954. However, the reserve was abandoned during the civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s resulting in the areas opening up for the re-establishment of settlements. After the Nkomati Peace Accord was signed in 1992, the Mozambican government entered into an arrangement with the Sociedade para a Gestão e Desenvolvimento da Reserva do Niassa (SRN) to manage NGR as a public-private partnership (Graham, 2005).

Figure 1.2 The location of the study area

Source: Modified from TANAPA (2009: 34)

The establishment of the link between the two game reserves is set to create the largest cross-border conservation area in Africa (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). Thus, the area separating SGR and NGR is currently the main focus of the TFCA activities. Subsequently, the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (SNWC) project was launched in early 2000 in order to create a wildlife corridor that cuts across the districts of Namtumbo and Tunduru to the Ruvuma river (Figure 1.3). The Ruvuma river forms the international border between Tanzania and Mozambique and also marks the northern border of the NGR. This implies, then, that the SNWC is entirely on the Tanzanian side. In terms of the biological distinctiveness index of ecoregions,

the SNWC is classified as locally important and globally outstanding thus making its conservation of global significance (Burgess *et al.*, 2004).

Figure 1.3 The Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor

Source: Modified from Baldus *et al.* (2003: 9)

Notwithstanding the biological distinctiveness described above, it is acknowledged that the rate of dependency on natural resources by local communities in the SNWC is 'very high' (InWent and GTZ, 2007, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). It is therefore necessary to analyze the complexities that exist when attempts are made to strike a balance between biodiversity and human needs. Based on the foregoing, fifteen villages among the twenty-nine that are located in the area of the SNWC were selected for a detailed investigation (see Table 1.2). Among these, four villages border the SGR and were involved in the establishment of buffer zones around the reserve. This study ascertains that the buffer zone project was the first phase of the SNWC project, hence the justification for the selection of the four villages. The twelve other villages are located southward towards the NGR and are the focus of the second phase of the SNWC project, which is currently underway to establish the actual wildlife corridor between the two reserves.

Table 1.2 Study villages in Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor

#	Village name	Village Population *	Project phase
1	Huria	1200	Phase 1 Buffer zone development
2	Darajambili	1018	
3	Kilimasera	715	
4	Mchomoro	6882	
5	Milonji	3204	Phase 2 Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor
6	Lusewa	5171	
7	Msisima	2785	
8	Matepwende	1555	
9	Ligunga	3352	
10	Amani	1165	
11	Magazini	5548	
12	Likusanguse	1666	
13	Molandi	2012	
14	Marumba	3238	
15	Misiaji	2570	

* Based on 2002 national population census
Source: Author compilation

1.7 Research design and methodology

The research was designed to facilitate the investigation of the process of constructing bioregions as a starting point, the conditions under which that process unfolds and its implications for the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. The

research was also designed to understand the network of key players, their roles and interests in Selous-Niassa TFCA. In doing so, I draw from perspectives of social construction of nature and critical realism. Social construction as a concept refutes the taken-for granted beliefs about the essential nature of things by showing that those things are not natural, but instead are somehow socially constructed, institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans (Demeritt, 2002, Bird, 1987, Klaus and Mark, 1996, Proctor, 1998).

Social construction as refutation rhetoric has been associated with a long-standing tradition of speaking truth to power and is often famous to the supporters of critical realism (Demeritt, 2002, Proctor, 1998). According to Bhaskar (1975), critical realism is a philosophy of science, which makes its strongest claims that social problems are a combined effect of separable processes that operate at different strata or levels of reality. Accordingly, realist philosophy offers a research approach that helps social scientists to understand and explain complex processes of the social world. Critical realism's key objective is to identify real causal processes lying beneath appearances and then to understand their operation in time and space (Sayer, 1992, Brown et al., 2002, Bhaskar, 1975). The use of social construction and critical realism in this study helps to uncover the ways in which reality is reproduced by people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it. As Kvale (1996) and Wengraf (2001) supports further, the conception of knowledge as a mirror of reality has, by a series of turns, been replaced by a conception of the social construction of reality. Constructionist and critical realist views derive the main argument of the study that the process of constructing bioregions is supported by conditions produced, modified and controlled by humans; conditions that are made foundational concepts in the environmental conservation debate.

Sayer (1992) argues that reasons given by different actors for their actions today may not necessarily be the real reasons. Neither structures nor conditions that result into related practices are given transparently; their identification is an achievement and must be worked for in order to explain the reality. Yeung (1997) cautions, however, that in the search for reality in an open social world, a single process may generate many outcomes, and similar outcomes may emerge from different processes. Besides identifying the immediate causes of events, research

explanation must include references to the necessary conditions for the existence of mechanisms, where they are not known. Along this line of thinking, social scientists are urged to always suspect that the most recent account is a fiction requiring further rectification (Wengraf, 2001). It is also noteworthy that social science in general and human geography in particular deals almost exclusively with open systems as opposed to other disciplines, which assume the existence of closed systems (Sayer, 1992). In the open system, problems are a combined effect of separable processes that operate at different levels of reality. In any case, patterns of events are not self explanatory thus they must be explained by reference to what produces them. It is this complexity that makes realist philosophy an appropriate theoretical underpinning for this study.

Reality in this sense is more than mere appearances may suggest. Accordingly, realists are forced to focus on processes rather than on patterns in their research. A realist researcher must thus ask what a system and its constituent objects must be like for regularities to be produced instead of assuming that conditions that produce regularities exist universally (Yeung, 1997, Sayer, 1992). In supporting the use of realist philosophy for the practice of geographic research, Yeung, (1997) acknowledges the one-to-many correspondence between cause and effect and that social processes operate at various scales, and so their analyses are designed to transcend these scales (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990, Outhwaite, 1987, Robson, 2002). Social scientists are thus required to analyze any one process considering aspects of the multi-layered or stratified character of the social world through the operations of economic, cultural and political processes (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990) and to interpret material conditions and statements in different ways across scales in order to learn new ways of understanding social world practices (Sayer, 1992).

The nature of the realist approach merits detailed examination as it provides a set of guidelines, which outline how to critically analyze and re-work existing conceptions of social processes across different scales (Allen, 1983 cited in Yeung, 1997). It is argued, along this line, that the relationship between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, but contingent (Yeung, 1997). Not surprisingly then, depending on conditions, the operation of different mechanisms may produce the same empirical events. Inevitably, the search for causal mechanisms is often unclear from

patterns of empirical events. This suggests that the discovery of what a given mechanism can and cannot do requires considerable effort and ingenuity. The search for regularities is thus inadequate.

In executing a realist approach, extensive and intensive research methods are differentiated (Sayer, 1992). Intensive methods beg the question of *how* some causal processes operate while extensive methods establish empirical regularities between issues. It is cautioned that the causal process cannot explain events directly without any need for empirical research into the contingency of the concrete (Yeung, 1997, Brown et al., 2002). It is argued further that, while quantitative methodology can help with the qualitative side in finding a representative sample, locating deviant cases and supplying background data, qualitative methodology can help the quantitative side by validating, interpreting, clarifying as well as strengthening and revising theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Neumann, 2003). Thus the study that uses both methodologies is considered more comprehensive because a researcher can observe and interpret things from different viewpoints (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Flick, 1998, Neumann, 2003). This observation, coupled with the nature of realism philosophy discussed above, warranted the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in this study.

In particular, this research adapted Yeung's (1997) realist methodological guide for human geographical research. This guide provides three methodological avenues and outlines the possible trajectories of realist research in practice. These are; the use of iterative abstraction, triangulation and grounded theory. As argued earlier, the open nature of the social world and its multidimensionality has led to an emphasis on the process of conceptualization in research (Yeung, 1997, Lawson and Staeheli, 1990). And, conceptualization begins with abstraction (Yeung, 1997) which is defined as a process of focussing on some feature (s) of some thing (s) while others remain in the background (Brown *et al.*, 2002). Abstraction involves identifying the necessary relations by which social objects are empowered or constrained and it serves two purposes; at the level of actual, it allows particular aspects or moments of social reality to be identified while at the level of beneath appearance it uncovers the real essence of the social phenomena of interest (Brown *et al.*, 2002). Sayer (1992) argues further that abstraction helps to distinguish external from internal relations

between objects and events. Abstraction as used in realist philosophy was, therefore, a sound step towards the conceptualization of the real essence, power and mechanisms for constructing bioregions.

Grounded theory as used in social science in general and realism philosophy in particular, is both a method for doing research and a mode of doing analysis for generating and testing theory (Robson, 2002, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As a method for doing research, grounded theory seeks to generate or validate a theory, which relates to the particular situation forming the focus of the study. The theory is grounded in the data obtained during the study, particularly in the actions, interactions and processes of the people involved (Robson, 2002). Overall, this study used the grounded theory as an integral part of the research methodology to guide data collection and analysis rather than developing a new theory. As it will be discussed below, aspects of grounded theory used in the study includes qualitative theoretical sampling (for the selection of first key informants, modification of interview guides and the addition of emergent data sources as the study progressed), data collection (iterative interviewing and field observations) and data analysis (coding and writing). These methods complemented iterative abstraction and data triangulation in search for causal processes. As discussed earlier in this section, a realist approach calls for this use of multi-methods due to the differences but complementary strengths.

1.8 Types and sources of data

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was collected during the fieldwork that was carried out between July 2007 and September 2008. The data was mainly obtained from the study villages and from the analysis of public records available as government documents and reports. Details of techniques used to gather information are discussed later in the forthcoming sections. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that primary data obtained from the field claims the strength to capture onsite events which can be refined daily in the field setting and thus helping to collect new data and gain new insights (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). In particular, I talked to people onsite and observed ordinary events as well as unusual occurrences, which helped me to acquire an insider's view while maintaining the analytical perspective. In fact, it is argued that primary data with their

emphasis on people's lived experiences are fundamentally well suited for locating the meaning people place on their lives and for connecting these meanings to the social world around them (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Neumann, 2003). It is from this emphasis on people's lived experiences that the study obtained most of the primary data from the study villages. It is important to note that the initial plan was to collect data from twelve villages that are currently involved in the SNWC project (refer Table 1.1). However, after the first phase of the fieldwork I realised that the SNWC is not a new project but had been implemented under the GTZ/Selous Conservation Program (GTZ/SCP). This demanded that the study be extended to the villages involved in the GTZ/SCP hence the increase of the study villages from twelve to fifteen.

Public records constitute a potential goldmine for social science investigation as they reveal how public and private agencies account for and legitimate their activities (Silverman, 1995). The analysis of these records can reveal the powers to determine the grounds through which agendas are set and outcomes determined. It is suggested also that public records are of importance for any research because the information provided may differ from and not be available in spoken form, and because texts endure and thus give historical insight (Hodder, 1994). Public records for this research were government policies and regulations (for wildlife, forests, land, tourism, local government reforms and poverty reduction), official files for different projects in the area (particularly the SNWC project) and consultancy reports. Other documents used were speeches (presented in conferences and seminars), minutes of meetings, maps, MoUs for related projects and other interstate and international agreements. In addition, the Tanzania National Archives in Dar es Salaam and museums in Songea and Arusha formed a source of vital historical information. The analysis of information obtained from these sources revealed the grounds on which the Selous-Niassa TFCA agenda was set, key players, their roles and interests thus stimulating further investigations that helped to understand the TFCA process and its potential outcomes.

Secondary sources of data were published research materials relevant to the establishment of TFCAs, media broadcasts, newspapers, magazines and different policy review papers. I conducted a secondary analysis research on these sources

and reorganised them to find categories of ideas that helped to answer research questions (see section 2.4). In particular, research was conducted in libraries at the universities of Cape Town and Dar es Salaam, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism-Wildlife Division (MNRT-WD) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) in Arusha, GTZ and World Wild Fund (WWF) in Dar es Salaam as well as PPF in Stellenbosch, South Africa. It is also indisputable that internet search made an important source of different types of information and a tool for identifying individual researchers and consultants in TFCAs who were thereafter contacted and interviewed.

1.9 Sampling design and sample size

The nature of inquiry in this study resulted in a complex sampling frame with scattered, difficult-to-reach and specialized individuals. Indeed, the sampling frame included government officials in key decision-making positions, donors, experts and consultants as well as ordinary citizens in the study villages. Babbie and Mouton (2001) advises that non-probability sampling method is suitable for drawing a study sample from such complex frames. In this sampling method it is the relevance to the research topic which determines the way in which the respondent is selected (Flick, 1998, Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Bryman, 2001). Thus the sample size cannot be determined in advance until the researcher deploys non-probability sampling techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Flick, 1998). This study used purposive and snowball sampling techniques that ensured the identification of relevant informants.

Purposive sampling technique ensures that all characteristics of importance to the research are represented (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Bryman, 2001, Flick, 1998, Miles and Huberman, 1994). In practice, purposive stratified sample was drawn to get key informants from each of the category of informants identified for this study (government officials, donors, experts and consultants as well as villagers) for in-depth inquiry. The selection of individual informants from these groups was based entirely on my prior knowledge of their involvement in TFCA activities and the specific roles that they play in the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Furthermore, snowball-sampling technique was used throughout the data collection period to supplement the purposive sample. Snowball is a multistage sampling technique, which begins with one or a few people and spreads out on the basis of links to the initial cases (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Snowball-sampling was

appropriate for this study due to the nature of the interconnected network of individual actors and organizations involved in facilitating TFCAs. The two sampling techniques resulted in the list of informants presented in Appendix 2.

Due to the relevance of methodological triangulation, probability sampling method was also used to draw the sample for quantitative survey. In particular, random technique was used to get respondents from the list of residents in each study village. Because quantitative survey was conducted to supplement qualitative information, I determined a sample size of about 1.5% of the population for the fifteen study villages. Thus, random numbers were used to get sampling units that gave each registered villager an equal chance of selection. This way, the evidence from the fieldwork enabled me to understand the study population. In practice, there were variations in the actual number of people interviewed in the villages due to different circumstances related to their availability. However, the sample size was reasonably achieved, which brought the total number of administered questionnaires to 664 (see Table 1.3).

Table 1.3 Study villages, population and number of survey interviews

#	Village name	Village Population *	Number of Respondents	% of total respondents
1	Milonji	3204	37	5.6
2	Lusewa	5171	48	7.2
3	Ligunga	3352	46	6.9
4	Matepwende	1555	51	7.7
5	Msisima	2785	51	7.7
6	Amani	1165	38	5.7
7	Magazini	5548	63	9.5
8	Likusanguse	1666	50	7.5
9	Marumba	3238	51	7.7
10	Molandi	2012	31	4.7
11	Misiaji	2570	50	7.5
12	Hulia	1200	51	7.7
13	Darajambili	1018	37	5.6
14	Kilimasela	715	32	4.8
15	Mchomolo	6882	28	4.2
	Total	**42081**	**664**	**100**

* Based on 2002 national population census given that most villages had no records for internal census

1.10 Data collection techniques

Interviews (both qualitative and quantitative) constituted the main thrust of the data collection component of this study. As Fontana and Frey (1994) argues, interviewing has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses. The most common type of interviewing is individual, face-to-face verbal interchange, but it can also take the form of group interviewing, mailed or self-administered questionnaires and telephone surveys (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Similarly, interviews can be structured, semi structured or unstructured; formal or informal, and, it can be used for understanding an individual or a group perspective. Therefore, interview research is considered an effective way of capturing the multitude of respondent's views of the research theme (Kvale, 1996). Nevertheless, it is cautioned that it matters to be explicit on how to obtain reliable and valid knowledge of the research theme from different groups of people. In the case of this study's theme, for instance, villagers, donors, experts/consultants and government officials were expected to have different understanding and ways of expressing views about the ongoing activities in Selous-Niassa area. Based on this observation, different types of interviews were used to

capture the diversity of views from these groups. Qualitative interviews were unstructured (formal and informal), semi-structured in-depth interviews and narratives while quantitative interviews involved questionnaire survey. The degree of structuring and/or formality of interview questions depended entirely on the stage of the project.

1.11 Interviews

a) Unstructured interviews

Denzin and Lincoln, (1994) suggests that unstructured interviews are useful for gaining entry, establish rapport and build trust and confidence with the respondents. Indeed, different sets of unstructured questions were prepared for different groups of informants and they were modified throughout the course of data collection. These questions aimed at understanding the meanings people attach to bioregional processes, their perceptions, assumptions, prejudgements and for connecting these meanings to the ongoing process of establishing the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Unstructured interviews were particularly conducted with government officials in different levels - the Ministries (Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), Ministry of Land and Ministry of Local Governments), Districts Councils (Namtumbo and Tunduru) and government leaders of the fifteen Village Councils participating in the research. At the community level, unstructured interviews were conducted with purposely selected individuals most of whom were identified by community members as *Wazee wa Busara* (wise men). In few cases, group interviews of up to six people were held and non-directional questions encouraged free and open discussion. These group discussions were particularly useful in establishing a general understanding of contradictory issues at the village level. Once a general understanding was established, semi-structured in-depth interviews followed to test the validity of the information.

b) Semi-structured in-depth interviews

As Kvale (1996) and Wengraf (2001) argue, in-depth interviews seek to get a better understanding of reality, which makes them highly professional. As such, in-depth interviews involves the interviewer in a process of both model-building and model-testing, theory construction and theory-verification within the same session (Wengraf, 2001). Admittedly, this process helped me to get a sense of how the

apparently straightforward was more complicated and how the surface appearance could be misleading about the depth realities. A it has been argued, if in-depth interviews are properly recorded and transcribed, the words spoken remain relatively non-controversial facts (Roulston et al., 2003, Wengraf, 2001, Kvale, 1996).

In-depth interviews in this study targeted donors, consultants, experts and government officials who are directly involved in the establishment of TFCAs in general and the Selous-Niassa in particular. In preparing for the interviews, this research adopted procedures as outlined by Kvale (1996) and Wengraf, (2001). These procedures include the formulation of guiding structural questions to allow me to reflect and determine their relevance in answering theory questions (Appendix 3). As such, these questions were to clarify issues that emerged from previous interviews as well as to acquire new perspectives. As advised by Wengraf (2001), I acquired relevant information concerning the prospective informants for the purpose of preparing interview questions. Eight key informants were identified mainly because of their merits to provide additional and detailed information. This number was also determined by the specialised nature of in-depth interviews, time needed per interview and its analysis. After the identification, informants were contacted to confirm their availability and venue for interview.

Specifically, interviews were conducted with key informants who represented institutions that pioneered the TFCA idea in different times and places in southern Africa. These informants include Dr. John Hanks – the former PPF Executive Director and the current Director of Conservation International (CI), Mr. Noel de Villiers – the Chief Director of Open Africa and Ms. Melissa de Kock - the Socio-economic Project Coordinator for PPF. As Appendix 2 indicates, these informants were interviewed in Cape Town and Stellenbosch in South Africa. In Tanzania, in-depth interviews were conducted with the Selous-Niassa TFCA donor representatives, project implementing/consulting agencies, technical experts and some government officials. Specifically, donor representatives included Dr. Alan Rodgers – the GEF/UNDP representative for East Africa and Dr. Axel Dorken – the GTZ-Tanzania Country Director. Technical experts interviewed are Mr. Rudolf Hahn – the GTZ Technical Advisor for the SNWC project and Mr. Wayner Lotter – the representative of the consulting agency Gauff Ingenieure GmbH that implements the

SNWC project. Others include Mr. Samwel Mgela - the Namtumbo District Game Officer (DGO). In-depth interviews were recorded to allow me to pay attention to the responses, ask liable questions and interpret non-verbal communication (Wengraf, 2001, Roulston et al., 2003).

In-depth interviews were also conducted with villagers who have a long history of issues related to land use and land use changes in the study area. These interviews stimulated stories about borders as understood locally, changes in borders and the meanings that people attached to such changes. Unlike other methods, the selection of respondents for border narratives based on their age, leadership role in society, their willingness and ability to participate. Three informants were interviewed iteratively and different versions of their stories were recorded. These informants are Mzee Swedi Sanangula – the Historian in Songea museum, Mzee Abraham Cosmas of Milonji village and Sheikh Mohammed Ilali Mikonga of Msisima village.

d) Archival research

Public records obtained from archives were analyzed in relation to other sources of data. In particular, minutes of the meetings that deliberated the changes of the borders of the SGR were used to interpret reserve maps, which were produced over time. These maps are used to analyze patterns in this thesis.

e) Quantitative structured interviews

Structured questionnaire interviews were the main quantitative techniques for establishing empirical regularities that informed the abstraction of the causal process. As acknowledged by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Robson (2002), this study found questionnaire interviews useful in capturing information on human population and social economic activities, which supplemented data, acquired through other techniques. The use of structured questionnaire interviews was also supported by the view that they were most useful in locating deviant cases, which might have been difficult to reach, overlooked or left out in the use of qualitative techniques (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Specifically, questionnaires were administered face-to-face with randomly selected villagers in the SNWC with the focus on capturing social economic aspects of the population in relation to the

wildlife land use (Appendix 3). This data was particularly used in the analysis of the impacts of the establishment of WMAs and the SNWC in the communal lands.

1.12 Observations

I observed and scrutinized the physical surroundings, social settings and daily activities of the villagers. With the guidance of local research assistants, I observed issues that villagers remarked in formal and informal interviews as their main concerns. These included areas that were formerly farms and settlements but already occupied by wildlife, settlements under relocation schemes, relocated people and their new settlements, border areas (for villages and between Tanzania and Mozambique) and mineral marks that were put by prospectors in village lands. It was also possible for me to observe tensions in the meetings between villagers and natural resource committee members. These observations were recorded as part of field notes and photos, which were later analyzed with other data. The use of this technique was supported by the fact that observation produces great rigor when combined with other methods and is an alternative source of data for enhancing cross-checking (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Adler and Adler, 1994) or triangulation against information gathered through other means (Flick, 1998). Indeed, when added onto other research methods, these observation materials enhanced information consistency.

1.13 The use of maps and photographs

Maps and photos were used as a source of information for the analysis of spatial interrelationships between different aspects of the research. Whereas photos captured onsite phenomenon, maps acquired from different sources provided information about the past, present and future plans for the study area. This information was vital in the analysis of borders and their current and future impacts on people and wildlife.

1.14 Data analysis

This research derived information from multiple sources and the information was in different forms including field notes, tape records, written documents, photographs and maps. Nevertheless, data collection and analysis were interwoven throughout the research process thereby facilitating storage of data, which is in different levels

of analysis. In using grounded theory method, the fieldwork was carried out in three phases to allow for the analysis of data between the field visits. Data analysis between different phases helped to determine the analytical significance of the gathered information and determined the type of information to be collected in the next field visits. The process of refining data and gaining new insight also facilitated iterative abstraction and made the study more of a spiral moving upwards thus helping me to permanently reflect on the whole research process and on particular steps in light of others. As such, iteration became a reflexive process (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009), and key to sparking insight and developing meaning. It is these new insights that helped to break through technocratic assumptions. In the context of grounded theory method, this repeated comparison of information from the field and theory facilitates constant comparative analysis of data (Neumann, 2003, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Flick, 1998, Morse et al., 2002, Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009).

This study borrows procedures for systematic and rigorous data analysis from Miles and Huberman (1994), Wengraf's (2001) and Morse et al., (2002). Generally, these sources argue for systematic and rigorous analysis as a tool for reliability and validity of data. Systematic analysis in this case refers to the conscious use of procedures to organise a mass of data methodically so that all the parts fit into a broader, structured whole (De Wet and Erasmus, 2005). In ensuring rigor and establishing reliability and validity of data, I worked in concurrent flows of activities throughout the research period. These activities are accurate recording, close reading, data reduction, data display, drawing of tentative conclusion and verification. Details of how I carried out these activities are provided in subsections below. It is noteworthy, however, that these activities were particularly guided by Miles and Herberman's (1994) data analysis model which suggests that a researcher should decide from the beginning which data pattern to use, which data in which form to be used for analytic activities and from which data regularities or patterns should the conclusions be drawn from. The three streams were thus interwoven before, during and after data collection in parallel form to enhance research comprehension.

a) Accurate recording

As discussed earlier, data were recorded using various methods. These are written notes, digital photos and digital voice recorders. Written notes were typed and saved as electronic documents alongside other digital records. Backup systems for these records were created to minimize the risk of losing information.

b) Close reading and categorization of data

Iterative reading and updating of notes and other research documents is an important analytical procedure (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009, Richards, 2005). As the research continued, the new information required to be read and the old records re-read. In fact, iterative abstraction was at the heart of visiting and revisiting the data and connecting them with emerging insights and understandings (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009). It is, therefore, through iterative reading that meaningful summaries can be generated from different forms of written documents, context in transcripts understood and themes from secondary sources teased out (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Morse et al., 2002, De Wet and Erasmus, 2005, Richards, 2005, Poland, 1995). In practice, questions were created to guide the creation of conceptual categories throughout the reading of research materials. These questions include, for examples, *what conceptual issues emerge from the data* (the answer to this question made the first step towards creating an information category), *why are they interesting* and *why are they of interest to this study* (the two questions helped to stimulate thinking and create the second and third information categories). A table was generated for advanced information categories and short descriptions of different concepts of interest to a specific research question were recorded and updated on a daily basis (See example in Table 1.4).

Table 1.4 A guide to creating conceptual information categories

Memos about emerging conceptual issues		
What conceptual issue is emerging?	**Why is it interesting?**	**Why am I interested in it?**
Number of villages in the corridor	- It reflects the scope of the project - It is the basis for analysing the impacts of the project	-The establishment of the SNWC in village lands implies change of land use, local borders and status -Wildlife land use is incompatible with local land uses.
Borders	- Borders (local and international) are not fences - Land use re-definition implies the establishment of human-wildlife borders in the village lands	- Border narratives used to establish claims for TFCAs are not supported by empirical data in S-N TFCA.
Scale processes at the local level	- Five WMAs are established in the area of the twenty nine villages -Nine community forests are merged with WMAs to establish the SNWC - MoU signed for Selous-Niassa collaboration	- Demonstrates how CBNRM supports the construction of large-scale conservation
Land use, ownership and change	- There has never been a wildlife corridor land use - The SNWC is established in village lands - Land is under the trusteeship of the President - The President can change land use based on national and/or global interest (world heritage)	- Land law reforms support changes in land use - The basis of loss of land by local communities
Impacts	- Increased wildlife population -Increased commercial hunting activities - Increased human-wildlife conflicts - Loss of farm plots and settlements	- Points to practices of nature commodification - Points to possible displacement of local communities
Actors and their roles	- German government as the main facilitator of the SNWC	-Points to possible links between colonial plans and TFCAs - Points to the existing institutional borders

The identification of clusters and hierarchies of information clarified complex issues and sparked ways of relating and explaining them. Progressively, regularities in the data became apparent thus supporting analytical writing as opposed to making descriptions of the original data. Throughout this procedure, however, I remained open minded, sensitive and creative to linking new information to other records thereby avoiding drawing conclusions based on what Morse *et al*., (2002) refer to as loudest bangs that are supported by particular group of informants. It is on this basis that the study managed to break through technocratic information.

c) Data transcriptions

The audio-recorded data such as semi-structured in-depth interviews and narratives were transcribed. Transcription was used as a method of making data available in textual form for subsequent analysis. Further reading of interview transcripts identified information that formed useful materials for the final writing of this thesis. As it is acknowledged, transcription process is, by itself analytical, as it sparks off many theoretical memos of the interview experience and reflection on the possible interpretations of that interview and data generated thereafter (Poland, 1995, Wengraf, 2001).

d) Use of Statistical Package for Social Science

The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) aided the analysis of questionnaire interviews. SPSS is a computer statistical package mostly used to evaluate empirical data. As the first step, questionnaire answers were transferred into data that could be analyzed by assigning them codes (usually in the form of numbers). As in qualitative data, codes assigned to questionnaire answers were those related to the study objectives. Coded information was then transferred to the computer and SPSS was used to prepare frequency tables showing the number, percentage, and cumulative percentage of cases for each value. Appendix 4 shows examples of table extracts, namely, SPSS output that were used to compare information within and across the study villages and to support findings from other sources of data.

1.15 Ethical issues

In Tanzania, all researchers are required to have research permits before conducting fieldwork in the villages. In adhering to this specific rule and to the research ethics in general, permits were processed at different levels. In particular, the University of Dar es Salaam provided a letter of introduction to different Ministries and non-governmental institutions where key informants were to be interviewed. At the local level, District Administrative Secretaries provided letters that introduced me to the Village Councils (see Appendix 5). As for the individual informants, consent was asked for prior to their participation in the interviews. Consents for qualitative interviews were mostly asked in advance of the interview day while questionnaire interviews contained a written section that was read for the informant on the day and

time of the interview (see the attached questionnaire in Appendix 3). It should be emphasized that informants were also asked for their permission to use their names in the study. Those who did not give their approval are referred to as anonymous in this thesis. Consequently, not all the names of informants as provided in Appendix 2 appear in the citations.

1.16 Limitations of the study

The study faced two types of constraints. Firstly, data for village wildlife utilization was difficult to compile particularly because of irregularities associated with poor recording and differences that exist in wildlife user rights in the villages. These irregularities made records for village hunting quotas inconsistent with the district data. Thus, the research used data for seven villages that form Mbarang'andu WMA, which is comparatively advanced in fulfilling requirements for the acquisition of wildlife user rights. Mbarang'andu was thus used as a case study for analysing the impacts of wildlife conservation in the study villages. Secondly, I experienced financial and time constraints that necessitated changes in the research area coverage. The initial plan was to investigate TFCA activities across Tanzania-Mozambique international border. This plan was revised due to accessibility problems created by the absence of bridges across the Ruvuma river. Until the time of the fieldwork, the crossing of the river depended mainly on unofficial local boats which were available during the dry season when the water level is low. Even after crossing the river, transport within the Niassa Game Reserve where villages are located and to the government offices in Niassa Province was unpredictable due to the absence of regular public transport. The Mozambican consulate in Dar es Salaam advised me to process research permit and organise for transport from Maputo. However, the time and budget available for fieldwork could not accommodate this plan. It is for this reason that I focussed mainly on the SNWC on the Tanzanian side. Despite this limitation, conclusions from the study and the thrust of the thesis were not compromised since the SNWC, which is an anchor project for the Selous-Niassa TFCA, is entirely on the Tanzanian side and it will not cross over to Mozambique because of the river which is an international border between the two countries. The net effect of changes on the Tanzanian side provided materials on which the impacts of the corridor could be understood.

1.17 Summary of chapters

This thesis is organised in seven chapters. As I indicated above, Chapter One is mainly concerned with the introduction of the research, the study area and the methodology used in data collection and analysis. Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework, which uses scale analysis and border literature to investigate bioregional processes. The main issues emerging from the scale literature include that scale is socially constructed as a result of struggles for power and control. The chapter discusses how scale re-arrangement produces new socio-physical and ecological scales that determine access to different kinds of nature. The chapter confirms therefore that the re-definition of scale alters the geometry of power. Furthermore, the chapter discusses how the construction of scale produces space and borders. Border studies show that borders are not simply lines or fences on the map or physical landscape but an act of power. Thus, new borders reflect the changing nature of sovereignty and they constitute physical and visible lines of separation between the social, political and economic spaces. The chapter links the scale and border literature as the basis for understanding bioregional processes that support TFCAs. Essentially, the chapter sets the basis for the investigation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA, the result of which is presented throughout chapter three, four, five and six.

Chapter Three examines how scaling process unfolds in Tanzania and the impacts that the process have had on the governance of natural resources. In particular, the chapter discusses the role of international conservation NGOs in institutionalising the Western view of Africa as pristine nature, how German and British colonial laws defined conservation agendas and determined rights and access to natural resource by Africans, and how these were later reproduced by post-independence policies. For example, relocations in Rufiji basin under colonialism restricted indigenous people's access to forest and wildlife resources in order to create the SGR as the first and largest protected area in Tanzania and currently one of the most famous hunting destination in Africa. The chapter also shows that the ideological and financial power of different international conservation NGOs facilitated the scaling up of national protected areas to the World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves, conditions that became central to the establishment of bioregions in the country. The

creation of bioregions in Tanzania, however, depended fully on the establishment of a new local scale, which becomes the focus of chapter four.

Chapter Four demonstrates that the implementation of the bioregional planning model in Tanzania required the creation of a new category of protected area in communal land herein referred to as WMAs. The creation of WMAs involved the rescaling of environmental governance through law and policy reforms that took place throughout the 1990s and 2000s, thus altering the scale and the style of environmental governance in the country. The chapter indicates further that key role players in facilitating governance reforms were international conservation NGOs, scientists and the business sector all of whom focused on WMAs as a conservation scale that could support the acquisition of communal land for the implementation of different bioregional projects in the country. Thus, the chapter presents WMAs as a new supra-village scale with a new governance structure. Furthermore, the chapter discusses how the scaling processes that establish WMAs are endemic to conflicts between different actors (conservation NGOs, the government and local communities) following the redefinition of power, rights and access to local natural resources. Notwithstanding these power issues, the chapter suggests that WMAs have presented a greater opportunity for the expansion and establishment of a network of protected areas using communal lands.

Chapter Five uses empirical data from southeastern Tanzania to derive the argument that WMAs are used to create the SNWC which is the main thrust of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Thus, the chapter provides evidence for the importance of the local scale in the construction of bioregions. The discussion in this chapter suggests that WMAs create a new space, namely, the SNWC. Thus, the SNWC override village and district land uses thereby creating new borders. Whereas WMAs establish CBOs as supra-village institutions, the SNWC has necessitated the creation of joint committees to oversee, among others, the cross-border conservation and economic activities. Based on this discussion, the chapter argues that the newly created supra-national space enhances wildlife welfare and opens up economic opportunities for private commercial activities while constraining local community use and rights to the area. Moreover, the chapter provides evidence that the German

government is the main actor that uses WMAs for the establishment of TFCAs with Selous-Niassa being the first terrestrial TFCA that involves Tanzania.

Chapter Six discusses in detail the impacts of the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA on local communities on the Tanzanian side. The discussion is based on the fact that land and wildlife in WMAs are protected by law leaving local communities with restricted access to the resources of the areas. The chapter proceeds to illustrate that while local communities experience loss of land, which is the basis of local livelihoods, customary rights to natural resources have been transformed into leaseholds for tourism hunting as the initial support for wildlife commercialization. Since these communities neither own the land and nor wildlife resources in it, they lack the power to negotiate for the benefits of wildlife commercialization in their villages. Taken as a whole, the chapter suggests that WMAs and the process that establishes the Selous-Niassa TFCA has resulted into rights reallocation and the disempowerment of local communities.

Chapter Seven provides the overall conclusion of the study. The chapter reflects on the main aim, specific objectives and the research questions that have guided the study. The discussion in this chapter is divided into three broad areas: the conceptual issues that supported the research process, issues emerging from the study and the contributions of the study to the research on TFCAs. On the conceptual framework, the chapter concludes that the scale and border framework as used to investigate the Selous-Niassa TFCA offers a useful analytical tool for understanding people-nature relations and for explaining power struggles over natural resources between different actors. The main finding of the study is that WMAs are a scale created to support the establishment of bioregions in Tanzania. In the case of this study, WMAs are used to create the SNWC, which is the core of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Contrary to the TFCA idiom of removing borders, the Selous-Niassa TFCA has generally promoted new borders. Overall, new protected areas and their borders have empowered the government and non-state actors while disempowering local communities in southeastern Tanzania.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORIZING BIOREGIONS: SCALE AND BORDERS IN TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the study, which draws on insights from scale and border literature. These insights are useful for analysing the process of constructing the bioregional scale and how, once it is constructed, it supports the creation of TFCAs. The chapter adopts the view that scale construction is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space (Rangan and Kull, 2009). The creation of space in turn implies setting new borders (Perkmann, 2007, Haywarda and Kerley, 2009). Proceeding from this view, the chapter analyzes ways in which bioregional borders are defined and how they also affect governance. The chapter is organised in four main sections. The first section argues for the importance of scale and border literature in the study of TFCAs as well as in political ecology. The second section presents border narratives and their usefulness to the analysis of bioregions and their impacts. Section three situates TFCA in the scale and border debates while section four analyzes the roles and interest of different actors in the construction of the bioregional scale.

2.1 Scale construction and its effects on governance

Concerns over scale and space are neither new nor are they restricted to geography alone. Other disciplines such as sociology and conservation biology have shown interest in issues related to scale. However, the question of scale for geographers has been topical ever since the institutionalization of the field (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, Haggett, 1965). In fact, the spatial and temporal scaling has been a conceptual and methodological problem for all other disciplines using geographical information (Harvey, 1996, Masson, 2006). Traditionally, scale has predominantly been a cartographic concept, where scale associates a map distance with the surface of the earth (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, Marston, 2000). This mathematical definition of scale gained general acceptance as a means of representing scale and remains the focus of cartography.

Further conceptualization of scale in the field of human geography associates scale with nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size – province, region,

continent - and different levels of analysis – local, regional, national and global – in which the investigation of political processes is set (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). The two notions treat scale as unproblematic, pre-given and a fixed hierarchy of bounded spaces (McCarthy, 2005, Marston, 2000, Howitt, 1998), the assumption that for a long time prevented geographers from investigating how scales are being continually reorganised. However, contemporary social theories emphasize that scale can better be understood dialectically than hierarchically. In addition to size and level, social science research has moved towards a relational conception, emphasizing the fact that scales are socially constructed through contingent political struggles (Howitt, 1998, Jessop, 2002, Brown and Purcell, 2005, McCarthy, 2005, Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). Accordingly, scale is continuously treated as a social construct rather than a concept guided by definitive law.

It is emphasized that scale is constructed through the political and economic processes of a societal system (Marston, 2000, Brenner, 2001, Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, McCarthy, 2005). Looking at capitalism, for instance, scale provides a vital geographical solution to the potential contradiction between expansion and centralization (Smith, 2004). Capitalism constructed scales and scale differences, and its uneven development is premised on the ability to construct and dismantle scales (Sheppard, 2002, Smith, 2004). Thus scale production becomes unquestionably a means for enabling capital accumulation (McCarthy, 2005, Brown and Purcell, 2005). Besides, political struggle is an ongoing process that makes scales and scalar arrangements strongly fluid and processual; scalar arrangements are being made and remade (Brown and Purcell, 2005). This supports the view that scale construction is a political process endemic to capitalism, the outcome of which is always potentially open to further transformation (Marston, 2000). Arguably, the intense interest in geographical scale from issues of the body to those of the globe is understandable a direct expression of the transformation of modern capital (Smith, 2004).

While attention must be paid to how each scale is constructed in a political struggle, it is important to examine how relations among scales are socially constructed (Brown and Purcell, 2005). Depending on the processes that produce scales and the purpose that they serve, different scales can be nested together by up-scaling and

down-scaling to produce a new scale that empowers a desired practice. In fact, the term glocalization characterises these re-scaling tendencies that change the importance and role of certain geographical scales, reassert the importance of others and sometimes create entirely a new significant scale (Perkmann and Sum, 2002, Swyngedouw, 2004a). In the glocalization process, new significant social and ecological scales become constructed while others disappear or become transformed. These scale re-definitions in turn alter the geometry of social power by strengthening the power and the control of some actors while disempowering others (McCarthy, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2004a). In the field of environmental science, for example, scalar re-configurations produce new socio-physical ecological scales that shape, in important ways, who will have access to what kind of nature, and the particular trajectories of environmental change (Swyngedouw, 2004b).

Studies on scale indicates further that modern societies cannot be described without recognizing them as having a fibrous, thread-like, capillary character, which is never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structures or systems (Smith, 2004, Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). Admittedly, Smith (2004) suggests that networks do matter in scale analysis because they are part of the politics of scale and the struggles for control over diverging spaces in the neoliberal world. These struggles may occur between scales or may involve operating on several scales simultaneously (Paasi, 2004, Adger et al., 2005, Bulkeley, 2005). For example, a local scale cannot be analyzed as a scale in isolation, it must be analyzed as it relates to other scales because the nation state is embedded within the global and the global is made up of the various national scales. Similarly, in contemporary globalisation events do not occur exclusively at one particular scale but across various scales simultaneously, making it difficult to assign causal priority to one scale over the others. As such, scale becomes the effect of networked practices (Legg, 2009). Focusing attention on one spatial scale will rarely be adequate for a full understanding of any multidimensional process. As a result, scale analysis should examine how the relationship among scales are continually produced, dismantled and re-produced.

Conceptually, social scientists need to understand scale and scalar relationships as the outcome of political agendas (Zimmerer, 2006, Smith, 2004). The analysis must,

then, address which political interests pursue which scalar arrangements. In fact, Smith (2004) suggests that in order to understand what outcomes a particular scalar arrangement will have, research must analyze the political agendas of the specific actors who pursue and are empowered by that scalar arrangement. The key is not the scalar arrangement itself, but the political, economic or ecological agenda of those who produce and benefit from it.

2.2 Scale in political ecology

According to Peet and Watts (1996), political ecology is a confluence between ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy. Robbins (2004) clarifies that although the term political economy has undergone extensive review from its early use in 1970s, a set of common elements remains; the relationship between political, economic and social factors with environment and changes. Accordingly, Robbins argue that political ecology is not only a body of knowledge but something that people do (Robbins, 2004). The discussion about scale in political ecology as used here relates to the question of how different actors use scale to make ecological change political through decisions and counter-decisions born by bureaucratic incentives, economic pressures and changing powers.

Rangan and Kull, (2009) demonstrates how environmentalists engage with the scale debate to make ecology the object of politics, policy making and political actions. Their common argument is that ecological and social change occurring in particular places should be understood as outcomes from the interactions of political and economic processes at local, national, and international levels (Peet and Watts, 1996). Hence, the ecological balance and good conservation practices will be the function of the scale of conservation. On the basis of the foregoing, views have emerged that large-scale conservation areas have the potential to maintain ecosystem balance while at the same time supporting human communities associated with conservation areas. The establishment of large-scale conservation areas has therefore been informed by different ideologies and practices, which originate from diverse disciplines. These ideologies include those supported by social movements, conservation biology and sustainable development paradigms.

Bioregionalism as a philosophy and social movement, argues for the conservation of small homelands. It originated primarily in North America but increasingly spread to Europe, Australia and other parts of the world where it has been used to find the balance between community livelihoods and the natural resources in their areas (Miller, 1996). It holds that the earth consists of contiguous but discrete organic bioregions where local and regional cultures are physically and symbolically rooted in the small units or homelands that are considered the most appropriate units for political organization (Aberly, 1999). As a social movement, bioregionalism is contingent on context and history, and on people's connections to place and the natural world. It is characterized by grassroots, 'bottom up' initiatives led by communities themselves with the devolution of power to local and regional bodies and the establishment of governance structures around bounded places (Aberly, 1999). It therefore rejects all forms of centralized authority (Fall, 2003, Wolmer, 2003b) and strongly argues for political autonomy, decentralized governance, grassroots empowerment, social equity and self-sufficiency. According to this philosophy a bioregion is a place defined by its life forms, its topography and its biota, rather than by human dictates; a region governed by nature, not legislature (Sale cited in Aberly, 1999).

In recent years environmentalists challenged the bioregionalism movement on the basis that problems such as global warming, loss of biodiversity and water resources cannot be handled at a small scale (Brunckhorst, 2000, Beresford and Phillips, 2000, Batisse, 1982). They suggest instead that bioregion should be made up of adjacent similar landscape ecosystems. This is on account of the fact that local human communities identify natural and cultural landscapes because of how they see them, and what these landscapes produces – whether mostly natural or through modifications to varying degrees (Brunckhorst, 2000). The concept presented here differs from the small, closed and self-sufficient community espoused in the grassroots bioregionalism movement (Wolmer, 2003a) and it advocates for large-scale bioregions where human communities and their resource use forms part of the landscapes. Arguments in support of large-scale bioregions are heavily drawn from the field of conservation biology.

Conservationists argue that effective conservation of biota that has extensive home ranges or migrates over large territories requires a landscape scale approach for survival (Forman and Godron, 1986, McGinnis, 1999). By this logic, it has been emphasized that contiguous and unfragmented habitats support ecological processes and meet the habitat requirements of keystone and indicator species (World Resources Institute (WRI), 2000). As a result, arguments in favour of conservation biology have suggested the expansion of conservation areas from protected landscapes (where natural environment, biodiversity conservation and ecosystem integrity have been the primary emphasis) to include cultural landscapes (where human history, cultural traditions, social values and aspirations are the primary emphasis) (Beresford and Phillips, 2000, Buggey, 2000, UNESCO, 1996).

The view advanced in the field of conservation biology on landscape conservation refutes the protected areas model that was meant to protect wildlife from human communities (Ramutsindela, 2004b). As it will be recalled, protected areas model created a dichotomy between natural and cultural landscapes. Nevertheless, there has been a twist of this ideology in the recent managerial approaches to embrace the view that, after all, many natural and cultural heritages are inextricably bound together (IUCN, 2008). Although this nature-cultural landscape concept is not new, the contemporary narrative has become important in supporting the elevation of the scale of management from protected areas only to include areas of human habitat. Different strategies have recently been used to bring this about. These include among others, the establishment and re-establishment of biodiversity corridors that cut across political borders. It is worth emphasising that although nature and cultural landscapes are unevenly distributed, efforts to unify them have mainly concentrated on cross-border areas. The analysis of whether bioregions must cross international borders to realise their potentials in conservation and economic development is beyond the scope of this research. It is apparent, however, that the focus on cross-border areas has formed an important step towards linking the international movements that support bioregions as part of conservation and development agendas. Bioregional planning approaches have led to the adoption of conservation policies that respond to the theories of environmentalism and sustainable development (De Villiers, 1999, Tarner, 2004, Van der Linde et al., 2001, Sandwith et al., 2001, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002).

Sustainable development is a central concept in the World Conservation Strategy published in 1980 (IUCN, 1980) and is also the foundation of the World Commission on Environment and Development that published the report on *Our Common Future*, setting out the global agenda for environmental management (Brundtland, 1987). These two documents underpin most contemporary thinking on sustainable development (Adams and Mulligan, 2003). A wide diversity of ideas have been supported by the concept of sustainable development including the concept of green developmentalism (McAfee, 1999, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Adams, 2001) and the commodification of nature (Harvey, 2004 cited in Liverman, 2004).

The two concepts advocate that conservation and the use of biodiversity can better be managed primarily by the market. It is argued, for instance, that nature's intrinsic value is a service, which can be valued in monetary terms (McAfee, 1999, Adams, 2001). Proponents of bioregional planning use this logic to emphasize that nature can be sold not only to save it but also to save human communities from poverty. Arguments for cross-border bioregions are strongly built on their potential to promote economic development (Hanks, 2003, Muruthi, 2005, Vreugdenhill et al., 2003, Van der Linde et al., 2001). Tourism investments are considered central to the achievement of this goal. In less developing countries and Africa in particular, this logic has gained support as it fits well into the conditions of poverty, which have become a common agenda for national and regional development strategies. It is on this basis that TFCAs have been advanced as a strategy for biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation in southern Africa, calling for the harmonization of national and regional conservation and tourism plans (www.sadc-dfrc.org; Katerere *et al.,* 2001; Ramutsindela, 2007). The implementation of these plans has involved activities that support, among others, the establishment of cross-border conservation areas. However, in the overall debate about the construction of scale, the space production is rarely explicitly reflected in the debate.

The construction of scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation occurs, so that a region is one scale in the social production of space (Smith and Dennis, 1987, Smith, 2004, Taylor, 1999, Rangan and Kull, 2009). This makes the emergence of scales and regions two sides of the process of spatial differentiation.

The scale literature and its application to conservation biology demonstrate that the process of constructing bioregional scale inevitably creates space and that the scale and space created are used to articulate relations, controls and representations of social and biophysical landscape (Rangan and Kull, 2009). As such, the role of the scale in producing space is what makes ecology 'political' (Rangan and Kull, 2009). The link between scale, regions and their borders is thus crucial for understanding cross-border projects (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, Newman, 2006), spaces of identity, inclusion and exclusion (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Marston, 2000, MacLeod and Jones, 2001, Newman, 2006) and schemes such as the rescaling of the economy and state (Brenner et al., 2003, McCarthy, 2005). In the following section I use border studies to demonstrate how, once constructed, bioregions necessitates border re-definition, which has potential impacts on power relations between different actors engaged in the creation and management of such areas.

2.3 Border narratives and their relevance to the analysis of bioregions

Bioregions should be understood as geographical spaces that, like any other spaces, have to be bounded. There are different narratives that explain bioregional borders. Ecologists claim that nature knows no borders. For this reason, bioregional borders are defined not by political jurisdictions but by the geographical distribution of ecological systems (Brunckhorst, 2000, Zbicz and Green, 1997, IUCN, 1982). In relation to the foregoing, arguments have been raised that African borders were artificially imposed to serve colonial interests rendering them irrational. This narrative suggests that imposed colonial borders separated African communities, interfered with ecological systems and have been the source of political instability in the region (Griffiths, 1986, Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Green and Paine, 1997, McNeely, 1993). It is therefore suggested that removing these borders by way of transcending them with ecological systems will restore ecological connectivity, encourage political integration and reunite human communities that were separated by colonial borders. By referring to the border communities and support for decolonization the two border narratives are politically appealing and have moral justifications. Consequently, the view has been shared widely among politicians and Pan Africanists, ecologists, tourism industry and border communities (Ramutsindela, 2007), rendering bioregions and their borders unproblematic.

Literature indicates, however, that various disciplines understand and treat borders differently. The term border has thus meant many things to different people, at different times. From the ecological and biogeography traditions, borders have, for a long time, meant physical limits inscribed in the landscape (Fall, 2003; 2005). In the social science perspective, borders are defined as a predominantly social phenomena linked to the organization of space and as constituting physical and invisible lines of separation between the social, political and economic spaces (Newman, 2006, Newman and Paasi, 1998). Accordingly, the role of borders in social science has been closely connected with the ideas of territory, territoriality and sovereignty (Fall, 2005). For example, political scientists consider borders as a reflection of the nature of power relations and the ability of one group to determine, superimpose and perpetuate lines of separation, or to remove them, and is contingent upon the political environment at any given time (Newman, 2006). For international lawyers, borders reflect the changing nature of sovereignty and the right of states to intervene in the affairs of neighbouring politico-legal entities (Kratochwil, 1986, Castellino and Allen, 2003). Yet, sociologists and anthropologists consider borders as indicative of the binary distinctions (us/them; here/there; inside/outside) between groups at a variety of scales, from the national down to the personal spaces and territories of the individual (Nadia, 1998, Fall, 2005, Newman, 2006).

The description of the meaning and role of borders as understood in social science suggest a consensus that all borders are socially constructed and that the creation of borders is an instrument of choice for new strategies of domination (Perkmann, 2007, Newman and Paasi, 1998, Newman, 2006). This understanding leads to the view that the creation of borders is not simply the drawing of lines on the map or the erection of fences in the physical landscape but an act of power (Newman, 2006, Fall, 2003, Agnew, 1994). Indeed, borders constitute institutions that enable legitimation, signification and domination, creating a system of order through which control can be excised (Blatter, 2003). It is on this basis that the attention should be paid to the border-producing processes. That is, the ways in which borders are demarcated and managed are central to the notion of a border as a process and institution. Therefore, the knowledge on the management of border regimes matter as it is the management that determines the nature of trans-border interactions. In other words, the demarcation and management of borders are closely linked to each

other. The former (the process of demarcation) determines the way in which the latter (the management of borders) is put into effect (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Fall, 2003).

Proponents of bioregions advocate for the removal of imposed political borders in favor of natural ecosystems. It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of geographical borders there are no '*natural borders*' as such (Newman, 2003). All borders are human made, delimited and demarcated by people. Natural objects such as mountains and rivers are only used as criteria to pre-determine a convenient cut-off point. This cut-off point is what falls into the trap of ecological fallacy (Newman, 2003). The impression created by ecologists that African borders are all marked by fences or objects that need to be removed to give way to natural borders is in contrast to the fact that borders are not necessarily physical – they can be invisible. In fact, African borders are not necessarily marked by fences (Ramutsindela, 2007) nor are bioregions without borders.

Studies on African borders establish that the European partition and the establishment of control over Africa split well-established lines of social communication into two or more colonies and later independent African successor states (Asiwaju, 1985, Griffiths, 1986, Ramutsidela, 1999, Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996). However, it is noted that many borders are defined in treaties and delimited on maps but are not demarcated on the ground. For example, Griffiths (1996) suggests that 45 percent of African borders follow rivers or watersheds while half of their lengths are straight lines, arcs of circles or are related to roads. In most cases, rivers and watersheds are small or seasonal and can easily be crossed on foot. Roads are also readily crossed. Overall, physical walls and fences are comparatively unusual type of borders in the modern world (Griffiths, 1996, Asiwaju, 2003). Therefore, African borders are permeable and border communities have tended to ignore the borders as dividing lines and carry on social relations across them as in days before the partition. From the viewpoint of border society life in many parts of Africa, the partition can hardly be said to have taken place (Asiwaju, 1985).

Problems associated with African borders and the state of instability in the continent have conditioned the emergence of the call to redefine African borders based on

African social realities and ecological systems (Ramutsidela, 1999, Asiwaju, 2003). As discussed earlier in this chapter, these realities and ecological systems are used to support the creation of bioregions across African borders. However, the removal of colonial borders will not necessarily leave Africa without borders. If the African map was to be redrawn based on socio-cultural relations and ecological systems, for example, new borders would emerge which are no less arbitrary in terms of both their origin and consequences (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996). Indeed, bioregions today are defined by new sets of borders, which are not represented as new in political discourse because they will have new meanings that can have far reaching political implications. Borders are thus perceived by people in places where no physical border exists. Equally, in places where physical borders exist they are ignored when they are perceived as being irrelevant to particular actions. It is advised, however, that to ignore changes in borders is, at best, to ignore the emerging meanings attached to the evolving cross-border spaces (Ramutsindela, 1998). It is against this background that borders remain inherently contradictory, problematic and their manipulations create power inequality.

2.4 Locating transfrontier conservation agendas in bioregional planning

The analysis of bioregions through scale and border literature is central to the focus of this study. As such, the harmonization of protected and cultural landscapes across frontiers require designing of international institutional structures to regulate environmental conservation and to support the cross-border flow of natural resources (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Sandwith et al., 2001, IUCN, 1994). In this regard, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that made environmental agenda a global mandate stands as a general framework. In addition, global conservation organizations have also included in their objectives the facilitation of the establishment of protected area networks and the link between these areas and the surrounding local communities as a mechanism for promoting landscape conservation (Interview, De Kock, 21/6/2007; Sandwith *et al*., 2001; Van der Linde *et al.,* 2001). Details of these organisations and their role in facilitating bioregional planning are provided in the subsequent section. The views of one of the founding members of PPF, Dr. John Hanks, confirm further that TFCAs are promoted within the bioregional framework. He states that;

> *….the longer I spent time in conservation in Africa the more I realised that those isolated protected areas will not survive on their own….the more we link them up into continuum network the better. The whole idea of TFCA is therefore to open international borders as much as possible to encourage cross-border tourism and for animals to move across those borders…As the theory of biogeography suggests, the bigger the area and the more there is connectivity the more likely you are to conserve biodiversity sustainably…* (Interview, Hanks, 11/5/2007).

More specifically, TFCAs in southern Africa are promoted for their potential to restore ecological connectivity through the re-establishment of wildlife corridors, and are said to foster economic development through tourism, peace and security through the encouragement of inter-state collaboration and also constitute a means of achieving the cultural unity of divided ethnic groups (Tarner, 2004, Van der Linde et al., 2001, Sandwith et al., 2001, De Villiers, 1999, Hanks, 2003, PPF, 1997). In practice, the re-establishment of nature-culture landscapes in southern Africa is facilitated through different strategies including the use of political platforms and governments as catalysts for policy reforms and institutional restructuring. Precisely, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been used as a launching pad for TFCAs in southern Africa and, in turn, TFCAs have been endorsed as a politically correct way of achieving the ambitious goal of African unity (Ramutsindela, 2007). At the grassroots level, nature-culture relationship is enforced through private and community-based conservation initiatives that are supportive of TFCAs. The later strategy advocates for among others, benefit sharing between protected areas and local communities. It is suggested that the involvement of the human component in the management of protected nature represents a win-win strategy between conservation and development. This builds into the wider view of TFCAs as an opportunity for economic development. The use of regional economic and political platforms has, therefore, facilitated the amalgamation of national parks, private and communal lands across political jurisdictions.

Critical research has raised questions about the motivations for TFCAs and the social and economic inequalities arising from them. Critics argue that the TFCA idea involves the re-colonization of the African countryside (Singh and Houtum, 2002, Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg and Wels, 2006) and that it is part of the on-going processes of globalization (Duffy, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2004b, Wolmer, 2003a). These criticisms are not without a basis. Consider for example that the green

developmentalism through which TFCAs are to realise their ambitions for economic development fall within the commodification of nature debate. Harvey (1996) defines commodification of nature as a strategy of accumulation by dispossession where states collude with capital to pillage nature and the commons. As a result, markets in environmental services become the dominant approach to managing and protecting the environment (Liverman, 2004). According to Harvey, (1996) the monetary valuation of nature appeals to the theory of markets, to the goal of maximizing utility and to the centrality of money as a common means to measure human desires and values of nature. Admittedly, to speak in money terms is to speak in a language, which the holders of social power appreciate and understand. Thus environmental economics becomes a pragmatic tool for getting environmental issues on the global monetary agenda. In essence, money as a form of social power has a certain asymmetry to it – those who have it can use it to force those who do not, to do their bidding (Harvey, 1996).

The commodification of nature has also become a topic of political and intellectual debate in the era of globalization. The main questions have remained on who makes environmental decisions and who has powers to negotiate and participate in the market? There are views that the move to sell nature and market its services is set to transform the human-environment relationships to serve the self-interests of the conservation constituency (Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Liverman, 2004). This constituency recognizes that the political economy of regions and landscape conservation are difficult to maintain in the face of objections by local people and their political leaders. As Ramutsindela (2007) warns, political and economic arguments for TFCAs represent a strategic alliance and a powerful tool for winning the confidence of national states that are striving to meet development obligations and for silencing local community resistance. Furthermore, there are views that the community-based programs have not, so far, been in favour of local communities (Songorwa, 1999, Dzingirai, 2004, Kideghesho, 2006, Adams, 2001) but have nevertheless become a strategy that brings communities and their political leaders onboard to support the establishment of TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007).

Experiences from the recently established TFCAs indicate that the reorganization of jurisdictional borders is rarely openly suggested and are replaced instead by the

need for partnership in the management of natural resources (Fall, 2003, Fall, 2005, Spierenburg and Wels, 2006, Singh and Houtum, 2002). This has serious implications on the initial role of the state as a guardian of biodiversity and its citizens in the sovereign territory. Whereas political jurisdictional borders are removed, new borders for TFCA are assumed and effective management structures become the automatic consequence (Wolmer, 2003b). Far from simply requiring ecologically appropriate size for biodiversity conservation, TFCAs present a project that has far wider political implications. In other words, TFCAs are not simply protected areas for biodiversity conservation but territories that are out of state bounds. Issues of ownership of these territories and the future of local communities within and around them remain vague. The analysis of these issues is carried out throughout this research as the basis for explaining the impacts of TFCA on border communities and national sovereignty.

2.5 Roles and interests of different actors in bioregional planning

The process of constructing a bioregional scale and, by implication TFCAs, is facilitated by a complex network of actors who use different but converging strategies. As discussed in the previous section, these strategies include the use of the economic aspects of nature as a means for achieving both conservation and development of local communities and states involved. Consequently, governments, NGOs, individuals and private companies with diverse interests have come together to facilitate the TFCA process. As the scale literature reveals, conservationists - including NGOs and social movements - invoke scale to negotiate the meaning and spatial extent of these areas, both among themselves and with government decision makers (Kurtz, 2003). In doing so, conservationists do not only create anew or align with variously defined scales of belonging, environmental damage or social justice, but they often engage with existing scalar fixes and with rescaling projects of dominant economic and political actors (Kurtz, 2003, Masson, 2006). Due to the multiplicity of actors involved in the same process, their diverse interests and ideologies coincide and diverge from time to time, causing contradictions and sometimes tensions and instabilities (McShane, 2003, Masson, 2006) but with traces of compromises (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). How this has taken place in the study area will be clear from the discussion below.

While the CBD remains the general framework for biodiversity conservation worldwide, two major organisations have, at different times, played a significant role in facilitating the construction of bioregions. These are the UNESCO and IUCN. In 1968, UNESCO held the first intergovernmental conferences to discuss biosphere conservation. During the same time, the IUCN developed the idea of combining conservation of cultural sites with those of nature. The two ideas were both presented to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. Eventually, a single text was agreed upon by all parties and the Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 16 November 1972 (www.whc.unesco.org/en/convention). By regarding heritage as both cultural and natural, the Convention deliberated the expansion of international activity on environmental issues. The two organisations implemented the convention complementarily to facilitate what represents bioregional planning today.

The UNESCO worked with two main programs. These are the World Heritage and Man and Biosphere Reserve (MAB). These programs provide an integrative tool and a strategic framework for land use management across jurisdictions which give UNESCO the mandate to monitor sites across landscapes and globally to the international network of biosphere reserves (Brunckhorst, 2000, UNESCO, 1996). Precisely, the World Heritage program uses the Convention of 1972 as an international legal instrument to identify, protect and conserve cultural landscapes that are designated as World Heritage Sites (Rossler, 2000, Breymeyer, 2000). Three categories of landscapes are used as operational guidelines. These are; landscape designed and created intentionally by humans (cultural), organically evolved landscapes (natural) and associative cultural landscapes (mixed). By April 2009, the UNESCO's World Heritage List had 878 properties (679 cultural, 174 natural and 25 mixed) in 186 State Parties (www.whc.unesco.org/en/convention).

The MAB program provides guidelines for the establishment of Biosphere Reserves. The Biosphere Reserve concept is based on a geographical zoning scheme, which comprises clearly delineated and legally protected *core areas, buffer zones and cooperation areas* (formerly transition zones) (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 2007). Thus Biosphere Reserves are defined as areas of terrestrial and coastal

ecosystems that promote solutions to reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with its sustainable use (UNESCO, 1995). Core areas are devoted to the protection of the environment and its biological diversity. Each core area is surrounded by a well defined *buffer zone* where only activities compatible with the conservation objectives may take place. To the extent possible, buffer zones should surround core areas, provide connectivity in the landscape via ecological corridors and meet their function as stand-alone polygons (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 2007). Buffer zones are surrounded by *cooperation areas* where new approaches to sustainable resource management initiatives and practices are encouraged, with the cooperation of the human population (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). Cooperation areas contain multiple land uses including forestry, agricultural activities, settlements and other human related land uses. As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the extension of a Biosphere Reserve into surrounding buffer zones and cooperation areas establishes a biogeographical region with sufficient size to promote conservation at a bioregional scale. It is alleged that only in these units it is possible to implement an environmental management that cut across large landscapes of different jurisdictions (Breymeyer, 2000, Batisse, 1993, Batisse, 2001, Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). By 2007, about 529 such reserves had been established in 105 countries and they form the world network of Biosphere Reserves (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 2007).

While the UNESCO made progress in establishing a bioregional model using Biosphere Reserves and World Heritage Sites, the IUCN developed a system of classifying protected areas in 1994. Protected areas were to be classified based on management objectives in order to redress differences in terminologies used around the world (Rossler, 2000, IUCN, 1994, Dudley, 2008). The IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas defined six categories of protected areas ranging from strict wilderness to managed resource protected areas. Table 2.1 presents the summary of these categories. The IUCN protected area categories system played a major role in coordinating standards, principles, practices and other recommendations for declaration and management of all kinds of protected landscapes. Notably, IUCN has retained the mandate to monitor and assess what is reserved irrespective of whether it is managed by the government, trusts, private individuals or institutions at national, regional and international levels (Green and Paine, 1997).

Figure 2.1 The bioregional planning model



Source: Adopted from Ajathi and Krumme, (2002: 149)

Table 2.1 The IUCN protected area categories

Protected Area Category	Definition
Category Ia	Strict Nature Reserve: protected area managed mainly for science
Category Ib	Wilderness Area: protected area managed mainly for wilderness protection
Category II	National Park: protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation
Category III	Natural Monument: protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features
Category IV	Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention
Category V	Protected Landscape/Seascape: protected area managed mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation
Category VI	Managed Resource Protected Area: protected area managed mainly for the sustainable use of natural ecosystems

Source: Dudley, (2008)

It is important to note that the current United Nations List of Protected Areas is classified according to IUCN's system of management categories (Green and Paine, 1997, Rossler, 2000). That is, in order to be listed, a site must adhere to the IUCN's protected area definitions. Many countries attach considerable political importance to the UN list. It is in the interest of the respective management agencies to ensure that their protected areas are listed, not least because they can qualify for financial assistance from international conservation agencies and avoid pressure from the same. This way, it has been possible for IUCN to build integrated bioregional management strategies that guides coordination, planning and management of buffer zones and other land uses around protected landscapes, which provides cross-jurisdictional consistency across state and international borders, private reserves and public lands (Brunckhorst, 2000). These management strategies have particularly been relevant for the establishment and management of cross-border protected areas.

As a strategy to reinforce the bioregional scale, the UNESCO's MAB program was reviewed in 1995 to match with the IUCN protected area categories. In a joint publication (Seville Strategy), the IUCN, UNESCO and the Australian Nature Conservation Agency agreed that the IUCN protected areas category system is not only compatible with the MAB program, but it can also inform the planning, management and effectiveness of Biosphere Reserves (UNESCO, 1996). As a result, the report made recommendations that strengthened the Biosphere Reserve model as fundamentally concerned with the whole landscape, whether inside or outside of protected areas. This means that the Biosphere Reserve would combine the protected natural landscape (IUCN's categories) and cultural landscapes (World Heritage's program).

Bioregional planning took advantage of multiple approaches, practices and the converging interests of IUCN and UNESCO. The harmonization of natural and cultural landscapes was a significant step in the construction of a bioregional scale (Breymeyer, 2000). In this scale, Biosphere Reserves could manage land uses and functional ecological flows across an entire landscape, which also includes a socio-economic dimension (Batisse, 1982, Brunckhorst, 2000, Laven et al., 2003). Today, TFCAs are firmly found on the bioregional scale. This explains the fact that TFCAs

extend far beyond designated protected areas, and can incorporate Biosphere Reserves, Cultural Heritage sites and a wide range of community-based natural resource management programs. Evidently, the majority of TFCAs around the world are both in IUCN categories I and II – the more strictly protected area categories - and a number of them are Biosphere Reserves and World Cultural Heritage Sites (Brunckhorst, 2000, Lamb, 2006).

The UNESCO and IUCN are important but not the only organisations involved in the bioregional planning processes. Other international development and conservation NGOs have historically operated independently but recently their agendas have converged to support the establishment of bioregions. For example, USAID - the principal agency of the United States in extending assistance to developing countries - funded the Biodiversity Conservation Program from 1989 to 2001 (www.usaid.gov/about_usaid). One of the major projects of the program was the development of trans-boundary natural resources management (TBNRM), which aimed at assessing processes, opportunities and constraints for international trans-boundary collaboration in Africa (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). Projects of other NGOs such as AWF whose main focus has been to secure land for the protection of African wildlife (www.awf.org) and the WWF that seeks to build a future where people live in harmony with nature (www.wwf.org) have collectively had a direct bearing on bioregional planning activities.

In 1999, these and other organisations initiated a strategic alliance of an umbrella organization of United States-based conservation NGOs with projects in Africa. Called an African Biodiversity Collaborative Group (ABCG), the alliance involves AWF, Conservation International, World Conservation Society/IUCN (WCS/IUCN), WWF and WRI (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The priority setting for conservation by the ABCG focuses on both regional and site-based scales. While WWF and Nature Conservancy works on the regional level, the AWF and WCS works on the site level (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The WCU/IUCN conservation guidelines are used in networking projects of individual organizations. Different activities of these organisations in Africa fit well and build into the IUCN and UNESCO bioregional model. For example, WWF facilitates the establishment of ecoregions - terrestrial or aquatic areas that are characterised by distinctive large or groupings of regional

landforms. These landforms represent the geographically distinct arrays of natural communities with similar environmental conditions and regional human activity patterns (Burgess et al., 2004, Ricketts et al., 1999, Brunckhorst, 2000). The CI's mission in Africa remains largely on supporting the protection of hotspots – areas of high biodiversity concentration. Among others, Nature Conservancy creates new protected areas and facilitate infrastructure planning in the regions of high biodiversity (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The WCS/IUCN supports the establishment of living landscapes - large wild ecosystems integrated within the wider landscapes of human influence as well as specific threatened species on site. The AWF works to establish African Heartlands - large landscapes of exceptional wildlife and natural value extending across states, private, and communal lands (African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), 2000, Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006, Burgess et al., 2004). In addition to the ABCG, the PPF works independently to establish TFCAs and TFPs in southern Africa. It is apparent from the above examples that different organizations work independently but they all focus on constructing bioregions of one type or another.

The similarities of activities and foci on cross-border areas by different international development agencies and conservation NGOs are remarkable but not entirely accidental. These actors and their activities form part of networks necessary for the construction of scale. As Legg (2009) argues, scales are not only planes at which processes operate but they can also present the size of networks. It is argued further that the (global) environmental governance represent a mosaic of spheres of authority within which different actors operate continuously, changing scale preferences, networks and alliances that link conservation and development agendas together (Büscher and Dressler, 2007). Views have also emerged that these networks and their scale effect reflect the environmentalist's underlying unity in what has come to be known as the greening of politics (Meyer, 1995, Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Adams, 2001). This line of thinking considers biodiversity conservation as mainly a buzzword used by different actors to compete for donor funding. In fact, critics from within environmental organisations suggest that ecological concepts such as ecoregions, heartlands, hotspots, landscapes, to mention a few, are scientific decorations but the marketing aspect is undeniably strong (Chapin, 2004, McShane, 2003). In practice, different ecological concepts

reflect priorities of different global financial institutions. Apparently, international laws, conventions and agreements to finance, coordinate, manage and facilitate the work of conservation organizations are closely linked to the same [global environmental] network thus making conservation and financial priorities part of one process.

International conservation NGOs forged the link between environmental protection and economic growth policies arguing that the two are not only compatible but directly dependant on each other. Precisely, the WWF, IUCN and UNEP produced the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, which became a landmark document that accentuated the relationship between conservation and development (Hails, 2006). Later in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) produced the Bruntland Report (*Our Common Future*) that framed discussions on conservation and development arguing that environmental issues are closely related with development policies and practices (Brundtland, 1987). The report insinuated that environmental goals and actions should be defined in relation to development objectives and policies.

Similarly, financial institutions which are, apparently, established by intellectual entrepreneurs hoped to gain control and influence over those seeking conservation funds following the changes in the global environmental outlook (McAfee, 1999). Notably, the World Bank underwent reorganization in 1987 that aimed at conforming to environmental portfolio and to establish new regulations to guide environmental assessments (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999). Following this new portfolio, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was founded in 1991 as a joint program of the World Bank, UNEP and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to provide funds for projects that focused on biodiversity (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999, McShane, 2003). As McAfee (1999) suggests, international conservation NGOs such as IUCN were insiders in the formation of GEF followed by others such as WWF, The Nature Conservancy, WRI, Biodiversity Action Network (BioNET), Climate Action Network and Environmental Defence Fund. The GEF envisaged the development of a portfolio that encompasses representative ecosystems of global biodiversity significance and it linked its instruments to the criteria such as levels of endemism and presence in global lists, which had been developed by IUCN and UNESCO

programs such as the Red List, Protected Area Categories, World Heritage Sites and Man and Biosphere Reserve (Boyle, 2003, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004). Embracing most of the CBD strategies for biodiversity conservation, GEF considered protected areas linked to their surroundings as the most important tool to achieve biodiversity conservation and ecological integrity (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004). Therefore, the GEF ecosystem conservation approaches ensured availability of funding and it accounted for the significant growth of conservation institution's interests in addressing conservation issues at the bioregional scale in the past three decades. In addition to the abovementioned actors, bilateral agreements between governments, development agencies and tourism companies have interest in bioregions in general, and in TFCAs in particular (see Chapter Five).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the process that constructs scale and how, once the scale is constructed, transforms space and necessitates the re-definition of borders. The analysis of literature supports that scale is not an independent concept but is limited to playing a role as handmaiden to the more important concepts of regions and space production (Howitt, 1998). The re-definition of scale and space becomes an act of power which causes power disequilibrium. Therefore, the transformation of space through scaling processes is neither neutral nor is it innocent with respect to practices of domination and control (Harvey, 1996). Scale and border literature as used in this study is therefore crucial for understanding the emerging issues of power geometry in conservation agenda. As Spierenburg and Wels, (2006) warns, power is about space and space is created through the exercise of power. The chapter reveals also that bioregional scale is supported by a complex network of actors who converge to facilitate transformations but nevertheless maintain control over different ecological spaces. This network and the powers embedded in it does not only jeopardise the role and powers of state governments as the proprietor of natural resource in their sovereignty but also becomes the root cause of local community's marginalisation. In the next chapter, I analyze the ways in which the scaling processes unfold in Tanzania and how they support the establishment of bioregions and their new governance across the frontiers.

CHAPTER THREE: COLONIAL POWER, CONTESTED NATURE AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION IN TANZANIA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the institutional organization, policies and laws that govern the protection and utilization of natural resources in Tanzania. The main objective of the chapter is to provide the basis for analysing the processes that support the construction of bioregions in southeastern Tanzania. The chapter demonstrates that the colonial vie of Africa as a pristine nature coupled with the economic importance of wildlife resources to the political economy of the colonial administration led to the establishment of laws that re-defined rights, access and modality of use of African wildlife resources. Hunting is used as an example of the contested use of African wildlife that stimulated debates culminating into laws that established protected areas. These colonial laws excluded natives' rights and framed natural resources as the property of the Empire, which required protection from destruction by Africans. The chapter attests also that the political transformation from colonial to independent government was dominated by Western conservation lobbyists who retained their influence over African wildlife as expatriates, tourists and sponsors of conservation projects. I argue further in the chapter that, the dominance of Western conservation thinking, political and financial powers of ex-colonialists and international institutions derive changes that support the establishment of new conservation scales and continue to determine access and right of resource use by Africans in the newly established conservation areas. The chapter demonstrates how the independent government inherited colonial conservation policies that continue to promote nature protection at the expense of local needs.

The discussion in this chapter is organised into four sections. Section one examines colonial conservation policies and laws and how the political economy of the colonial masters influenced practices in southeastern Tanzania, particularly in the Rufiji basin where the SGR is presently located. Section two focuses on the role of individuals and conservation organisations in defining conservation agendas for the colonies in Africa and how the collective work of these actors resulted in the current laws that govern the establishment of large-scale conservation areas in Tanzania. Section three presents the organizational structure of the management of natural resources

in Tanzania after independence while section four demonstrates how different actors participate in changing global environmental outlook to influence institutional structures that provide support for the ongoing establishment of bioregions.

3.1 The politics of nature control in colonial Tanzania

Political history often informs contemporary government policies and Tanzania is no exception (Barrow et al., 2000, Goldstein, 2005). The country's governance history is founded on two colonial regimes. The first was the German East Africa colonial regime which included Tanganyika (now Tanzania[1]), Burundi and Ruanda. This regime started when the Berlin Conference partitioned the African continent in 1884. After the First World War (WWI) in 1919, Burundi and Ruanda territories were transferred to Belgium and the Tanzania part of the colony was transferred to Britain as a mandate by the League of Nations. Both colonial regimes formulated laws that governed the administration of the colony in general and the control of natural resources in particular, each with differences that related to the specific economic and political objectives of the imperial government. Essentially, land was renounced the property of the Empire throughout the colonial period and natural resource control meant circumscribing native rights of access to fertile agricultural lands, game, forests and use of their products. Throughout colonial rule, African livelihood strategies were outlawed; collection of fuel wood became encroachment and theft, hunting of animals became poaching and pasturing cattle became grazing trespass (Chachage, 1988, Kideghesho, 2006, Goldstein, 2005, Adams and McShane, 1996). However, colonial laws recognised professional forestry and hunting became a white man's game (Ylhäisi, 2003, Sunseri, 2003, Neumann, 1998, Chachage, 1988).

3.1.1 German colonial rule and the local political economy

The history of conservation in Tanzania starts from the southeast along the coast of the Indian Ocean around Rufiji basin where the present SGR is located (see Map 3.1). In 1874 - ten years before German colonial rule began in East Africa - the British officer Frederic Elton had visited the southeastern coast of Tanzania and noted the presence of forest and wildlife resources and their commercial importance

1 For the purpose of consistence, Tanzania will be used to refer to the former and present name of the country.

to the dwellers of the Rufiji delta (Sunseri, 2003). The Rufiji people obtained a wide variety of forest products, including wax, rubber, ivory, mangroves, and large quantities of copal to trade with Indians and Arabs who settled on the coast. During this time the entire Rufiji delta was occupied by local ivory and rubber traders. Trade, particularly on ivory, had been there since the tenth century when Arabs moved to the southeastern coast of Africa that included Mombasa, Bagamoyo, Lindi, Kilwa and the Island of Zanzibar (Toit, 1951). Professional hunters, Indian merchants and trading companies from Europe and America provided capital to furnish caravans to exchange clothes, beads, wire, guns and powder for copal, ivory, and rubber in the interior (Gißibl, 2006, Adams and McShane, 1996, Majamba, 2001).

Figure 3.1 The location of the present Selous Game Reserve in the Rufiji Basin



Source: Illife, (1967: 496)

When the German explorer Carl Peters appeared on the scene in 1884, ivory trade was still the most lucrative export commodity along the Indian coast followed by copal and rubber (Monson, 1993, Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1967). Peters learned that the

land from the coast across the interior was suitable for colonisation and hurried to sign false treaties with local chiefs while at the same time establishing the Society for German Colonisation (DOAG). The DOAG was initially established to control the southeastern coastal trade routes (Stoecker, 1987, Meritt, 1978). However, the German government granted an imperial charter to DOAG in 1885 to support the expansion of the territory to different directions (Toit, 1951). In 1891, the German government took over the administration of the territory acquired under the DOAG in southeastern Tanzania.

The analysis of early accounts of Rufiji basin in southeastern Tanzania before and during colonial administration suggests that wildlife and forest resources in the area that includes the present SGR had since been contested. The local economy in the Rufiji basin that included Lindi, Liwale and Rufiji districts depended on trade of nature-based commodities (Figure 3.1). The region teemed with elephants that maintained their habitats in the forests. The basin was thus famous for its wildlife and attractive hunting ranges, water catchments and a bay that offered an outlet to the Indian ocean (Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1979). In the struggles to compete with the established European and Indian traders for ivory, German rule in East Africa used DOAG Concession Company to expand the state control over forest as a strategy to take over the coastal trade in forest products (Sunseri, 2003). By 1900 thousands of hectares of mangrove forest in the Rufiji delta had been put under firm state control and Rufiji was in effect designated as a wood reserve for the capital city of Dar es Salaam (Sunseri, 2003, Ylhäisi, 2003, Chachage, 1988). During this time, the governor leased forests to German business companies interested in marketing mangrove logs to Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, and South Africa, and enlisted German chemical firms as buyers of mangrove barks for leather dye (Ylhäisi, 2003).

The first colonial legislation was instituted to protect wildlife in 1891 followed by the forest law of 1893. These laws were important since they empowered the government to designate reserves for hunting and forest exploitation. Furthermore, the two laws gained more power with the establishment of the Crown Land Ordinance in 1895. Specifically, the Crown Land Ordinance marked the start of the colonial state-regulated resources whereby the ownership of occupied and unoccupied land in the colony became the property of the German Empire with only

right of use granted to indigenous occupants (Kideghesho, 2006, Goldstein, 2005). Obviously, the control of land, the most important resource for the local people, could only be legitimised for use by the imperial government. This meant also that it would be possible for the government to demand alienation of local people in useful areas at any time (Sunseri, 2003). The most important of these lands, from different viewpoints, remained forests, game, water sources and agricultural lands (Neumann, 2002, Kideghesho, 2006, Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1967, Chachage, 1988). Using the Crown Land Ordinance, the colonial government created forest and wildlife reserves followed by the formulation of other specific laws for the protection of specific resources against the natives (Barrow *et al.*, 2000).

The Wildlife Ordinance was instituted in 1896 and became a licence for the establishment of the first hunting reserves. Among others, the Rufiji delta and a one hundred mile stretch of coastal mangroves was designated a forest reserve in 1904 (Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1967). Further in 1905 part of the Rufiji basin in Muhoro - also known as Kisaki - was set aside as the first hunting reserve (Baldus, 2001). Although written records give little indication of the time of the establishment of other hunting reserves, Matzke, (1976) reports that by 1912 three more such reserves had been designated around the Rufiji basin. These reserves are Mtetesi in the south, Matandu in the southeastern and Mahenge in the west (Matzke, 1976) (see Figure 3.2). This means that the first hunting reserves in Tanzania were concentrated along the Rufiji basin near Liwale and Lindi districts (Baldus, 2001). With the developments around Rufiji basin, the German East Africa Corporation controlled wildlife and forest exploitation and occupied all main coastal trading ports. African rights of access to forest and wildlife resources were thus severely circumscribed (Sunseri, 2003). Restricted access to resources coupled with colonial agricultural and labour policies that imposed levy head taxes and forced labour triggered the movement against colonial oppression that resulted into the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905. Indeed, the Rufiji basin became the first unit of Maji Maji rebellion that lasted for two years (1905-1907) (Illife, 1967). As the sections below will demonstrate, most of the Maji Maji war sites turned out to be unsettled and thus ideal for the expansion of wildlife reserves (Rodgers, 1976, Neumann, 2001).

Figure 3.2 Hunting Reserves in the Rufiji Basin



Source: Adopted from Matzke (1976: 30)

The concentration of activities in the southeastern Tanzania during the early years of the German colonial administration suggests that the control and exploitation of natural resources was a matter of urgency and the main motive for the occupation of the area by the first German explorers. Indeed, far from simply protecting nature, reserves provided a mechanism for control of people and critical resources of the

Empire (Sunseri, 2003). Although conservation politics suggest that ivory exports from mainland Tanzania declined sharply with the assumption of formal German rule in 1891 (Iliffe, 1979, Baldus, 2001), this explanation ignores the fact that until 1894 ivory accounted for half the value of all exports from the German colony (Iliffe, 1979, Gißibl, 2006) and that southern Tanzania was still the major conduit for the export of elephant and ivory (Koponen, 1994). It is important to note too that state-regulated access to forest and wildlife resources did not restrict hunting by military and colonial administrative workers and they did not put strict rules for sport hunting (Bonner, 1993). These rules were rather sought to clear reserves of natives by holding their multifaceted sources of local livelihoods; gathered food in times of famine, location of wild rubber, honey, wax, ivory, and game for cash economy as well as spiritual sites. Deprivation of resources coupled with hunting bans brought the famous ivory trade to an end for natives but not for white hunters (Neumann, 2002, Chachage, 1988).

3.1.2 Conservation in British East Africa

The expansion of protected areas characterised conservation activities throughout the British East Africa that included Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. As it was with German administration, land and natural resources remained the property of the Crown (Gißibl, 2006, Neumann, 2002, Goldstein, 2005, Matheka, 2008). The British government in Tanzania (1919-1961) gazetted all hunting reserves that German administration had created and enacted the Game Preservation Ordinance in 1921 to support the designation of more land for protection. In Kenya and Uganda, major changes were also made in the game departments including the establishment of controlled hunting areas and national parks (Matheka, 2008, Himmelfarb, 2006). Essentially, conservation under the British colonial government was influenced by two main issues; firstly, changes in the global political economy following the impacts of the two world wars and secondly, the emergence of conservation lobbyists who worked to influenced decisions made by the colonial administration.

Illife (1979) argues that in the period following the WWI, political and economic trends changed the content, implementation, and enforcement of wildlife and national park laws in East and Central Africa. The economic depression following the WWI had shown that investments in guiding impoverished colonies could serve the

long-term market demands of the Empire. Linked to this was the rising importance in Africa of the scientific experts in agriculture and natural resources management, particularly wildlife conservation (Drummond, 1972, Neumann, 2002). Notwithstanding the economic motive behind wildlife conservation, the British government had pressure to respond to the alarm on the decline of African wildlife numbers which were mostly raised by people who happened to be members of the British and Europe's aristocracy (Neumann, 2002, Epstein, 2006, Beinart, 1990, Goldstein, 2005, Gißibl, 2006, Adams and McShane, 1996). Apparently, these individuals had, since 1900, formed an independent Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE) that had powers to lobby and influence the colonial office on the policy content and modalities of their implementation in Africa (Prendergast and Adams, 2003, Gißibl, 2006, Epstein, 2006).

Post WWI period experienced the emergency and increased importance of international conservation organisations in setting and implementing the agenda for national park and wildlife conservation (Levine, 2002, Neumann, 2001, Epstein, 2006). Indeed, this period was critical in the history of conservation policies that, for many, represented the scramble for African wildlife (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Levine, 2007, Honey, 1999, Bonner, 1993). Notably, controversy and inconsistency surrounded the issue of the state of African wildlife population throughout the British colonial period. The controversy was on two issues; whether there was a decline of African wildlife as reported by members of SPFE; and the appropriate strategies to deal with the problem (if there was any). The SPFE - mainly an elite group of nature scientists and experienced game hunters - reported unprecedented decline of population in African wildlife due to the careless native slaughter while the British territorial government disputed these reports based on the field administration reports and first hand experiences (Neumann, 2002). Nevertheless, the government created more protected areas and strengthened the control and management of wildlife, which constrained the future of native hunting while creating more favourable regulations to allow sport hunting that could bring money to the territory (Kideghesho, 2006, Gißibl, 2006, Majamba, 2001).

The Game Preservation Ordinance was then followed by the establishment of the Game Department in 1921, the designation of Ngorongoro Conservation Area and

Serengeti Game Reserve in 1928 and 1929 respectively (Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, 1995). In the southeastern Tanzania, the Rufiji basin was still a stronghold of elephants and 'it had a sentimental interest of having within it the grave of the British great hunter Frederick Selous' (Hingston, 1931: 412). The four hunting reserves established by the German colonial administration were merged in 1929 to create larger area that could accommodate the growing number of elephants (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1998). Details of these changes and how they built into the present SGR are provided later in Chapter Five. Elsewhere in the country five game reserves (Ruvu-Masai, Mkomazi, Rungwa, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru) were gazetted in 1951, and Uwanda and Biharamulo in 1959. In addition, Game Controlled Areas were established countrywide in 1946 and divided into hunting blocks for professional hunters and their tourist clients (Graham, 2005). Throughout the British colonial period, therefore, laws permitted hunting in the game reserves and game controlled areas. With the exception of Serengeti National Park, which was gazetted in 1951, the government did not gazette national parks until 1960, a year before independence when Lake Manyara and Arusha (formally Ngurdoto) National Parks were established.

3.2 African wildlife contestation: the role of almighty hunters

There is a growing body of literature which suggests that the space of interaction in the protection of nature in Africa was first created by a web of individuals and organizations who were at different times involved directly or indirectly in wildlife expeditions, business and later as conservationists (Chachage, 2000, Gißibl, 2006, Neumann, 2002, Bonner, 1993). Ivory, the commodity that could only be procured at the expense of elephants, made elephants the main target for tourists and business but also the main focus of wildlife experts and conservationists throughout the colonial period (Gißibl, 2006). Indeed, the early outcry of extermination of African wildlife mostly made reference to elephants so were the nature protection measures that followed. Literature suggests also that the idea of Africa as a symbolic Eden stimulated Western interests in African conservation before and throughout the colonial time and it strongly influenced the practices in nature conservation today (Adams and McShane, 1996, Bonner, 1993, Ramutsindela, 2007, Neumann, 1998). I draw examples from early explorers in the African continent that interpreted the

environment in the context of Western civilization and maintain deceptive views of the relationship that existed between nature and African societies.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Western professionals and sport hunters produced rich literature that sparked scholarly attention and influenced laws that led to the preservation of some wild animals as part of the wider conservationist initiative[2]. Some of the popular accounts of early expedition literature include *A Hunters Wanderings in Africa (1881)*, *Sport and Travel, East and West (1900)* both authored by the British explorer and hunter Frederick Courteney Selous; the *Five Years of Hunter's Life in the Far Interior of South Africa (1850)* by the Scotsman hunter Roualeyn Gordon Cumming; the *African Game Trails* (1910) authored by Theodore Roosevelt, the twenty-sixth President of the United States (1901-1909). Indeed the account of African expedition by these and other hunters is well documented in museums, novels, electronic databases as well as in academic literature. It is reported, for example, that by the time of his death in 1917, 'Selous had in his *bag* thirty-one lion, at least two hundred buffalo and a large number of elephants' (Adams and McShane, 1996: 27). In the Roosevelt's trip in 1909, 'over five hundred animals were shot' (www.nationmaster.com/Frederick-Selous). Moreover, Cumming claimed to have short hundreds upon hundreds of elephants, impala, rhino and wildebeest among others in his career (Adams and McShane, 1996). Notwithstanding this massive slaughter European hunters received recognition for their contribution to science that shaped ways in which wildlife protection could be carried out in colonial Africa. For example, Selous was awarded the Royal Geographical Society Founders medal in recognition of his work in African wildlife and the SGR was named in his honour (Bonner, 1993, Adams and McShane, 1996). Currently Selous is described as 'the largest game reserve in the world' (Baldus, 2001) and among the 'best hunting destinations in Africa' (Interview, Wayner, 4/9/2008).

Drawing on the experience acquired from African exploration, Western individuals and links to their institutions played a major role in influencing colonial governments

2 See for example Bonner, (1993): At the Hand of Man; Beinart, (1990): Hunting and Ecological Change in Southern and Central Africa, Chachage (1998): Nimrods and Thomas Cooks: Accumulation and Tourism in Tanzania, Adams and McShane (1996): The Myth of Wild Africa.

on matters of wildlife. For example, through their organised publications they managed to undermine African hunting and persuade colonial governments on the matter (Bonner, 1993, Beinart, 1990). Views held by this group dominated conservationist thinking in most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and they form global environmental laws that operate today (Epstein, 2006, Neumann, 2001). For example, the reports that expressed concerns over the decline of wildlife in East Africa was one of the major reasons that prompted British and German colonial offices to organize an international conference to discuss matters related to the protection of African Wildlife. The conference for the 'Preservation of Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa' was held in 1900 in London. The colonial offices in London and Berlin agreed on the conference resolutions, which developed international standards that were in line with the London Convention. In particular, the convention included the idea of establishing a closed hunting season, protection of some animal species, particularly elephants, and banning of African hunting techniques such as use of nets, snares, traps and pits (Kideghesho, 2006, Neumann, 2002). Since colonies and their administration were fully integrated into the international system, the London Convention remained a critical document that framed African wildlife as imperial heritage that required preservation and it laid down international standards on the establishment of national parks. As such, the conference was the first step towards the establishment of rules that internationalised African wildlife (Epstein, 2006, Gißibl, 2006).

In 1903 - three years after the London Convention - conservationists organised themselves through the London-based SPFE and published the *Journal of the Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire* (the precursor of *Oryx*) that largely authored accounts of hunting trips in the Empire and editorials against African hunting (Gißibl, 2006, Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993, Neumann, 2002). Despite all the damages caused by the hunting expeditions of the members of the society and other hunters, this literature labelled African hunting as the cause of wildlife extinction, thus captivating the imagination of Westerners who sympathised with conservationists. More importantly, the literature put pressure on colonial governments, which had been mandated to protect wildlife of the Empire. Nevertheless, the British colonial governments were far from united in the interpretation of the dangers caused by native hunting as raised by the society (Neumann, 2002). Yet, the SPFE became the

most active conservation lobbyist group in the British Empire that later won the support of the colonial offices in London and Berlin (Epstein, 2006). Specifically, in 1930 the Secretary of States for British colonies approved the SPFE's mission to visit the East African group of colonies to discuss the future policy regarding African wildlife, and particularly, on the establishment of national parks (Hingston, 1931). The SPFE entrusted Major R.W Hingston whose report accented the importance of protecting African wildlife in the following words:

> *The most wonderful thing in Africa is its animal life. It has probably been the wildlife more than any other factor, which has been responsible for attracting the Englishmen to Africa and establishing in our colonies a white population. Its disappearance through any shortsightedness or neglect would be a deplorable calamity...Native hunter cares nothing about trophies, species or sex, nor does he hunt for the fun of the thing. What the native want are as many animals as possible for the purpose of either meat or barter* (Hingston, 1931: 406).

Hingston proposed the scheme of national parks in British East Africa that included Selous, Serengeti and Kilimanjaro in Tanzania and the South-Central African National Park in the border between Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). The report and the proposed scheme for national parks in Africa coincided with the Society's international conference held in London in 1933 (Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993). Part of the conference resolution saw the establishment of the International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN) in 1934. The SPFE, which is referred to as the world's first conservation society played a key role in establishing most of the international conservation organizations including the IUCN, WWF, and the CITES Convention (www.fauna-flora.org). Collectively, these organizations influenced nature protection throughout Africa during and after independence. Before demonstrating how these organizations influenced wildlife protection in Africa, the section below links the London politics, responses and impacts on Tanzania's SRG.

3.3 London politics and the management of the Selous Game Reserve

Although the British colonial office in London signed the Convention for wildlife protection in 1900, rules of the convention were loosely applied in the East African group of territories. In fact, Neumann, (2002) argues that the East African territory offices signed the Convention in 1935. Thus, little attention was paid to the national

park proposal and the native hunting restrictions with the exception of elephants. Colonial officers in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia maintained a view that reports on the decline and wildlife population in their territories were far from the reality thus native hunting, albeit controlled, continued to be an important economic activity. Correspondence within game department offices in Tanzania suggests that both SPFE and the colonial office in London had overrated the issue of decline in wildlife numbers because the game department was dealing with problems related to the increased wildlife population. Examples of such correspondences from the Tanzanian National Archives (hereafter Tanganyika Notes and Records (TNR) include that of 13 March 1942 where the Southern Provincial Commissioner reported to the Arusha Game Warden about elephant problems in SGR saying;

> *...the measures to protect crops from marauding elephants are no longer sufficient. The most fertile valleys outside the reserve in Milola, Kahungutwa, Mangi, Lijundu, Ndapata and Mbindera suffer to an increasing extent from the marauding elephants. Game scouts, several of whom, have been doing a very stout and hard job in this district for several years. It is no longer merely a matter of scaring off elephant at night, but a perpetual day and night warfare, with unprotected African a clear loser...* (Tanganyika Notes and Records (TNR), 1942).

Notwithstanding the overrated loss of wildlife, the government was still compelled to create protected areas for two reasons; firstly, tourism - particularly sport hunting - was still targeted for economic recovery of the British Empire and the running of the colonies. Besides, game departments had been overwhelmed by the wildlife protection task that involved the use of game rangers in crop protection against raiding elephants. To deal with the problem, the department instigated the need to confine the expanding population to exclusive reserves. The second reason, however, was the necessity for land for agricultural schemes in connection to the increased demand for food both in Britain and in the colonies following the impacts of the Second World War (WWII) (Neuman, 2001). Confining wildlife in the reserves was thus to open up fertile areas for crop production.

As part of the solutions for the increasing wildlife numbers in SGR the game department embarked on the reserve expansion project. In a letter dated 8 November 1933, the Tanganyika Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam office ordered the Southern Provincial Commissioner A.V Hartnoll to expand the western area of

Selous in Ulanga and Songea districts. However, Hartnoll expressed dissatisfaction with the decision to expand the reserve in the letter dated 12 January 1937 saying: '*after visiting and discussing the matter with the Ulanga district officer (Mr. Culwick) and the game ranger (Mr. Arundell), I have come to the conclusion that a sufficient case has not been made to justify the alteration of the present boundary*' (TNR, 1937). This response bears the testimony that decisions for the expansion of the reserve were not based on the local needs. In practice, there were no threats to wildlife when demands for expansion were raised. Nevertheless, cases were made that deliberated the expansion of the reserve throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

Conditions were created to justify the displacement of local people in the present SGR. However, these conditions were not necessarily related to the threats posed by African hunting as suggested by European wildlife activists but were part of the scheme that sought to concentrate the control of wildlife in a single land unit. One of the conditions used to create areas devoid of people was the spread tsetse flies and sleeping sickness. Kjekshus (1977) and Iliffe (1979) report that elephant control schemes encouraged the expansion of bush lands and, by implication, the spread of tsetse flies in the most fertile valleys. The increased elephant numbers and tsetse flies eliminated possibilities for cultivation and settlement which became the basis for the relocation of people. This way, more land was secured and wildlife borders were re-defined to include areas that had been farms and settlements in the SGR. Based on the elephant concentration objectives, some reserves were abolished while others were designated.

The Mtetesi game reserve in the southern Selous was abolished in 1940 and a new reserve was created north of Mtetesi in Njenje-Mbarangandu-Luwegu area. Inhabitants of the newly established reserve were concentrated elsewhere as an anti-sleeping sickness measure, and therefore dropped out of the reserve picture (TNR, 1941). Later in 1944 the Provincial Commissioner, game officers and sleeping sickness surveyor deliberated the extension of the eastern borders of the reserve that would consequently eliminate Liwale district. It was resolved that; *'the concentration of the bulk population of Liwale in three centres at Ngarambi, Muhinji Chini and Namatele Valley will leave this area empty, which will lead to a great increased chance of introducing sleeping sickness into the areas. This area will then*

be included in the reserve for easiness of elephant control' (TNR, 1944). Further in 1947, decisions were made to extend the northern borders of the SGR in Rufiji district and the sleeping sickness measures were used to evacuate more people in Mpanga and Mkindu areas to a site in Ndundu valley (TNR, 1947).

Wildlife protection in SGR was supervened by the proposal put forward by the Overseas Food Cooperation (OFC). As such, OFC proposed to withdraw from the reserve areas that had agricultural potential. Apparently, game officers who had, in different times, expressed dissatisfaction with the decision to expand the reserve merely for the sake of protecting wildlife, welcomed this proposal. For example, the Southern Provincial Commissioner had expressed in a letter dated 24 October 1935 that;

> *'I shall be grateful if that portion of the reserve may be altered. The reason for this request is that the area desired to acquire from the reserve is very valuable rice and cotton land. Many natives would settle and produce in the area if marauding game could be kept behind the proposed new line'* (TNR, 1935)

Writing to the Selous game warden on 25 October 1935, the Commissioner proposed that the portion of the western Selous in Mahenge district be altered to the east to acquire from the reserve twenty five square miles of land which was valuable for rice and cotton schemes. This plan was to encourage natives to settle and cultivate in the area. In response to this proposal, the Chief Secretary's recommendation was succinctly that; *'the Kilosa-Ifakara road between Ruaha and Msolwa rivers be accepted as a boundary rather than twenty five square miles. After all a mile or two in the great area of the SGR is no great consequence to wildlife*' (TNR, 1938). In 1948, the OFC identified more areas in the eastern Selous in Liwale district for a groundnuts scheme thus limiting the possibility to include areas of the district in the reserve as proposed earlier. In responding to one of the many appeals, the agricultural officer maintained that,

> *...it is clear to my mind quite impossible to pledge any large areas of virtually unoccupied land as a game reserve if it should ultimately prove possible to grow groundnuts. Moreover, I do not really feel that the game department has any overwhelming claims to this large area of land*… (TNR, 1948).

Two main issues are quite clear from the above discussion; Firstly, that throughout the official communication, no mention whatsoever is made of other wildlife species but elephants and rarely rhinoceros. In most cases, proposals for expansion were based on the assumption that the reserve was too narrow to afford protection to the growing elephant population. As the communication between the Southern Provincial Commissioner and the Game Warden supports, wildlife laws were to be changed to afford elephants more protection;

> *'…an order be made under Section 14* (of the Game Ordinance, 1940) *to declare certain species of game animals other than elephant and rhinoceros as vermin in a defined and demarcated area…The extension to the Selous was made primarily for elephants, therefore, such an order would allow the reserve to fulfil its function'* (TNR, 1942).

This is a testimony that the outcry in London about African wildlife extinction was, apparently biased towards elephants and it did not match the local realities. The situation in the neighbouring colonies was not different. Mathake (2008) reports, for instance, that by the late 1950s district councils in many parts of Kenya were bombarded with reports of elephant depredations from the local chiefs and that it was not a new development but the problem was at its height. As Abensperg-Traun, (2009) argues, threats that Africa's wildlife populations would become almost completely extinguished have proved unfounded. On the contrary, the core protected areas can no longer accommodate wildlife populations. In South Africa, for example, 80% of the potential elephant range is outside protected areas, and in Botswana, 60% of its elephants live outside protected areas while in Zimbabwe, some 10,000 elephants reside in communal lands (Abensperg-Traun, 2009). It is this growth in wildlife population that has necessitated the expansion of protected areas and the use of community and private lands as buffer zones and wildlife corridors (Gallo *et al.*, 2009).

The second observation relates to the fact that the expansion of protected areas meant alienation and relocation of dwellers of land whose livelihoods depended on hunting and farming. For example, about 40,000 people were evicted from Rufiji basin to establish the SGR and these relocations were fundamental to the construction of Selous as the largest elephant wilderness in the world (Neumann,

1998, Baldus, 2001). Currently, the reserve covers an area of 50,000 km^2, which represents 6% of the Tanzania's surface (Siege and Baldus, 2000). Comparatively, the area exceeds the size of Switzerland. Coupled with the ban on ivory trade in 1980s, elephant populations in the ecosystem increased to over 67,000 in 2004, which is about 60% of Tanzania's total elephant population (Stephenson, 2004). Of these, 20% are found outside the reserve boundaries. In fact, Siege and Baldus (2000), reports that elephants roam over an area larger than 100,000 km^2, which is beyond the reserve boundaries by 50%. Against this background, interest to expand SGR to accommodate elephant populations continues today focussing on areas currently settled by the same local communities that were relocated from the reserve during its creation.

3.4 Political independence and the transformation of natural resources governance

Echoing my earlier discussions about the role of SPEF (today Flora and Fauna International (FFI)) in the establishment of other conservation NGOs such as IUCN and later WWF and AWF, this sections aims to demonstrate how these and other NGOs became an important vehicle for adjusting colonial laws and conservation ideologies to an independent Tanzania in the early 1960s. The section provides a critical analysis of activities that support the use of the SGR in the Rufiji basin as a core area for the construction of a bioregional scale, which is the main focus of this study. I seek to attest that the concern over African wildlife extinction, which dominated conservationist thinking throughout the colonial period, transformed into fear of loss of power and access over wildlife to African governments on the eve of political independence. The work of the private sector, led by long established conservation NGOs such as FFI, IUCN, UNESCO, AWF and WWF established a general framework for the global environmental governance, which altered considerably the powers of African governments over natural resources, especially wildlife. In my view, it is this struggle over power and control of natural resources in Africa, and Tanzania in particular, that accounts for the continuous re-scaling of environmental governance.

It follows that the future of African wildlife was an issue of major concern to the Western conservation lobbyists and colonial governments following the wave of

decolonization throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Almost all southern African states experienced changes in conservation programs around their time of independence (Ramutsindela, 2008). It is argued, however, that these changes were not necessarily related to deteriorating environmental conditions but the concerns over the implications of political transformation on access and control by those who benefited most from resources (Ramutsindela, 2008). Although government commitments in conservation was called for, neither African states were considered capable nor the leaders were trusted as sole custodians of wildlife (Matheka, 2008). In particular, European scientists conducted research mostly focusing on the international importance of African wildlife thereby framing wildlife as a global heritage (Huxley, 1961, Riney, 1961, IUCN, 1963) and its protection as a choice for African governments between civilization and savagery. Such studies opined for example that;

> *In the modern world, as Africa is beginning to realize, a country without a national park can hardly be regarded as civilized. And for the African territory to abolish a system of national park already established or to destroy its existing wildlife resources would shock the world and incur the reproach of barbarism and ignorance* (Huxley, 1961: 94)

According to Ramutsindela (2008), critics that undermined the capacity of states to protect nature strengthened the role of the private institutions in the conservation of natural resources. In the years that followed political independence in British East and Central Africa, conferences were organised consecutively to bring together elite groups that worked with the British government to deliberate the succession of the wildlife sector. Unlike in the past where conferences were held in London, a number of such conferences were hosted in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s. This shift of the venue from London to Africa itself recounts the agency that was there to get the African leaders and their governments involved in endorsing conservation blueprints that had long been prepared by Europeans. Conferences were, for instance, held in Bukavu - Belgium Congo in 1953, Entebe (Uganda) in 1956, Arusha (Tanzania) in 1961 and Nairobi (Kenya) in 1963 (IUCN, 1963). There are important features of these conferences that inform the scope of this section; their organisation, representation and ways in which decisions were made to frame African wildlife for many decades that followed.

The Bukavu-Congo conference of 1953 brought together Africa-based conservationists and leaders and linked them to external interest groups (IUCN, 1963). Among others, Dr. K.T Caldwell and Dr. E.B Worthington were key representatives of the British colonial office and the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (CSA), respectively. In the earlier conferences, however, Caldwell had represented the Flora and Fauna International (Mathake, 2008). Interest groups were represented by members of the Game Preservation and Hunting Association of Northern Rhodesia, Fauna Preservation Society of Nyasaland, Kenya Wildlife Society, Tanganyika Wildlife Society and the East Africa Tourist Travel Association. Among others, the conference commissioned a team of experts to lead an enquiry about nature conservation in British colonies. The team that was lead by Worthington brought together a long serving African-based scientist such as Prof. Julian Huxley (also the first director of UNESCO) and Mr. Gerald Watterson (the FAO forestry officer and the IUCN general secretary) (IUCN, 1963, Matheka, 2008). The report of this inquiry led to the establishment of the African Special Project (ASP) which ran from 1960 to 1963 (Riney, 1970, IUCN, 1963). The ASP involved a tour in almost all states in Africa south of the Sahara with the aim of discussing the principles and practices of conservation with African leaders.

The nature conservation inquiry and ASP run concurrently with a number of other activities at the background. Apart from the major events related to the political independence of Tanzania in 1961, Uganda and Kenya in 1962 and 1963 respectively, powerful alliances between international conservation organisations and individuals were forged to facilitate the smooth running of the conservation debates and deliberations. Whereas IUCN- the brainchild of FFI - had been the key player in organising and facilitating meetings in the region, it conceived the idea, which established WWF during these regional debates. To be precise, WWF was founded on 11 September 1961 by a group of ardent, mostly businessmen and British naturalists such as Victor Stolan, Peter Scott, Max Nicholson, Guy Mountfort and Julian Huxley (Hails, 2006). All the founders had connections with other conservation organisations such as IUCN, the Fauna Preservation Society, UNESCO and the British Nature Conservancy thus WWF had a springboard from their knowledge and connections (Hails, 2006, www.panda.org/about_wwf). The WWF was established as a public relations and fund raising organization seeking

money to support the protection of African wildlife (Bonner, 1993, Neumann, 1998). Notably, the IUCN launched an association with WWF immediately. According to Bonner (1993), about the same time that WWF and IUCN collaboration started, American game hunters established the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation – later to be the AWF. Similarly, AWF was backed by political conservatives, who like in other organisations, many had hunted in Africa and feared that African independent governments would place untrained Africans in charge of conservation and thus spell doom for game (Neumann, 1998, Bonner, 1993).

The report of the inquiry and the ASP project echoed the views of many conservationists who believed that only international intervention could save African wildlife. Both reports highlighted the need to influence African opinion on wildlife, the need to train African game officers, integrate conservation into socio-economic development programs, and the need for international support for wildlife conservation in Africa (IUCN, 1963). More importantly, however, is the fact that African governments were urged to consider a new and broad-based convention designed to conserve natural resources in decades to come (Matheka, 2008, Riney, 1964). These recommendations and the convention captivated conferences in Arusha and Nairobi in 1961 and 1963 respectively and they had major impacts on individual African states and the region at large following its adoption by the Organization of African Unity in 1968 (Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1968).

In September 1961 - three months before the independence of Tanzania - the Arusha conference, officially titled Pan-African Symposium of Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States, marked the peak of the conservation mission and the beginning of decolonization of nature in Africa (Neumann, 1998, Matheka, 2008, McCormick, 1989, Adams and McShane, 1996). Funds for this purpose had been offered by the American Conservation Association, the Deutsche Afrika-Gesellsehaft, the Fauna Preservation Society, the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and UNESCO (IUCN, 1963). The meeting was attended by delegates from different parts of the world - about hundred and forty participants from twenty one African and six non-African countries, and five international organizations, not counting the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, (CCTA) and IUCN who were jointly responsible for the

preparation of the Conference (IUCN, 1963). Among the participants were also fifteen representatives from the Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Kenya, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. Among the messages of good wishes for success that were sent to Arusha were those from Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. On a side event, WWF that had just been established had its *de facto* launch during the conference. In fact, one of its founders, Max Nicholson, wanted a launch to be accompanied by a 'Declaration of a state of Emergency', that would be signed by new African leaders, scientists and conservationists in Europe and the United States (Bonner, 1993: 64).

Among the top officials of the Tanzanian transitional government who attended the conference was the Prime Minister Mwalimu J.K Nyerere (Watterson, 1961). The Tanganyika Governor Richard Turnbull presented the conference opening remarks which corresponded sharply with the recommendations of the reports of inquiry and the ASP that preceded the conference. In short, the Governor summarized the nature protection agenda under three main themes: 1) that wildlife and wild nature were an undoubted source of revenue needed for social services, and must therefore be rationally exploited as it is the best form of land use, 2) the public opinion, whose support was essential, must be convinced of the value of this heritage, 3) the international aid would be needed if the world in general wished to see Africa's unique fauna preserved in Africa for the benefit of humankind (IUCN, 1963). The culmination of the Arusha conference was the Manifesto which was presented by the Prime Minister Mwalimu Nyerere. Indeed, the Arusha Manifesto echoed issues raised by the colonial government and conservationists:

> *The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source of wonder and inspiration but are an integral part of our natural resources and of our future livelihood and well-being. In accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife, we solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our children's grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance. The conservation of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained manpower, and money. We look to other nations to co-operate with us in this important task, the success or failure of which not only affects the continent of Africa but the rest of the world as well* (Nyerere, 1961).

It should be noted that the manifesto similar to this was read by the Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta during the Nairobi conference organised by IUCN in 1963 precisely the year Kenya received its political independence. Part of the Manifesto reads:

> *The natural resources of this country - its wildlife which offers such an attraction to visitors from all over the world, the beautiful places in which these animals live, the mighty forests which guard the water catchment areas so vital to the survival of man and beast - are a priceless heritage for the future.... The Government of Kenya, fully realising the value of its natural resources pledges itself to conserve them for posterity with all means at its disposal. We are confident of the cooperation of other governments of East Africa in this important task but, we are unable, unaided, to provide specialist staff and money which are necessary. We therefore invite other nations and lovers of nature throughout the world to assist us in honouring this solemn pledge* (Quoted in Matheka, 2008: 124)

The two manifestos indicate distinctly that East Africa's ecological diversity was the first determinant of its history. The manifestos give the international conservation actors the mandate for the protection of African flora and fauna on the assumptions that African states were and still are economically weak and, perhaps, their leaders unwilling to take up conservation agendas (Ramutsindela, 2008, Muthake, 2008, Singh and Houtum, 2002). Thus, the manifestos presented wildlife conservation as a choice for African governments, natural resources as the World Heritage and external assistance as an option agreed upon by scientists and African leaders. Indeed, the three tenants of the manifestos correspond sharply with broad themes of the IUCN categories of protected areas; preservation of nature, balancing protection of nature with recreation and managing nature for its sustainable use (Ramutsindela, 2008). The impact of these themes in shaping the global natural resources governance cannot be overstated.

By signing the Arusha Manifesto, the Western view of African wildlife had successfully been endorsed as an agenda for the newly independent Tanzanian government. Known to be an economically weak state, the continuation of the flow of aid packages was tied to conditions, which favour the conservation interests of Western countries, international conservation NGOs and bilateral institutions (Kideghesho, 2006, Neumann, 1998). Indeed, shortly after the Arusha conference projects that aimed at implementing conference recommendations were funded and

implemented. For example, in 1963 the WWF provided the grant for the establishment of the College of African Wildlife Management (CAWM) - Mweka in Tanzania as its initial efforts to produce technically trained game officers for positions such as game wardens for all of Anglophone Africa (Neumann, 1998, Bonner, 1993).

As Neumann (1998) suggests, the transition from colonial to independent natural resources governance relied almost entirely on CAWM and thus a reliance on international conservation organisations that funded it. The college received planning consultants and hosted exchange of park officials in America and Europe (Garland, 2006, Neumann, 1998). This is without considering the fact that former colonial officers maintained key positions in wildlife department in the independent government until the first bunch of trained officers in CAWM, Europe and America could take over wildlife protection responsibilities (Iliffe, 1979, Bonner, 1993). For example, the British game ranger and renowned hunter Brian Nicholson was the Principal Game Warden of Tanzania until 1973 when he retired to manage the Afriventures – an alliance of hunters group based in Nairobi (Brian, 1970). During Nicholson's term in office, game reserves (including SGR) were demarcated into hunting concessions and areas outside the reserves were designated as hunting blocks exclusively for hunting tourists. Apparently, Afriventures managed the largest number of hunting concessions (Brian, 1970). By the late 1970s, an elite class of bureaucrats trained in Western ideologies and practices of natural resource conservation had emerged subscribing to the Western belief that African wildlife should be protected from Africans. The CAWM-Mweka remains a pioneer institution which has, since its establishment, trained 4000 wildlife managers from 28 African countries (www.mwekawildlife.org). Having been fully facilitated by Westerners, protected area programs continue to exclude local communities from accessing and benefiting from natural resources in their ancestral lands. Even in the supposedly community-based conservation projects that emerged recently, village game scouts are still trained as guards who protect wildlife from people and the vice versa hardly functions (Garland, 2006).

Whereas the impact of the Arusha Manifesto on wildlife protection cannot be overemphasized, the popular view that it was originally the choice of African leaders has been criticised. Critiques have emerged that although it went uncovered, the

manifesto was prepared by members of Western conservation organisations for African leaders to sign (Rangarajan, 2003, Honey, 1999, Bonner, 1993). In fact, Bonner (1993: 65) maintains that, 'the statement (Arusha Manifesto) is often cited by Western conservationists to display their commitments to conservation. It was written by Europeans, including Max Nicholson, founding member of WWF, and Ian MacPhail, an advertising executive hired by WWF'. This is not surprising when conceptualised from the historical narrative of the European involvement in African wildlife as discussed earlier in this chapter. As such, this study establishes that apart from the use of the Arusha Manifesto in different citations, the document is not available in any other format suggesting that it was adopted as a government document. Notwithstanding its questionable authenticity the manifesto serves as a mantra for conservation in Tanzania and it is widely used by donors, conservationists and researchers to hold the government to its conservation commitment and responsibilities for the preservation of forests and wildlife (URT, 1998a; URT, 1998b; Goldstein, 2005). Recently, the TANAPA headquarters in Arusha was named after the late Mwalimu J.K Nyerere and his statute holds the Arusha Manifesto firmly at the entrance (see Figure 3.3). In the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism the manifesto features on the second page of the wildlife policy and it remains the basis of the policy and wildlife conservation in the country (URT, 1998b, TANAPA, 2009).

Figure 3.3 Mwalimu J.K Nyerere and the script of the Arusha Manifesto

Source: Photo taken by the author, 21/8/2008

3.5 Post-independence and nature conservation in Tanzania

The sentiment that conservation at the time of political independence in Tanzania was a colonial agenda that served the colonial interest is not an overstatement. This opinion does not invalidate the fact that the government had commitments and responsibilities for the protection of natural resources. Rather, it serves as a reminder that the government had inherited a poor country with an export-oriented economy, little internal infrastructure and low levels of literacy and education (Iliffe, 1979, Nyerere, 1967) which should have been the main concerns of the independent government. Indeed, these problems, as attested to by the economic policies that

followed, were the main national agenda in 1967 and formed the basis for what would be considered a true Arusha Declaration (see Appendix 6). The 1967 declaration is not to be confused with the Arusha conservation Manifesto of 1961. The two declarations should, however, serve as a basis for differentiating the colonial and national agenda in the early years of independence. The difference also shed light on the contemporary organisational structure for natural resources management and the role that international actors had in shaping conservation policies and practices in the country.

The Arusha Declaration represented a turning point in Tanzania's political and economic development and it placed on record the acceptance of socialism as the ideology of the country, the major tenet of the policy being self-reliance. The declaration outlined Tanzania's policy on socialism that included compulsory villagization (*Ujamaa*), nationalization, and price controls. The declaration and actions relating to public ownership required the state apparatus to control the major means of production and exchange to ensure that the economic development was to be based on self reliance (Nyerere, 1967). As the founder of the idea, Mwalimu Nyerere believed that Tanzania received political but not economic independence and he maintained that donor assistance would not pull Tanzania out of poverty (Nyerere, 1967). Notably, the Declaration recognized land, forests and wildlife as major means of production and thus they were nationalized. This meant that the external cooperation in conservation was discouraged as the government had hoped to monopolize natural resource-based revenues (Goldstein, 2005). The responsibility for the management and utilization was thus put under government departments and parastatals. For example, land management and control was taken over by the National Food Corporation (NAFCO), forests conservation by the Forest Division and wood based industries by the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO). The TANAPA managed wildlife in the national parks while the Wildlife Department (now the Wildlife Division) managed wildlife in game reserves and game controlled areas.

On the one hand, nationalization of natural resource elucidates Nyerere's own views on the Arusha conservation Manifesto in relation to the political implications of private and external influence over natural resources. Unlike in other countries in southern Africa such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa where new

legislations supported private conservancies (Ramutsidela, 2008, Wels, 2003, Carter et al., 2008), socialism blocked the privatization of nature until the 1980s when the economic liberalization necessitated reforms that opened doors for the private sector involvement. Nationalization of natural resources was based on the assumption that wildlife and forest resources could propel economic growth. Admittedly, conservation in the new government continued to reflect the political and economic circumstances of the country after independence. However, natural resources management remained almost entirely on the colonial organizational structure; laws remained the same with the exception of minor amendments. For example, as it was with colonial laws, the independent government was vested with ownership and control powers to all lands and the land tenure took the form of conveyance of ownership and leaseholds (Mallya, 1999, Shivji, 1998). The legal land regime established under the British Land Ordinance of 1923 was taken over virtually unaltered (Shivji, 1998). In fact, the difference was made only by changing the trustee's authority over the land from the Governor to the President (Goldstein, 2005). The concept of public land introduced by the colonial law was thus inherited and the President assumed powers to grant land rights of occupancy. In 1963 the freehold tenure, which was a German colonial relic, was abolished. However, this move affected only a small proportion of the land. The freehold titles were converted first into government leases and later into long-term (99 years) rights of occupancy (Shivji, 1998). Yet none of the above measures amounted to land tenure reform in the 1960s and 1970s. As Chapter Four will demonstrate, changes in land tenure came about indirectly through economic liberalization in the 1980s rather than a result of a consciously conceived national land tenure policy.

Like in the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism became the central body responsible for the country's overall wildlife and forest policies. The government retained all the colonial institutional pillars, which included the Wildlife and Forest Departments (now Wildlife and Forest Divisions), TANAPA and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA). The colonial Fauna Conservation Ordinance Chapter 302 of 1940 was used until 1974 when the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 repealed and replaced it. As it was with the Fauna Conservation Ordinance, the Act rests ownership and control of wildlife solely on the government. Section 5 (1) of the Act specifies, for example, that the principal powers of wildlife

conservation, management and utilization (in the regions, districts and villages) are vested in the President, the Minister responsible, the Director of Game (now the Director of Wildlife) and the Game Officers appointed to administer legislation (URT, 1974). The Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 continues to provide the legal framework for wildlife management throughout the country in game reserves, wetlands and game controlled areas. In the national parks, the TANAPA National Parks Ordinance Chapter 412 of 1959 that was established under the British government was only amended in 1978. As the initial purpose of its establishment, TANAPA's core business remains to protect wildlife in the national parks throughout the country (TANAPA, 2008). Likewise, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Ordinance Chapter 413 of 1959 was amended in 1975 and is still responsible for the management of the Ngorongoro Crater and its surroundings.

Essentially, the 1980s marked a turning point in Tanzania's socialism policy and government monopoly in the management of natural resources following the global political and economic liberalization. For reasons beyond the scope of this study, details of the failure of the Arusha Declaration will not be provided. It is important to note, however, that the Cold War (1945-1989) and the global political struggles that followed were among the reasons for the adoption of capitalism in Tanzania, the mode that derived political and economic changes throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The acute economic crisis following the global oil crisis coupled with the war with Idd Amin in 1978/79 and a natural drought that hit the country during the same period left Tanzania as the world second poorest country in per capita terms (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001). Although the country resisted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality since it adopted the self-reliance policy, it succumbed to foreign aid to meet development expenditures and, by implication, accepted the Economic Recovery Programs (ERP) in 1986. As it was implemented elsewhere, the ERP focussed on eliminating state monopoly in the economy.

During the acute economic crisis the country's natural resource base also became noticeably threatened perhaps due to budget cuts for activities such as wildlife research, monitoring and surveillance. This resulted in, among others, the plight of elephant and rhino widespread poaching in the late 1980s. Leader-Williams, (2000) reports that the country's elephant population declined by 80% between the 1960s

and 1980s. In particular, the number of elephants in SGR dropped from 110,000 in 1976 to approximately 55,000 in 1980 (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Leader-Williams, 2000). In 1986, the government banned the local ivory trade and in 1989 embarked on a countrywide special operation known as 'Operation Uhai' to crack down on poachers and local dealers in ivory and other elephant products (URT, 2007a). Conceptually, the ban on ivory trade fuelled the country's dependency on external sources of funding and created conditions that strengthened the view that Tanzania does not have the capacity to adequately manage its protected areas without permanent external assistance. Indeed, Tanzania appealed to the international community for assistance. It is important to note also that some of the protected areas in the country had qualified for the IUCN's list of protected areas and had, during the 1980s, already been registered as World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves (UNESCO, 2006) (see Table 3.1). By a considerable margin Tanzania contributed much more land under IUCN protected area categories than any other sub-Sahara African countries. Precisely, the country contributes about 27% of the total Area of World Heritage Sites with its SGR being the largest natural World Heritage Sites in Africa (IUCN, 2008).

Table 3.1 World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves in Tanzania

Conservation Area	IUCN Protected Area Category	UNESCO Status	Criteria	Year
Ngorongoro Conservation Area	VI (Managed Resource Protected Area)	Biosphere Reserve and Natural World Heritage Site	Natural Criteria ii, iii, iv	1979
Serengeti National Park (NP)	II (National Park)	Biosphere Reserve and Natural World Heritage Site	Criteria iii, iv	1981
Manyara NP		Biosphere Reserve		1981
Selous Game Reserve	IV (Habitat/Species Management Area	Natural World Heritage Site	Criteria ii, iv	1982
Kilimanjaro NP	II (National Park)	Natural World Heritage Site	Natural Criterion iii	1989
East Usambara Mountains		Biosphere Reserve		2000

Source: (www.unesco.org)

The foregoing discussion points to the fact that Tanzania's nature conservation policies were directly linked to the neoliberal global environmental agenda. Like in most developing countries, the international financial conditions that came through Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1980s challenged the regulatory role of the state in economic planning. Subsequently, pressures to liberalize from the World Bank committed Tanzania to regulate powers that the Arusha Declaration had placed on the central government (African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), 2007). Guided by SAP, policy reforms continued apace with emphasis on the privatization of public-owned enterprises (including parastatals that dealt with land, forest and wildlife) and market liberalization (involving relaxation of government controls on prices, production, marketing, transport and foreign exchange allocations) (Maliyamkono and Mason, 2006, Shivji, 2006). Supported by economic reforms and the Arusha Manifesto, international conservation actors, their funds and networks facilitated the harmonization of the country's new economic policies and global environmental outlook that recognised the environment and development as dependant variables. These policies also affected the agricultural sector as the balance between subsistence food production and the market became complex (URT, 2001a). As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, land reform became the basis of these transformations followed by further reforms in wildlife and forest sector that reduced government powers and control over natural resources (URT, 1998a; 1998b; GTZ, 2003b). These reforms legalised the use of community and private land for expansion and for the establishment of a network of protected areas.

In addition to the internal reforms, the government of Tanzania took part in the regional and international policy dialogues, which saw the country signing several international and regional agreements on conservation and development. This way, the international conservation actors acquired powers to monitor and influence government decisions over the management and use of protected areas especially those identified as World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves. Tanzania signed the CBD at the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Following the ratification of the CBD, national and regional environmental objectives were revised and agreed upon by the states to match those of the international conservation and financial institutions. Precisely, Tanzania signed the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations in 1996 (directed at

controlling Illegal trade in wildlife); the Convention on Migratory Wild Animal Species in 1999 (to provide for mechanisms to conserve migratory wild animal species); the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement in 2000 (to establish common approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources) and others such as the RAMSAR convention ratified in 2000 (directed at sustainable use and management of habitats that are critical for the survival of elephant populations). Collectively, these conservation agreements created synergy between the global environmental, development agenda, and national programs. For Tanzania, the implementation of these agreements continued to rely on funding from international NGOs, bilateral governments and international financial and development agencies.

The institutional framework that emerged shortly after changes of the global environmental politics in the 1990s supported conservation NGOs and development agencies in mobilizing worldwide support for programs that offer solutions for threats that allegedly challenged national and global natural resources. Along this line, the GEF's objective of facilitating the establishment of protected areas network ensured sustainable funding for such projects in cross-border regions. As Table 3.2 indicates, GEF/World Bank funding in East Africa focussed on facilitating cross-border projects. Most of the long-established conservation institutions and NGOs have since then moved from their traditional small-scale land units to increasing engagement in particular themes that reflect changes of their operational scale. For example, programs such as the WWF's '*Wildlife and Human Needs'* and AWF's '*People and Parks'* reflect changes from traditional single species focus on elephants to landscape scale projects that combine diverse set of land uses and social contexts. In many ways, this change has also meant working on larger geographical areas across frontiers (Hails, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2007, Burgess et al., 2004, Muruthi, 2005).

Table 3.2 Cross-border projects in East Africa

Name of the Project	Facilitator	Project Area	Year Started
Institutional Support for the Protection of East African Biodiversity	GEF/UNDP	Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda	1992
Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity and Pollution Control	GEF/UNDP	Tanzania, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Zambia	1995
Lake Malawi/Nyasa Biodiversity Project	GEF/World Bank	Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique	1995
Conservation of Coastal Forest Biodiversity in East Africa	GEF/UNDP and IUCN	Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique	1997
Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas Marine Transfrontier Park	GEF/UNDP and IUCN	Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique	1997
Reducing Biodiversity Loss at Cross-border Sites in East Africa	GEF/UNDP	Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda	1997
Transfrontier Parks/Conservation Areas	PPF	Southern Africa	1997
Ecoregions	WWF	Globally	1998
African Heartlands	AWF	East and Southern Africa	1998
Forest frontiers Program	WRI	Globally	1999
Western Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (SNWC)	GEF/UNDP and GTZ	Tanzania and Mozambique	2006

Source: (World Bank, 2001, URT, 2001b, GEF/UNDP, 2004, Manikowski and Gündling, 2000, WWF, 2005, AWF, 2007, PPF, 1997)

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that global environmental governance is linked to environmental NGOs, which had since colonial times represented the interests of individuals, their institutions and governments. Politics around governance transformation from colonial to independent regime facilitated the continuation of the colonial influence and control over natural resources in most African countries. Intrinsically, laws for wildlife protection were mostly driven by Western ideologies through the international conservation NGOs and they continue to form the main subject of international cooperation in conservation today (Gißibl, 2006, Chachage, 2000, Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993). In practice, norms to protect wildlife remain distinctively rooted in Western ideologies of pristine nature (Adams and Mulligan,

2003, Ramutsindela, 2004b, Neumann, 1998, Chachage, 2000, Epstein, 2006). Viewed from the angle of its genesis, contemporary natural resources governance remains heavily tied to the past through policies and laws that create dependency on financial and technical assistance from Western individuals and institutions. As Bonner (1993) argues, Western conservation partners and their money have as much influence on conservation governance as the imperial colonial government would have. The trend in the establishment of large-scale cross-border protected areas in the region is not surprising when considered from the historical and political economy of wildlife in Africa. As such, the international investments in the construction of new conservation scales in Tanzania have transferred much more powers over wildlife resources from the government to the external institutions rather than to the local institutions that they claim to empower. In the next chapter, I analyze the process that establishes WMAs as a local conservation scale and demonstrate how that process is adopted by different actors to facilitate the construction of the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

CHAPTER FOUR: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS IN TANZANIA: ACTORS AND NETWORKS IN FRONTIER EXPANSIONS

4.0 Introduction

Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) as referred to in this chapter represent land use type established in communal and/or privately owned lands to facilitate the protection and utilization of wildlife resources outside core protected areas. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that WMAs in Tanzania are a local scale at which buffer zones and wildlife corridors are established in order to promote the bioregional model referred to in Chapter Two. Since WMAs represent a particular scale, the process that establishes them is endemic to power struggles between the national government (that owns land and wildlife), the local communities (who have rights to land), conservationists and the private sector (that facilitate the WMA process and seek to create a self-regulating wildlife market economy). Power struggles between these actors push local communities to the margin while economic and environmental laws continue to protect wildlife and expand commercial investments in communal lands.

The chapter is organised in three main sections. The first section introduces various initiatives that seek to break through the fortress conservation approaches to bring local communities into nature conservation. These initiatives are discussed in relation to their evolution as community-based conservation projects, which have recently been transformed into autonomous institutions working parallel to the conventional government structures. The second section provides an analysis of the WMA process in Tanzania. In particular, the section presents the review of institutional transformations that led to the establishment of WMAs. Furthermore, the section demonstrates how the network of actors and their strategies facilitated the re-arrangement of conventional natural resource management institutions as a pre-requisite for the establishment and functioning of WMAs. The third section draws on the previous chapters to ascertain that the WMA process in Tanzania is entirely designed and financed by international conservation NGOs and development agencies that seek to deregulate government powers over natural resources management and utilization. The section uses the case of five WMAs (Mbarang'andu, Nalika, Kimbanda, Chingoli and Kisungule) in Tunduru and

Namtumbo districts. These WMAs are merged to establish the wildlife corridor (SNWC), which is the anchor of the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

4.1 Paradigm change, WMAs and conservation at the local scale

Setting aside WMAs is neither new nor is it a patented invention to Tanzania. Well-documented cases of community-based wildlife management are found in widely different cultural and physical settings in the world. However, the emergence of community-based projects linked to the establishment of bioregions is a recent phenomenon. Ali (2007) suggests that these community-based projects are currently used to establish large conservation areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This observation supports the view that WMAs occur at the local level yet they are part of a network of scales that are used to promote the establishment of bioregions. The use of communal and privately owned land as buffer zones and wildlife corridors has thus become a common practice in bioregional planning.

Following the emergence of community-based projects in many African countries in the 1990s, community WMAs became an acceptable approach within a discourse opposed to centralised and top-down natural resource policies and which favours the adoption of local governments and grassroots communities as the most effective natural resource governance structures (Schroeder, 1999). The approach was variously put in practice as Community-Based Conservation (CBC), Joint Resource Management and/or Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM)[3]. There are views that various community-based projects came forth as a panacea for alleviating the antagonistic relationship between protected area authorities and local communities that had resulted from the failure of fortress conservation (Adams and McShane, 1996). This approach was guided by principles of decentralization and local community empowerment as opposed to the central government control and ownership of natural resources. Despite being widely heralded as Africa's most successful conservation initiative in the 1990s, critics emerged from amongst its proponents, practitioners and researchers over where the decision-making power was placed within the local communities. Thus, the issue of power has since the

3 For consistency CBC will be used in this chapter.

beginning of the community-based approaches been central to the debate on the appropriate governance structure for local resource management.

Critics consider initial community-based projects as partially decentralised wildlife conservation programs, which are complex, bureaucratic and upwardly accountable to central governments (Junge, 2002, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007, Baldus, 2008, Nelson et al., 2007, Katerere et al., 2001, Nelson, 2007). For example, the Communal Area Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is one of the first famous models in Africa that faced fundamental challenges relating to powers over natural resource and property rights (Alexander and McGregor, 2000, Murombedzi, 1999, Murphree, 2000). In particular, the district councils which are designated as the 'appropriate authority' for wildlife management in communal lands are criticised for failing to devolve authority to lower tier structures of administration, such as village and ward committees (Mamimine, 2000, Murombedzi, 1999). In fact, critics argues that CAMPFIRE is a district-based and not community-based program (Murombedzi, 1999). In Zambia, however, the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) opted for what could be considered a true community-based governance system where the program used traditional chiefs from participating communities. Even then, ADMADE was criticised for being a chieftaincy-based organisation where chiefs were vested with powers to control its agenda and membership (Gibson and Marks, 1995). Taken as a whole, these criticisms point to the politics of scale jumping that support environmentalists in their efforts to construct new spaces of conservation. As it will be demonstrated below, both the state and indigenous environmental governance are ignored and instead replaced by new regimes that are exposed to forces operating at various scales thus weakening the power of the state and local communities over natural resources (Ramutsindela, 2007).

Criticisms against local-based conservation and governance structures imply that alternative governance institutions are necessary to reassert the local. This becomes even more urgent in the face of globalization and neoliberalism, and the unwillingness of governments to genuinely promote the decentralization of natural resource governance. The call for strong local structures is made against the observation that principles of economic liberalization guide the ongoing

transformations of community-based conservation initiatives, a process that represents the beginning of the new era of nature privatization. It is held that only once the state accepts its total disengagement in the ownership of natural resources that conservation will have net economic gains to the communities (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). In practice this means that wildlife resources in the communal lands should be managed by non-state institutions as opposed to the conventional local governments and local structures (Hitchcock, 2000, Parren and Sam, 2003). On the basis of this view, WMAs are transformed into new institutions that govern the local resource base. However, since the notion of the local is ambiguous and it encompasses state and non-state actors with divergent interests, the question of who will retain power and control over WMAs has become the core of struggles between the government and the private sector (the later often being understood as business-related subjects) (Schroeder, 1999).

It goes that African governments have since the 1990s been engaged in the redefinition of state-centric conservation objectives to formulate conservation strategies that reflect new conservation thinking. As a result, national conservation strategies that highlight the importance of non-state institutions have been adopted as blueprints for nature conservation (Schroeder, 1999, Hitchcock, 2000). For example, Botswana has, since 1986, established community WMAs and granted local people the right to use the wildlife resources subject to the government regulations (Arntzen, 2003). However, in 1991 the IUCN facilitated the formulation of the National Conservation Strategy which changed environmental policies and legislation resulting in the adoption of management plans that supported the establishment of local-based non-state institutions for the management of wildlife in communal lands (www.iucnbot.bw). This way, the conventional WMAs governance structure was replaced by new Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) established to govern wildlife in the WMAs with a greater degree of freedom from the central government system (Hitchcock, 2000, Arntzen, 2003). By the year 2000 about forty six such CBOs had been registered in Botswana focussing mainly on economic-oriented approaches to wildlife management (Hitchcock, 2000, Arntzen, 2003).

Likewise, in Ghana the Conservation International, USAID, World Bank and UNESCO facilitated the review of wildlife and forest laws in 1996, the process that

culminated in the establishment of Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs) (Parren and Sam, 2003). As with WMAs in Botswana, CREMAs are non-state institutions recognised as '*body corporate*' responsible for wildlife matters in the local areas (Parren and Sam, 2003). Elsewhere in Africa, the government of Namibia granted rights to establish and own conservancies for private landowners since 1975. However, the conservancy approach involving rural black communities on public land emerged in 1996. Supported by the private sector and conservation NGOs such as WWF and USAID, the government of Namibia led the development of policies and legislation that approved the new policy for communal areas conservancies in 1997 (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). The policies and legal framework related to conservancies in Namibia was the basis for the nation-wide movement that had registered about thirty communal area conservancies by 2001 (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). For more examples of private conservancies in Africa see Wels, (2003); Carter, *et al.,* (2008) and Gallo, *et al.,* (2009).

Recent studies establish that WMAs and their contemporary governance structures in Africa build on the broader neoliberal movement that assigns greater roles to the market system (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Spierenburg et al., 2008). New institutions that are created parallel to the conventional government structures facilitate the acquisition of legal titles to communal lands and related resources. Having legally guaranteed property rights these institutions acquire capital and/or collateral to enter into conservation oriented business ventures (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). This implies that the community-based doctrine neither strengthens the capacities of African states in conservation of biodiversity nor, for that matter, does it empower grassroots communities through their local governments. At best, it forms part of the process that establishes new regimes and transforms the communal land use and tenure system into wildlife market-based economy.

The above discussion points to the importance of conservation NGOs, development agencies and other local-based private institutions in the rescaling of environmental governance. These rescaling tendencies are responsible for the establishment of land use pattern and governance structures necessary for the creation of bioregions (Hanks, 2006, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). As such, De Klerk *et al*., (2004)

acknowledge that protected areas in IUCN categories I–VI in Africa have gaps that constrain the current efforts to establish bioregions in the region. Many of the gaps are identified in areas of high human population and good agricultural potentials which challenge the conventional approaches in biodiversity protection (Fjelds et al., 2004, De Klerk et al., 2004). Notwithstanding local land uses, it is envisaged that communal land that supports wildlife be included within official lists of protected areas to warrant their use for closing the existing protected area gaps. Indeed, the Fifth World Parks Congress held in Durban in September 2003 adopted the recommendation that national and international recognition of Community Conservation Areas[4] (CCAs) is an urgent necessity (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004, IUCN, 2005). The Congress recognised CCAs as a means to strengthen the management and expand the coverage of the world's protected areas, to promote connectivity at landscape and seascape level and to enhance public support for protected areas (Pathak *et al*., 2004; IUCN, 2005). Specific recommendations were thus provided to encourage governments to recognise CCAs as legitimate conservation tools, and to, as appropriate, assign them to national and to the IUCN international protected area categories (Pathak *et al*., 2004, IUCN, 2005). It is against this background that CREMAs in Ghana are the main option for the establishment of elephant corridors between protected areas (Parren and Sam, 2003) while communal and private conservancies in Namibia and WMAs in Botswana are critical to the establishment of TFCAs/TFPs in southern Africa (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007, Hanks, 2006, Gallo et al., 2009, Ramutsindela, 2007).

4.2 WMAs in Tanzania: the manifestation of scalar construction

Political ecologists have maintained the view that local scale arrangements are more likely to be beneficial to local communities than other scales. However, there is lack of clarity on how the local scale is constructed to achieve this goal. This section seeks to contribute to knowledge about local scales and their nestedness by analysing the process that establishes WMAs in Tanzania. Even though WMAs occur at the local level they are not independent from other scales. In the context of

4 CCAs are officially defined as natural and/or modified ecosystems containing significant biodiversity values, ecological services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous and local communities through customary laws or other effective means (IUCN, 2005).

this study, WMAs are integral to the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA, which in turn forms part of the global goals for establishing cross-border bioregions. The WMA process as presented in this chapter focuses on three interrelated issues critical to the analysis of scale and the construction of space. These issues are: the use of legal instruments for re-structuring natural resources governance, actor networking and assemblage of activities at the local level as well as the establishment of new governance structures parallel to the conventional government institutions.

This research suggests that the establishment of WMAs in Tanzania depended entirely on the institutional and legal transformations that involve the formulation and changes of policies and laws governing natural resources. Through these transformations, traditional resource use, tenure and governance systems were reoriented to support the functioning of WMAs on the ground. Although the new policies and laws were aimed at the local scale and their net effects were felt by local communities, the basis of the whole process of law making and legislation change can hardly be said to be driven at the local level. This is to say that laws governing WMAs are heavily implemented at the local level but are not limited to a particular category of scale.

Major reforms occurred in the Ministry of Lands (ML) and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). Whereas the ML oversees land management issues countrywide, the MNRT is responsible for the management of forest and wildlife resources through the Wildlife, Forest and Beekeeping Divisions (URT, 1998a; 1998b; 2001a). Under the MNRT are also government parastatals such as Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA). Transformations in the two ministries were implemented as part of the wider local government reform project that had been running as the component of the World Bank Economic Recovery Program (ERP) since 1993. Most important for this discussion is the fact that the connection was established between reform processes and rural development. Among others, this connection presented community-based approaches as part of rural development strategies. The country's Rural Development Strategy that had been in place since the Arusha Declaration was revised in 2000 with the aim of opening up opportunities for private sector

involvement in rural development (URT, 2005). Precisely, the revised strategy considers ecotourism and tourism planning as potential areas for attracting private sector and unlocking opportunities for economic gains in rural areas (URT, 2002b). Obviously, the strategy influenced conservation since wildlife tourism around protected areas has long been a target for private investments in the country.

By recasting tourism as the source of economic gains for local people, new tourism ventures and capital investments were called for and local communities around protected areas were encouraged to plan their land uses with particular attention on tourism as a poverty alleviation strategy. At the same time, however, the international financial policy on poverty required Tanzania to produce the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a condition for writing off debts or making new loans (Alastair, 2005). Following the PRSP, a number of local programs were revised and initiated along the lines of poverty reduction. Yet, Tanzania had no legal and institutional framework to implement recommendations of new developments. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 did not provide for participation and ownership of wildlife by local communities. Likewise, the land law, which was inherited almost unaltered from colonial rule entrusted the government with ownership of land and related resources under the trusteeship of the President. Hence land use and tenure system became central issues in the reform processes. These issues stimulated debates that focussed on resource use politics that had resulted into forced relocations, property and human rights violations (Parkipuny, 1991, Shivji, 1998). At the core of the debate was the need for re-defining land ownership to protect community rights to own and benefit from wildlife in their lands.

It is worth noting that colonial laws which protected most of the areas immediately bordering national parks and game reserves for the purpose of regulating hunting outside core protected areas continued to influence wildlife management in Tanzania. As in colonial times, lands bordering core protected zones were maintained as Game Controlled Areas (GCAs). The Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 which replaced the colonial law inherited provisions for creating and managing GCAs. Throughout the colonial and post-colonial period, however, the laws did not regulate human activities such as settlements, cultivation and livestock keeping thus people lived in GCAs (Nahonyo, 2001, Majamba, 2001). During the

national-wide villagization program of 1975, scattered croplands and homesteads were mobilized which left most of village lands open for wildlife dispersal and migration. To date, GCAs have remained a land category surrounded by considerable confusion and ambiguity concerning the protection and utilization of wildlife (Majamba, 2001, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004, Nelson, 2007). Apparently, these are the areas targeted for WMAs. As in colonial laws, the Wildlife Conservation Act No.12 of 1974 empowers the Minister to declare any area of Tanzania to be a GCA (Section 14 (1)) where no person, except with the permission of the Director of Wildlife can hunt, burn, capture, kill, wound or molest wild animals (Section 17 (1)). The same section empowers the Minister to designate GCAs as hunting blocks under the administration of the Wildlife Division. Currently, there are more than 50 GCAs and 150 hunting blocks which cover 10% of the country (TANAPA, 2008). As the details below suggest, the ownership and use of land and wildlife in GCA remained the focus of land, wildlife and forest sector reforms that supported the establishment of WMAs in GCAs.

a. Land sector reforms

Tanzania had no policies on land, wildlife or forest resources until the mid-1990s. The first land policy was passed in 1995 with the objective of, among others, setting ceilings on land ownership to prevent land grabbing (URT, 1995). In 1996, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) hired a British consultant for the Ministry of Lands to draft land laws (Shivji, 1998). By 1999, the government had passed the Land Act No.4 of 1999 and Village Land Act No.5 of 1999 to deal with land in urban areas and private estates and in villages, respectively. These laws redefine rights, ownership and use of land and related resources and they support, among others, the establishment of a new wildlife regime that directs the sector towards the modern political and economic transformation. As such, the land laws of 1999 divided the land throughout the country into three categories: general, reserved, and village land (URT, 1999a). These land categories are defined as follows:

> *Reserved lands:* Are all land set aside for special purposes, including national parks, game reserves and forest reserves, which are established under sectoral pieces of legislation including the National Parks Ordinance, Forest Ordinance, Marine Parks and Reserves Act and the Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 1999a).

As it remains in the Wildlife Act of 1974, the Land Act recognises national parks, game reserves and forest reserves as exclusive protected areas put aside for wildlife protection.

General lands: Are all public lands which are neither reserved nor in village lands (URT, 1999a).

Village land: Is the area of which the boundaries have been demarcated as village land under any law or administrative procedure in force at any time before the Village Land Act came into operation (URT 1999b). These previous laws include the Village Settlements Act of 1965 which established villages and the Local Government (District Authorities) Acts of 1982, which established local governments (URT, 1999b).

The land policy and Land Acts are directly related to the Wildlife Conservation Act. For example, Section 4.1.1 (iv) of the land policy states, on the one hand, that where necessary, alienation of village lands [for wildlife protection] can be carried out with consultation and consent of Village Councils (URT, 1995). On the other hand, the Village Land Act has provisions for the transfer of village land to any other category as deemed right. As such, Section 4 (I)) of the Village Land Act declares that '*where the President is minded to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved land for public interest; he may direct the Minister to proceed in accordance with the provisions of this section'* (URT, 1999b). Section 4 (2) of the same Act clarifies further that public interest in this case shall include investments of national interest. However, a further analysis of Section 5.6 (2) of the Land Act leads to the conclusion that GCA's are reserved lands under the jurisdiction of the Wildlife Division. Yet the Land Act defines village lands according to the definitions laid out in the Village Land Act. This translates that the Land Act defines village land as both reserved and village lands. Nelson (2005) has also made this observation where he argues that the two Land Acts together with the Wildlife Act create a legal situation that accounts for the on-going conflicts, as both the villages and the Wildlife Division are able to interpret the laws as giving them powers over wildlife outside protected areas. The main point is, however, the fact that all these laws facilitate wildlife protection in village lands today.

The conflict of power caused by wildlife and land laws has been the source of insecurity among local communities and private tourism investors. Insecurity on the

side of local communities emanates from the fact that GCAs (most of them are WMAs now) overlap entirely with demarcated village lands which were once the core of the common property systems (Neumann, 2002, Leader-Williams, 2000, Homewood and Rodgers, 1991). Yet, local communities do not own wildlife. As a result, communities have no role to play in the allocation of hunting blocks and their land rights are not taken into account in the distribution of benefits from hunting (Majamba, 2001, Nelson, 2005, Nshala, 1999). The private sector blames the government for its reluctance to relinquish ownership of land and wildlife (Interviews, Anonymous Informant, 31/1/2008; Zakaria, 15/3/2008), which is a requirement for the establishment of an independent conservation scale (Baldus, 2008, Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007). In fact, the central control of the resources has been considered too bureaucratic thus constraining wildlife commercialization (Lawyer's Environmental Action Team (LEAT), 1998, Baldus et al., 1994, GTZ, 2003b, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004, Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007, Nelson et al., 2007, Baldus, 2008, Baldus et al., 2004, Garland, 2006, Junge, 2002, Brockington, 2005).

b. Wildlife and Forest sector reforms

As it was with land, there had been neither a policy on wildlife nor any on forests until 1998. In fact, the urgent need for these policies emerged mostly from private investors, international environmental NGOs and development agencies who are opposed to central ownership and control of resources arguing that; firstly, local communities and the private sector do not have adequate or secure rights. The second argument is that the exclusive central ownership and management of natural resources has failed to deliver efficient protection of wildlife and forest resources outside core protected areas (Interviews, Hahn, 27/11/2007; Rodgers, 25/1/2008). Thus new policies were needed to facilitate the establishment of community WMAs and their autonomous governance structures (Baldus et al., 1994, GTZ/SCP, 1995, Nshala, 1999, GTZ, 1998). Not surprising, individuals and environmental NGOs lobbied for wildlife and forest sector reforms with the main objective of downscaling state powers over resources while at the same time establishing new governance structures. Details of how individual actors and their institutions formed networks that influenced the establishment of WMAs are provided later in this chapter. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the external pressure attached to donor funding conditions were critical to the formulation of forest and wildlife policies in 1998.

Official records suggest that the preparation of the first draft of the wildlife policy commenced in 1988 with the main architects being conservation NGOs and donors who had, for a long time, been providing financial and technical assistance for wildlife protection in the country (Nelson et al., 2007, Hartley, 1997). It is acknowledged that the policy process dragged on for about a decade following negotiations between the government and local communities on the one hand, and the government and the private sector on the other (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 31/2/2008). Central to these negotiations was the issue of wildlife control, especially on communal lands. Following lengthy discussions, the wildlife policy was passed in 1998. Like it was with land, the wildlife policy states that the government will maintain ownership of wildlife, and that national parks and game reserves will continue to be the basis for wildlife conservation (URT, 1998b). However, the policy calls for a new approach to wildlife conservation in the village lands, that is the establishment of WMAs. The policy states its objectives as '*to promote the conservation of wildlife and its habitats outside core protected areas (National Parks, Game Reserves and Ngorongoro Conservation Area) by establishing a new category of protected area to be known as WMAs for the purpose of effecting community-based conservation'* (URT, 1998b: 8,10). The policy defines WMAs as *'areas set aside by communities and declared by the Minister[5] to be so for the villages to use and manage wildlife resources for their own benefits'* (URT, 1998b: 35). On wildlife utilization, the policy aims '*to create an enabling environment for the private sector to invest in different forms of wildlife utilization and conservation'* (URT, 1998b: 8). Therefore, the main thrust of the wildlife policy of 1998 is the empowerment of private sector and local communities to manage wildlife and forest resources in the village lands outside protected areas.

The spirit of the policy suggests the weakening of control by the central government, attempts to delegate powers to local communities and the promotion of community and private sector involvement in the conservation of wildlife (GTZ, 2003b, Nelson et al., 2007, Baldus, 2008). However, the conflicting provisions on land and wildlife continued to give the central government an exclusive authority over wildlife outside

5 Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism.

protected areas (LEAT, 1998). The role of the government becomes ambiguous as it seeks to protect its resources and people while providing incentives for the private sector (often associated with Western domination) on the other side. In fact, key informants in the Wildlife Division hold the view that external actors use community-based approaches as their support for land grabbing and control of wildlife resources (Interview, Zakaria, 10/3/2008). Although it goes unsaid, this remained the major source of tensions between the government, which provides a legal framework, and its external development counterparts who are the main donors and proponents of WMAs (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 31/1/2008). Notwithstanding these tensions, the government released Wildlife Conservation (WMA) Regulations and guidelines in 2002 to provide a legal basis for the establishment of sixteen pilot WMAs around the country[6] (URT, 2002c, URT, 2003b). As summarized in Table 4.1, the regulations set out detailed procedures for the designation of WMAs.

Procedures for the establishment of WMAs suggest that an AA is a legitimate body responsible for all issues related to natural resources management and utilization. A typical AA structure is formed by the central council and the board of trustees whose members are elected by their respective Village Assemblies. The implication of the AA structure at the village level is the addition of two committees over those of the mainstream Village Council. These are namely the CBO committee and Village Game Scouts (known in Kiswahili as *Kamati ya Jumuiya* and *Askari wa Wanyamapori*, respectively). Five elected village members normally form the former committee while twelve members form the later. The two committees are thus representative of the village to the AA council and are charged with the conservation and protection of wildlife in village areas set aside as a WMA. To this end, the new committees in the village are directly associated with the WMA scale even though their responsibilities are similar to those of Village Council committees on natural resources and defence.

6 The pilot period was to run for three years from 2003-2006.

Table 4.1: Procedures for the establishment of WMAs

1) Village Councils intending to become a WMA are required to recommend to the Village Assembly an area of village land that is suitable for establishment of WMA. Villages are also required to form Community-Based Organization (CBO), which will be given wildlife management responsibilities and user rights in the WMA.
2) The application to designate a WMA is made by the Village Councils through the District Council to the Director of Wildlife and each application is processed together with:
    i) A land use plan approved by the Village Assembly
    ii) A certified copy of minutes of the Village Assembly meeting that endorsed the designation of village land to be WMA.
    iii) Completed village information data sheet
    iv) Certified copy of the certificate of registration of a CBO
3) The Director of Wildlife forwards the application to the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism and a successful application are published to be managed by the Authorized Association (AA).
4) The Director of Wildlife facilitates a Village Assembly and guides the formation of CBO[7]
5) The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism issues a certificate of authorization to the CBO and declare the CBO an AA.
6) The AA applies for wildlife user rights to the Director of Wildlife who grants user rights in a WMA to an AA. WMAs will then be managed by the AA, which consists of representatives from one or several member villages. The AA is responsible for, among other things, negotiating and entering into contractual agreements with investors in WMA, developing mechanisms for the equitable sharing of benefits between WMAs as well as supporting wildlife protection.

Source: URT, (2002c)

Since the election of new committees is made a public matter carried out in the Village Assemblies, AA governance structure is presented as a true representation of villages forming a WMA. However, it remains understated that villagers in these rural areas have had no influence over top-down processes that manipulated their decisions on resource management and administration. In my view, the creation of WMAs and CBOs capitalises on this low level of understanding of the functions, jurisdictions and the implications of two governance systems. In the light of this, Village Councils become the source of legitimacy for the new institution, which in turn, secures support of villagers who are to endorse their lands for wildlife protection. Mr. Adam Mdoo who is the Kilimasera village chairperson iterated in an interview that democratic election of village representatives to the AA legitimized the division between the Village Council and the AA and, in his view, this division is the

7 According to the WMA guidelines, a CBO is a civil society organization (registered under the societies Ordinance Chapter 337) whose primary objective is to conserve resources in a manner that facilitates the sustainable utilization of the resources by and for the benefits of community members ordinarily resident in the resource area (URT, 2002c).

choice made by the proponents of WMAs in order to ensure a smooth re-distribution of powers between the Village Council and AAs (Interview, 21/11/2007).

The foregoing suggest that rather than transferring wildlife rights to Village Councils, the WMA regulations require the creation of a new governance structure, the CBO, which becomes an AA and given wildlife user rights and management responsibilities. Naturally, all the villages contributing land to the WMA become members of the CBO. In the context of this study as a whole, the creation of WMA space and the formation of CBO for their management is a scale issue; it signifies the construction of space and the division of power over such space. Since WMA space cuts across village borders and forms areas larger than a single village, the management authority must be at a level above that of the village. This interprets then that, WMA is a supra-village scale with CBO as its autonomous government. This observation is supported by the reading of the constitution of the recently established CBO for the management of the Mbarang'andu WMA in Namtumbo district. The constitution reads that;

> *Mbarang'andu will be a CBO which will be independent, non-political and without any religion or discrimination of any kind (Article 1). The functions of the organisation will be to manage WMA in accordance to the existing general management plans, negotiate and enter into contractual agreement with investors, develop and implement mechanisms for benefit sharing between village members and to oversee investment of development activities (Article 4)* (Mbarang'andu, 2005).

4.3 Expansion, governance and the politics of power

Although wildlife areas are the core of the WMA initiative, unreserved village forests have recently been critical to the expansion of WMAs across the country. It is acknowledged that forests in Tanzania cover 15% of the country's surface area and of this, '3% overlap with wildlife protected areas' (URT, 1998a: 4). Thus, the forest sector reforms that run alongside those of the wildlife sector took into consideration the fact that unreserved village forests make important wildlife habitats. Indeed, the forest and wildlife policies were launched in the same year (i.e. 1998) and both made conditions conducive for the creation of WMAs. For example, similar to the wildlife policy, the forest policy provides incentives for local governments and the private sector 'to manage unreserved and unprotected forests in the village lands' (URT,

1998a: 14). It is also important to note that as it was with wildlife, forest sector geared towards the establishment of new conservation areas in village lands but their institutional and management structures differed. Whereas the wildlife sector established supra-village institution for wildlife management, the forest sector realigned village forest management activities to those of the mainstream Village Councils (URT, 2001c). Village Councils are thus accountable to the community forest users. As the scale literature suggests, the institutional difference does not invalidate the observation that new village forest areas contribute to the expansion of WMAs. Instead, these differences are considered as conditions created to re-organise the existing institutions to allow for a smooth establishment of a desirable scale (Smith, 2004, Zimmerer, 2006).

In early 2000 the Forest and Beekeeping Division received further financial support from the Finish and German governments to develop a forest program for 2001-2010 period (URT, 2001c). Since the legal framework of the time did not provide for community ownership of forest resources as recommended by the policy, the forest program initiated the review of the colonial Forest Act of 1953 and the new Act was passed in 2002. The Forest Act of 2002 conforms to other legislations such as the Wildlife Act, the Land and Village Land Acts and it delegates responsibilities for the management of forest resources to the Village Councils as the lowest level of management (URT, 2002a). The forest program continued to facilitate the collaboration between local governments and the private sector in the management of both reserved and unreserved forests in village lands. Like in the wildlife sector the program involved local communities in the establishment of buffer zones around forest reserves through Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) (URT, 2001c).

JFM was practised in formerly established forest protected areas such as National Forest Reserves (NFRs), Local Government Forest Reserves (LGFRs) and Private Forest Reserves (PFRs). The JFM was then formalised through the signing of an agreement between Village Councils and the government (either the District Council or Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism). Unlike JFM, the CBFM took place in unreserved forests found in villages lands. Under CBFM, villagers take full ownership and management responsibilities for an area of forest within their jurisdiction and it is

declared by the Village Council as a Village Land Forest Reserve (VLFR). The same arrangement establishes Village Beekeeping Reserves (VBRs) thus enabling the protection of woodlands and forests in village lands. In these reserves villages are not obliged to share forest royalties with the central government (Blomley, 2006). Most recently, however, the proposal was made to merge VLFRs, VBRs and WMAs within village lands (Blomley, 2007). This strategy is particularly referred to as *'eating from the same plate'* and it suggests that forests are wildlife habitats thus the institutional and physical borders in the management of forest and wildlife should be removed to enhance conservation of both (Nelson and Blomley, 2006). As a result, the harmonisation of forest and wildlife areas has meant that Village Councils lose powers over VLFRs and VBRs to WMAs and their AAs. Conceptually, the re-alignment of wildlife and forest areas at the village level confirms the argument that institutional reforms were instrumental to the creation of WMAs in Tanzania and that they created conditions for intensifying conservation efforts at the local scale. Also these reforms supported the re-organisation of conventional institutions and the establishment of the supra-village institution to allow for the smooth establishment of the desirable scale. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how legal reforms formed part of the process of creating the local scale in Tanzania.

The establishment of the WMA scale in Tanzania raises three key questions related to the nature of CBOs, power struggles and beneficiation. Firstly, CBOs established for WMAs should under normal circumstances, have been initiated by communities themselves with the guidance of the Societies Ordinance Chapter 337. The procedure is for the community to agree on the CBO constitution which qualifies it to be a civil society organisation registered under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Contrary to this procedure, the WMA process has been overly influenced by wildlife laws and that local communities are literally mobilized and facilitated by various actors to complete the procedures in a rather top-down fashion (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 23/9/2008). I argue, then, that WMAs in Tanzania are not local initiatives hence communities have no direct role/influence over their establishment. Instead, different actors who facilitate wildlife protection (the government, international conservation NGOs and development agencies) maintain command of the WMA process, mostly in favour of wildlife protection, expansions and utilization in communal lands.

Figure 4.1: Governance reforms and scale effects in Tanzania



The second question relates to the tensions that exist between the old and newly established natural resource institutions at the local level. The tension emanates from the fact that WMA governance established structure alongside the existing local government institutions such as District and Village Councils. The Tanzanian government recognises District and Village Councils as responsible bodies for the management of natural resources in their jurisdiction (with village as the lowest level in the hierarchy). In the villages, the Village Assembly is a supreme authority made of all constituent member households of the village (URT, 1982). The assembly elects its own village government (that is the Village Council) composed of the chairperson, executive secretaries and representatives of social workers and religious leaders to mention a few. These members of Village Council form different

development committees for, say, natural resources, finance, planning, security and defence. According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, the Village Council is an independent legal entity with powers to manage resources in village lands, hold property and is able to enter into contractual arrangements (URT, 1982). As observed earlier, the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 has additional provisions that grant the Minister responsible for wildlife discretionary powers to designate Village Councils as Authorised Associations for wildlife conservation (Section 26 (1)). These provisions make Village Councils central institutions for local natural resources management.

Prior to the establishment of WMAs, Village Council natural resource committee (known as *Kamati ya Mali Asili* in Kiswahili) would oversee all issues related to natural resources in the village land in addition to the village defence committee (*Mgambo wa kijiji*). Discussions with people in the study villages revealed a perception of WMAs as an outside body confused with the central government and donors (mostly Western institutions) who support the protection of the SGR. This was confirmed in the group interviews held with Huria and Kilimasera villagers who refer to the newly established committees as '*conservationists'* (famous as *Wahifadhi* in Kiswahili) and WMAs as GTZ/SCP project areas (Group discussions, Kilimasera, 21/11/2007; Huria, 8/8/2008). This suggests that villagers consider *Wahifadhi* who are entrusted with wildlife protection in WMAs as agents of GTZ and not the community representatives. This perception relates directly to the legacy of colonial and post-colonial wildlife laws that withheld indigenous rights and access to wildlife and forest resources in protected areas.

The confusion that exists in the local level relates also to the wider debate on whether mainstream local government (in this case Village Council) is an appropriate scale to support wildlife protection. On this note, views have been expressed that community wildlife management in Tanzania should be practised through the conventional local government institutions and the focus should be on making village government truly democratic (Shivji, 2001). Counter arguments hold that resources and skills would inevitably remain inadequate at the village level thus new approaches are necessary for diversifying conventional governance structures (Walsh, 2000). It is on the later view that Village Councils become the point of

divergence between the old and new institutions in the WMA process. The two institutions remain the source of tension in the villages following unclear borders and overlap of responsibilities. Whereas new institutions have power and knowledge on matters related to wildlife conservation and utilization in WMAs following recent trainings, Village Councils are also legal entities with powers to control all the land and activities in their area of jurisdiction, including in WMAs. These tensions are even more intensified by the division of village revenues accrued from natural resources in the same village.

The third question relates to how revenue from tourism-related activities is distributed. It is apparent that CBOs in WMAs have power to do one thing that local governments (District and Village Councils) never did; that is to enter into contractual arrangement with private investors. However, as noted earlier in this and previous chapters, the government has, through the Wildlife Division, maintained a command system of control of hunting investments over a long time and hunting tourism remain the main source of its revenue (Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, 1995, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). Since WMA is an additional institution in the sector, it has brought financial implications to the Wildlife Division. As part of the enforcement of the WMA regulations, a benefit-sharing mechanism has been proposed to protect this important source of the government revenue while ensuring that local communities benefit (but are not exploited) by private investors (Interviews, Zakaria, 15/3/2008). At the time of this study, the benefit sharing formula had not been released to the public. However, informants who spoke on condition of anonymity revealed that the Wildlife Division and Treasury hold a stake as the two support the establishment of WMAs. Views of these informants suggest further that, the Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund supports wildlife protection throughout the country thus, it is legible for the share of benefits accrued from the conservation of WMAs. Moreover, District Councils provide social and technical services to the villages owning WMAs so they need to cushion their revenues using WMA funds. Likewise, Village Councils, which own the land where wildlife is found, and CBOs, which are the AAs in WMAs, deserve a lion's share of the revenue (Interviews, Anonymous Informants, 31/1/2008; 17/3/2008).

Even though other actors such as conservation NGOs and development agencies facilitated reforms with the objective of downscaling government powers over wildlife and creating an autonomous local scale, the process has depended largely on the government laws, which have since the approval of WMAs, been continuously changing. For example, in 2000 new regulations to govern hunting tourism were issued. Although this is around the same time that WMA regulations were prepared, the hunting regulations prohibited tourism from being carried out in any hunting blocks, including those in WMAs, without the permission of the Director of Wildlife (URT, 2000, Nshala, 2002). Recalling from the WMA procedures on the same issue, the regulations require that before the AA enters into investment agreement with private investors the Director of Wildlife must approve the investment (URT, 2002c). In the meantime, the review of the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 which had been under way since early 2000 led to the adoption of the Draft Wildlife Conservation Act (2004)[8] which legitimizes the creation and use of WMAs (URT, 2004). The Draft Act reflects even a much more centralized framework. For instance, Section 3(1) of the Draft applauds that;

> *The ownership of all wildlife in Tanzania is vested in the President on behalf of, and for the benefit of the people of Tanzania'*. The Act declares further in Section 28(3) that, '*benefit sharing in WMAs shall comply with circulars issued by the government from time to time and shall adhere to mechanisms of equitable distribution of costs and benefits*[9]*.*

Furthermore, the Wildlife Conservation (Non-consumptive Wildlife Utilization) regulations were reviewed and passed in September 2007. The regulations have provisions that give the government powers to control wildlife-related activities and revenues in WMAs (URT, 2007b). The regulations indicate that all sources of revenue are planned and controlled by the Wildlife Division, including tourist entry fees to WMAs. Therefore, local communities have no direct access to the revenues generated from WMAs. The above law provisions raise concerns among local communities and non-government actors, most of them blaming the government for regulating the process in its favour. The main concern is the degree of the autonomy of the WMA institutions. Currently, CBOs remain semi-autonomous following new

8 During the time of this study the Draft Wildlife Conservation Act 2004 was waiting to be tabled in Parliament.

9 Distribution in this case is between the government, AAs (for communities that happen to reside proximity to wildlife areas) and the general public (for the later to get share of the wealth created from wildlife in their country).

government regulations and laws that redefine powers from time to time. Thus different views have emerged on the viability of WMAs as the catalyst for community and private sector empowerment under the current practices. On the one hand, donors, conservation NGOs and even local representatives consider wildlife laws and WMA regulations too complex. The protest cites critical issues such as mechanisms for benefit sharing, quota utilization and investments in the WMAs, which are still under the control of the Minister and the Director of Wildlife (Nelson, 2007, Nelson and Blomley, 2006, Nelson et al., 2007, Rodgers et al., 2003). There has also been an outpouring allegation of corrupt and inept government officials at both the Wildlife Division and at the local government levels.

Research demonstrate that the existing mechanisms for benefit sharing favour institutions and individuals – the Wildlife Division, District Councils and private investors - who do not bear the costs of conservation while constraining the flow of benefits to the local communities (Brockington, 2007, Kideghesho, 2008b, Baldus, 2006a, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), 2009, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). Government officials, particularly in the Wildlife Division are alleged of not only colluding with illegal hunters but also with foreign private investors in influencing the allocation of hunting blocks and other wildlife benefits in WMAs (Kideghesho, 2008b, Nelson et al., 2007). It is alleged that hunting concessions are allocated at prices far below market value irrespective of size, quality and income potential (Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG), 2006, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). As a result, the income to the Wildlife Division has remained the same despite the increasing number of hunting clients. Even where distribution to the District Councils is effected, the discretion of allocating wildlife funds rests with government officials and most of the revenues do not find their way down to the communities (Kideghesho, 2008b). These allegations have been the source of tensions in the Wildlife Division as donors and local communities express their dissatisfactions about the WMA process. Tensions and struggles over control of natural resource between different actors are not exceptional to Tanzania but are inherently the manifestations of scaling processes. Since scale changing inevitably re-arrange institutions, create new space and redefine powers over that space, the process is expected to empower some actors while disempowering others (McCarthy, 2005, Paasi, 2004, Perkmann and Sum, 2002, Swyngedouw, 2004b). This understanding

should therefore be the basis for the analysis of the impacts of WMAs on different actors involved in their creation.

4.4 Actor networks and assemblages

Echoing the discussion in Chapter Three, the management of natural resources in Tanzania depends heavily on external actors - most of whom represent major global corporations, bilateral governments, development agencies and transnational conservation NGOs. In fact, it is argued that almost all external actors direct their funds toward activities that influence policy changes and the re-definition of borders of nature as a strategy for translating the global conservation and economic policies into workable situations in the country (Williams and Mohan, 2005, Alastair, 2005, Barrow et al., 2000). In particular, these actors and their different activities have, in one way or the other, focused on the implementation of the bioregional planning model by creating a network that facilitates the realignment of their activities that target WMAs as stepping stones toward the implementation of specific bioregional projects. The networks that connect these actors and their specific programs in the country are complex. For example, the '*Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG)'* brings together all development actors but does not include '*government membership*' (Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG), 2006). As such, the government of Tanzania receives about 40% of its total annual budget from these partners (Levine, 2002, Nelson et al., 2007). More specifically, the MNRT draws about 90% of its annual conservation funds from these partners (URT, 1998b). The point here is that scales (including WMAs) must be appreciated as effects of these networked practices (Legg, 2009, Swyngedouw, 2004a). Indeed, the network of development partners in Tanzania, their financial and technical support in training, ideas and philosophies of Western nature conservation sustained greater control over the country's environmental conservation policies (Schroeder, 1999, Levine, 2002, Bonner, 1993, Igoe and Brockington, 2007) which facilitated the establishment of WMAs.

Different members of the DPG targeted core protected areas as the place where any strategy for expansion and protection of wildlife must begin (AWF, 2006). Thus, assistance for conservation programs in the country targeted wildlife institutions with the main aim of introducing CBC projects throughout the country. Actually, CBC

projects were important for achieving conservation objectives since protected areas are surrounded by the poorest communities (Parkipuny, 1991) who not only pose threats to such areas but also have rights to the land that is considered critical for the expansion of protected areas. Precisely, the WWF facilitated anti-poaching and general management activities of game reserves and national parks through the Wildlife Division and TANAPA since 1985 (URT, 2001b). The management plans that followed introduced the community-based approaches to wildlife protection (WWF, 2004). Later in 1989, the WWF through its Wildlife and Human Needs program started community-based projects around protected areas in Ruaha and Udzungwa National Parks, East Coast Forests, Eastern Arch Mountains as well as in SGR (Levine, 2007; TANAPA, 2008; Interview, Sosovele, 22/9/2008).

Similarly, since 1988 AWF supported TANAPA's general management plan and anti-poaching activities (AWF, 2006, TANAPA, 2008). Interviews held with the TANAPA ecologist (Mr. Inyasi Lejora) and the AWF's Heartland Director (Dr. Stephen Kiruswa) confirmed that the joint efforts of the AWF and TANAPA led in the establishment and running of the TANAPA-Community Conservation Service (CCS) program in all the national parks (Interviews, Lejora, 30/1/2008; Kiruswa, 12/9/2008). In fact, the CCS program (commonly known as *Ujirani Mwema*[10]*)* was anchored on the AWF's philosophy of '*Neighbours as Partners*' (www.tanzaniaparks.com). The AWF financed a full time officer to run the TANAPA-CCS and the program expanded to a full-fledged department with permanently employed staff in all the national parks (TANAPA, 2008, Goldstein, 2005, AWF, 2006). Further in 1992 AWF focused on facilitating community wildlife projects in northern Tanzania around Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Serengeti, Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks (Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006, AWF, 2006, Barrow et al., 2000).

Meanwhile, the German government initiated collaboration with the Wildlife Division with the aim of influencing the management plan for the SGR. By 1988, the German technical agency, GTZ, had set the Selous Community Conservation Project (SCP) that aimed at establishing wildlife buffer zones in village lands surrounding the reserve (Siege and Baldus, 2000, Baldus and Hahn, 2004). The GTZ extended its

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community-based projects in other reserves such as Katavi-Rukwa and Saadani Game Reserves. Later, GTZ embarked on nationwide projects that supported institutional framework for the community-based approach. At the central government level, GTZ established an office for community wildlife management in the Wildlife Division where the German technical expert (Dr. Rolf Baldus) held the post as a '*National Advisor*' for community-wildlife management (GTZ-Tanzania, 2005). At the local government (which include District and Village Councils), GTZ sponsored the District Natural Resource Management projects and placed its technical advisors as district employees who worked to advise District Councils on community wildlife issues (www.wildlife-programme.gtz.de/wildlife/start.html). Other actors include the Norwegian Agency for International Cooperation (NORAD) and German Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) who jointly facilitated wildlife CBC projects around Serengeti National Park; DFID, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and USAID who jointly supported the establishment of CBC projects in different parts of the country (URT, 2007a, Levine, 2002). These CBC projects were thus transformed into WMAs with the continued support of different international conservation NGOs and development agencies (see Table 4.1).

The preceding discussion points to the importance of networks and assemblages in the creation of a desirable scale and how common scalar interests are pursued by different actors from different angles. Specifically, WMAs have become a tool for the implementation of the bioregional planning model as applied by different actors in Tanzania. The WWF is currently using WMAs to create ecoregions (Interviews, Salehe, 28/2/2008; Sosovele, 22/9/2008); AWF uses WMAs for the expansion of heartlands (Interview, Kiruswa, 12/9/2008) while the German government uses WMAs to create the SNWC and the TFCA. As Adams and McShane (1996) put, the Western dream of the '*frontier of wilderness*' has managed to re-organise African governments and translate community-based approaches into a policy tool for the expansion and control of wildlife outside core protected areas. Indeed, there has been a drastic increase in wildlife numbers in communal lands (Baldus, 2008, URT, 2007a). Not surprising, elephants are increasingly reported killing people and livestock, competing for water and destroying facilities in the villages as well as trampling crops in the fields and granaries (Magingi, 2002, Kideghesho, 2002,

Nahonyo, 2001, Kideghesho, 2006, Kikoti, 2001). In 2007 alone, wildlife-caused agricultural losses averaged 40% of the crops grown in Tanzania and about 68 people were killed by elephants countrywide (URT, 2007a). Against this background, WMAs have become important tools for achieving global conservation objectives of expanding and establishing a network of protected areas.

Table 4.2 WMAs and their main facilitators countrywide

Name of WMA	Main facilitator (s)
Mbarang'andu (Namtumbo)	GTZ/GTZ-IS
Nalika (Tunduru)	GTZ/GTZ-IS
Kisunguke (Namtumbo)	GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW
Kimbanda (Namtumbo)	GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW
Chingoli (Tunduru)	GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW
Makame (Kiteto)	AWF
Pawaga-Idodi (Iringa)	WWF
Burunge (Babati)	AWF
Ikona (Serengeti)	FZS
Enduimet (Longido)	AWF
Liwale (Liwale)	GTZ
Ngarambe-Tapika (Rufiji)	WWF
Uyumbu (Urambo)	Africare
Ipole (Sikonge)	Africare/USAID
Wami-Mbiki (Bagamoyo & Morogoro)	Danish Hunters' Association
Ukutu (Morogoro)	MNRT-Wildlife Division

Source: Author compilation

In the case of the SNWC and the TFCA, the process of establishing WMAs is not completed yet, and institutional conflict continues to grow but different strategies are converged to ensure that WMAs can be expanded once they are in place. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the proponents of WMAs viewed the Forest and Beekeeping Division as an important partner in the initiative. Thus different bilateral and multilateral development partners (some of whom had facilitated wildlife sector reforms and the establishment of WMAs) including the DANIDA, the Finnish International Development Agency (FINIDA), GTZ, NORAD and the World Bank supported the implementation of a national wide forest program that focussed on the realignment of village forest and wildlife areas (URT, 2001c). Consequently, new village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs) and Bee Reserves (VBRs) were created for

that purpose. For example, at the same time that the SNWC project started in early 2006, the FINIDA financed a three year plan (2006-2010) to establish nine VLFRs in Namtumbo and Tunduru districts with particular focus on villages in the SNWC area (Interview, Mgela, 12/9/2007). This source confirmed that until March 2007 six VLFR (Kilangalanga, Solute, Chegena, Masuguru and Naikesi Kumbara) had been established. Along these lines, an email correspondence of 2 March 2008 from Tom Blomley - the Senior GTZ-Technical Advisor on Participatory Forest Management to Rudolf Hahn - the GTZ-Technical Advisor for WMAs attested that the integration of VLFRs to WMAs would expand wildlife habitats across village borders and support the creation of the SNWC (Blomley, 2007). In the coming section I demonstrate how WMAs (that include VFLR and VBRs) are created and used to establish the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

4.5 The creation and functioning of WMAs in Selous-Niassa area

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) was a CBC project jointly implemented by the German government through the GTZ and the MNRT-Wildlife Division. While the German government was the pioneer and the main sponsor of the SCP (hereafter GTZ/SCP), the MNRT-Wildlife Division is the government agency responsible for the overall management of the SGR. The GTZ/SCP worked between 1988 and 1998 to establish buffer zones in communal lands of fifty one villages in seven districts (GTZ/SCP, 1995, Baldus, 2006a). Put together, approximately 8600 km^2 of communal land was converted into some sort of wildlife conservation areas (Baldus, 2008). In the context of this study, the ten year period of the GTZ/SCP was the first phase of the implementation of the broader objective of the establishment of a bioregion across the Tanzania-Mozambique border. The second phase of the bioregional project is discussed in this section only in relation to the creation of WMAs. Further analysis of how these WMAs are used in the creation of the SNWC is provided in Chapter Five.

In 2003, the five GTZ/SCP buffer zone areas were designated among the first sixteen WMA sites in the country. The buffer zones in Namtumbo and Tunduru districts formed Mbarang'andu and Nalika WMAs respectively. CBOs for the two WMAs were registered recently; Nalika in 2007 and Mbarang'andu in 2008. At the time of this study, however, these CBOs were still awaiting the Director of Wildlife to

declare them AAs. In the meantime, Graham (2005) reports that these WMAs have prevented further settlement and farming activities in the village areas identified for wildlife and have provided openings for the continuation of habitats southward to the NGR in Mozambique. This would thus mark the beginning of the SNWC, which is an important component of the bioregional planning model. The creation of the SNWC depends exclusively on the establishment of more WMAs. Hence, three WMAs have, since early 2006, been proposed and the process of their establishment is currently underway. The proposed WMAs are Chingoli, Kisungule and Kindamba that extends southwards to the Tanzania-Mozambique border. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, it is these WMAs coupled with the already established Mbarang'andu and Nalika WMAs that form the 15,000 hectares zone mentioned earlier (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Baldus et al., 2003). The ownership and use of WMAs remain ambiguous as they are village lands but, at the same time, the Wildlife Division leases them as hunting blocks to the tourists.

Figure 4.2: WMAs that form the SNWC across village lands



Source: Modified from Schuerholz and Bossen, (2005: 2)

The SNWC project was first introduced in the villages in early 2006 with the aim of establishing three WMAs in the area of twelve villages (see Table 4.3). Unlike in

Mbarang'andu and Nalika, the twelve villages have not been involved in community-based conservation so the WMA idea is relatively new to the villagers. It will be recalled that Mbarang'andu and Nalika WMAs took nearly two decades from the time GTZ/SCP started in 1988 to 2007/2008 when WMAs were registered. Comparatively, the process for the proposed WMAs in the SNWC project was well advanced when the fieldwork was finalised in August 2008. The progress could be explained by the fact that the SNWC is an extension of the GTZ/SCP thus the experience and techniques used are replicated. While this is a positive result for the project, the side of the local communities lacks knowledge on the WMA process and its livelihood impacts. As the details below will indicate, the process of creating the three WMAs has been surrounded by fear of loss of land by local communities and also generated conflicts over control and use of wildlife by local natural resource institutions, the central government and the proponents of WMAs.

Table 4.3: Study villages and their WMA memberships

#	Name of Villages	Name of WMA/CBO	Time started	WMA/CBO status
1 2	Darajambili Huria	Nalika	1988 (part of the GTZ/SCP)	CBO registered in 2007 and waiting for the AA status
3 4	Mchomoro Kilimasera	Mbarang'andu	1988 (part of the GTZ/SCP)	CBO registered in 2008 and waiting for the AA status
5 6 7 8 9	Milonji Lusewa Ligunga Matepwende Msisima	Kimbanda	March 2008 (part of the SNWC)	Proposed WMA (subject to the village land use plans)
10 11 12	Amani Magazine Likusanguse	Kisungule	March 2008 (part of the SNWC)	Proposed WMA (subject to the village land use plans)
13 14 15	Misiaji Marumba Molandi	Chingoli	March 2008 (part of the SNWC)	Proposed WMA (subject to the village land use plans)

It follows that the SNWC project trained Village Council leaders and twelve game scouts from each village. On their arrival from the training, village leaders convened Village Assemblies where five village members were elected to join the game scouts in representing the village in the SNWC project (Picard and Hahn, 2007). As it was for the GTZ/SCP, the elected committee and game scouts were not to be confused

with the mainstream Village Council natural resource committees. New committees are specifically identified with the SNWC project. Literally, the villagers call the members of these committees the *Washoroba* (literally meaning the corridor people). The *washoroba* would also include the SNWC officials, district game officers and any other person in the village who supports the SNWC project. Other village-based training programmes followed in early 2007 where Village Councils, traditional and religious leaders were trained on laws governing village land administration and planning *vis a vis* conservation (Lerise *et al.*, 2007). According to the District Land Officers in Namtumbo and Tunduru, the training focussed on providing legal assistance to community leaders for them to understand the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 and to guide community members on land issues related to use, rights and ownership. Of importance to this discussion is the fact that the training used the Village Land Act to elucidate that all the land in Tanzania is public property and the President holds it in trust on behalf of all the citizens. This was to let villagers know that the President can take away a person's right to occupy land for the benefit of the public. Indeed, village leaders who attended the training acknowledged in the interviews that the training came as a threat at the time when they were supposed to decide on the areas of village lands to set aside for wildlife (Interviews, Matepwende Village Council, 18/9/2007, Lusewa Village Council, 19/9/2007). Villagers generally shared this view. In fact, the villagers regarded the delegation of the training facilitators (that composed of district game officers, the SNWC project managers, sponsors and technical advisers) as an indicator of the value of their land for wildlife, which according to the laws, would outweigh the existing community use. Leaders of the Msisima village were especially concerned about the statement that Dr. David Kaggi, a German conservationist and one of the pioneers of the SNWC project made to the Village Assembly. According to these leaders, the statement insinuated that;

> *...even if the village disapproves the project (SNWC project), by virtue of having wildlife the area is of international importance and the government would declare it a wildlife corridor* (Interview, Msisima Village Council, 18/9/2007)

Accordingly, the Msisima village endorsed the project because it could not oppose the government. In other villages such as Likusanguse, the training delegation encountered hostility from villagers following the SNWC project's plan to relocate one of its sub-villages called Semeni. The detailed discussion of these relocations is

provided in Chapter Six. In short, the location of the Semeni sub-village is considered a threat to wildlife and the SNWC project in general. However, villagers question the decision to relocate 332 people of Semeni when the village is yet to decide which part of its land will be set aside for wildlife. The Likusanguse village leaders brought to my attention that in October 2007 the Village Assembly put the Village Council under pressure to conduct democratic voting for or against the SNWC project. It follows that, *fifty three* villagers supported the project while *one hundred and eighty three* voted against the project (Interview, Likusanguse Village Council, 20/9/2007). On arrival of the delegation of the SNWC and the DC in the village on 19 October 2007, the Village Council presented views of the assembly based on the votes. According to the key informant in the village, the DC tore the voting report and insisted that '*the wildlife corridor project is not a subject of discussion. The President has already signed an agreement so nobody can oppose this decision'* (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 18/11/2007). At the end of the fieldwork, land use issues and the demands of the Village Assembly in Likusanguse village remained inconclusive. In other villages land use maps were produced with the participation of local residents. For example, the SNWC facilitated training workshops in November 2007 which, for the first time, brought together eighty five newly elected representatives of the twelve villages (Lerise et al., 2007, InWent, 2007a, Picard and Hahn, 2007). In terms of the WMA governance structure discussed earlier in this chapter, these village representatives would form WMA councils and establish the CBOs. Among other things, the workshops reiterated on issues of land use, ownership and conservation in the village lands. Discussions on these issues formerly registered village endorsements of the SNWC's objective of establishing WMAs. In fact, village representatives participated in the drawing of land use sketch maps for their villages as the initial step towards setting aside wildlife conservation areas. Figure 4.3 shows the example of such maps for Magazini village in relation to the neighbouring villages of Amani (to the west), Likusanguse (to the east) as well as Mozambique[11] (to the south).

11 Msumbiji is the Kiswahili name for Mozambique.

Figure 4.3: An example of land use maps drawn during the training workshop



Source: Adopted from InWent (2007a: 22)

The drawing of these sketch maps by village representatives suggests that there was an attempt to decide on village land use through a small section of the community. Likewise, these representatives deliberated the names of the proposed WMAs/CBOs (as indicated earlier in Table 4.3) and elected the leaders (including the chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers as well as members of Board of Trustees) (Picard and Hahn, 2007, InWent, 2007a). Thus in my view, the training workshops and land use maps prepared by village representatives served to ratify ceding village lands for wildlife. As such, the workshops established the governance for the WMAs and prepared grounds for the actual land use planning that would facilitate the acquisition of village lands for wildlife and therefore create space for WMA institutions to function. To this end, the wildlife management responsibilities were to be shared between the Village Councils and newly established supra-village institutions.

4.6 Conservation, commercialization and private trusts

The AWF, with the support of the FFI, GEF, Nature Conservancy (NC) and USAID initiated the idea of a conservation land trust that would facilitate the purchase of community, private and government-owned lands in wildlife rich areas with a motto that '*to save wildlife one must save land'* (AWF, 2007, Muruthi, 2005, Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT), 2000). In early 2000, the first Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT) was registered as an NGO with the objectives of acquiring critical wildlife areas threatened by private developments (www.awf.org). Precisely, the TLCT is managed by a Board of Trustees who are drawn from AWF, WWF, UNDP and TANAPA (Sumba *et al.*, 2005). The Trustee's role is to ensure that the Trust Fund and the Property (land) is expanded for wildlife protection (Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT), 2000: 22).

On 19 April 2001 the TLCT made its first successful business when it bought the government-owned Manyara ranch, an area of about 44,000 acres with a 99-year deed issued '*gratis'* to the TLCT (Sumba *et al*., 2005). The ranch is located within the wildlife corridor that links the Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks in the northern Tanzania. Surrounding the ranch is the Burunge WMA, which forms an important part of the corridor. The acquisition of the ranch was thus a critical step towards the expansion of both the WMA and the corridor and it contributes to the creation of the AWF's Maasai Stepples Heartland. The consequences of the ranch on local communities will be made clear in Chapter Six. For now, I concentrate on how the TLCT acquires land for conservation. Interviews with anonymous trust officials revealed that the TLCT is focusing on any negotiable lands (government or privately owned) in ecologically rich areas, preferably around national parks and cross-border zones. The TLCT has a national mandate to secure areas of interest for conservation and is expected to use a range of legal and economic tools such as easement, direct purchase and management agreements with local land owners (Sumba *et al.*, 2005). Elsewhere in the region, the AWF, which acts as the secretariat for the TLCT facilitated the establishment of such trusts in Kenya, Zambia and Mozambique, and are to become regional models in securing land for the establishment of large scale conservation areas (www.awf.org). Thus, the creation of private trusts and new land categories such as VLFRs and VBRs is a strategy for

land acquisition that points to the need for further analysis of the role and interest of the private sector in the expansion of conservation at a local scale.

It is apparent that reforms that occurred in the natural resource sector in Tanzania have created an environment conducive to the expansion of wildlife areas and have opened space for the liberalization. As such, the private sector has recently become an active player in deciding investments in communal lands as ways of accessing markets in nature conservation. Although land laws in Tanzania still restrict private ownership of land, especially by foreign individuals and companies, there are provisions in the law that encourage partnership between foreign and local investors and does allow foreigners to own investments in the land (URT, 1999a). In this case, foreign development partners could invest on land where wildlife exists as private properties albeit in a joint venture with local partners. It should be emphasized that investment and partnerships in WMAs are part of larger projects. Since the current policy direction is clearly towards the establishment of WMAs as non-government institutions (Marcus, 2007, Nelson et al., 2007), it is likely that WMAs will be core areas for nature commodification in Tanzania. Based on this view, the current investment and partnerships in WMAs intend to create a commercial niche for individuals and private sector actors.

Although WMAs in Tanzania are yet to attain complete autonomy over wildlife, there have already been striking business connections between them and private investors that require little or no approval of the central government. Thus, rather than the economic empowerment of states and local communities that were envisaged earlier, WMAs in Tanzania are used to forge connections that integrate local resource base directly into the global market. Under normal circumstances, however, principles of globalization create conditions that local people are not often able to compete effectively in the face of much more powerful multinational interests (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). In fact, Brockington (2003) argues that neither protectionism nor neoliberal economic development needs to benefit the poor in order to thrive. Despite these views, poverty in rural areas is often invoked to promote conservation and nature-related businesses as the recent scientists and hunters symposium held in London in 2006 demonstrates. The aim of the symposium was to examine recreational hunting as a conservation tool and to explore how hunting could be a

partner in rural development. At that symposium, the president of the Tropical Game Commission of the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC) Rolf Baldus - formerly the Technical Advisor for the GTZ/SCP - used his experience of wildlife policies and practices in Tanzania to sell the idea that hunting could contribute significantly to the conservation objectives and to poverty alleviation schemes in economically marginal regions (Damm, 2006). Subsequently, the idea was adopted in the Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP 9) to the CBD held in May 2008 in Bonn, German. For the first time in history, CIC and the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection presented a Markhor Award during the COP to the leaders of the five WMA CBOs in the SNWC and three others on the Mozambique side (Figure 4.4) (International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2008).

Figure 4.4: CIC Markhor Award for the WMAs in SNWC

Source: Photo taken by the author, 6/8/2008 in Lusewa village office

This award points to the fact that the local scale and its resources are connected to the global market through individuals and global corporations that facilitate the establishment of WMAs. As Igoe and Brockington (2007) argue, this connection and the role played by these actors will determine who has powers over wildlife resources in the village lands in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa. Comparatively, the German government has assumed an exceptional donor position in the development of the SGR and the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Details of this discussion are provided in Chapter Five. In the meantime, my assertion that Germany is the main actor of the ongoing TFCA process is supported by the analysis of the scientific and financial contributions made through different German government agencies to the Wildlife Division with the focus on the SGR and the SNWC project. I go further to ascertain that since the planned Selous-Niassa TFCA has economic potential, different actors have interests which range from personal, institutional and political (through international relations and geospatial expansions) to regional and global recognition (through the support for biodiversity conservation). As such, the Selous-Niassa TFCA is considered a gateway for regional commerce and trade through the MtDC thus interests of different actors revolve around access and control of this new business area. The German government is better placed since it controls the TFCA process and it is likely that the Selous-Niassa TFCA will be the political ground on which it regains control and influence over the southeastern Tanzania that had once been its centre of commerce. This argument is captured by views of different informants. For example, a policy analyst in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism opined that;

> *...we should not ignore the fact that reasons that brought colonialists to Africa remain the same. They (former colonial masters) are still interested in expanding their geopolitical influence from which they can continue getting raw materials for their industries, cheap labour, and employment for their people and of course market for their manufactured goods. These things are needed more than during colonialism. The only difference is the approach that they take…* (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 15/2/2008).

Conceptually, business in the wildlife protection projects in southeastern Tanzania manifests in a number of ways; one is through direct wildlife-based businesses such as hunting tourism, which involves coordination of regional and international tourism industry and, second, through the provision of consultancy services, equipments and

direct placement of experts in such projects. On the first way, hunting tourism especially in southeastern Tanzania remains an important business area with high potential for expansion since the SGR is currently considered one of the best wildlife hunting destinations in Africa (African Indaba, 2007). Securing sustainable hunting areas and other wildlife-based investments is thus one of the interests of different actors in the Selous-Niassa area. Currently, the GTZ boosts for facilitating the achievement of the said status (Baldus, 2008, GTZ-Tanzania, 2005). Related to this is the fact that in November 2007 the German Federal Environment Ministry established the 'Business and Biodiversity' initiative through which leading companies are encouraged to integrate the protection of biodiversity more closely into their business activities (GTZ, 2008, www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen). Precisely, the GTZ is charged with the implementation of this initiative. Thus, GTZ provides experts and arranges contacts with institutions and environmental organisations to work in partnership with the businesses (GTZ, 2008). These organisations determine how nature protection and utilization can be integrated into their business activities. This way, the biodiversity conservation, especially in developing countries where states lack sufficient resources, becomes a business area for different actors. In fact, the Markhor award to the SNWC villages is part of the business and biodiversity project and, according to the CIC sources, the award will be given every two years at the future COPs in recognition of good practices in conservation through sustainable use of wildlife, particularly hunting (www.cic-wildlife.org).

The second way in which business environment is created in the Selous-Niassa area relates closely to the foregoing. Chapter Five provides details of how the network of actors and assemblage of technical and financial resources facilitate the establishment of the SNWC. These networks have relevant connections to the discussions in this section. In short, the SNWC is implemented by the private consulting companies most of which are the agencies of the main donor (i.e. the German government). These agencies provide consultancy services in the implementation of worldwide projects financed by the German government and other partners in developing countries including the World Bank, European Union or United Nations and other private organisations. In the case of the SNWC, the GTZ-IS is paid commission to implement the GEF/UNDP component of the project (Interview, Dorken, 18/8/2008) while the private consulting company JBG Gauff

Ingenieure is paid commission to implement the KfW funds in the project (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 4/8/2008). Apparently, JBG Gauff Ingenieure is also a German-based private company with its head office in Nuremberg (www.bau-ingenieure-gesucht.de). Apart from commissions, the private companies enjoy tax exemptions which are part of bilateral cooperation agreements. Specifically, Article 1 (1.3) of the German-Tanzania financial agreement for the SNWC states that '*Taxes and other public charges will be borne by the recipient and import duties shall not be financed from the financial contribution'*. Article 6 (6.1 (d) clarifies further that, '*the recipient shall ensure the full financing of the project costs not paid from this financial contribution'*…which includes import duties [my emphasis] (KfW and URT, 2006).

Literature supports that schemes of profit through capital, market and labor are inherently unequal and have, for the past three centuries, been the fundamental force in reshaping the world's politics, economy and environment in favour of capitalist countries (Harvey, 2001, Ingham, 2008, Castree, 2008). Linked to the foregoing discussions about biodiversity protection and business connections is the fact that Germany remains among the top trading partners of Tanzania. This position was partly supported by the signing of a number of economic cooperation agreements immediately after Tanzania secured independence from Britain in 1961. These agreements include, for example, the trade and economic agreement of 1962, the shipping protocol of 1962, the investment protection accord of 1965 as well as the bilateral air service agreement of 1981 (www.daressalam.diplo.de). Worthy of notice in this regard is the fact that Tanzania is currently a focal country of the German development cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa with an annual budget of around Pounds 45 million (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2007). As would be expected, the level of development allows Tanzania to export mainly agricultural products to Germany while importing machines and chemical products (www.daressalam.diplo.de). Recently, the United Nations revealed further that the German companies see a considerable potential for expansion of trade relations with Tanzania following the expanded market size and access through East African Community which is expected to offer investors the second largest single market in Africa by 2013 (United Nations, 2005a). The GTZ coordinator for Tanzania confirms that;

*...Tanzania has great potentials for business with German...the country is very rich in agricultural and tourism areas. The government of German has obligations to assist it in alleviating poverty because in a globalised world it is a mutual benefit for a poor country to develop. A well-off Tanzania will be of interest to any partner in business. Tanzania cannot buy much-sophisticated products from German if it remains poor so German will lose market to China… (*Interview, Dorken 19/2/2008).

4.7 Conclusion

Scale perspective as used in this chapter offers an alternative approach towards understanding the political and economic processes that influence decisions over natural resources management in Tanzania. The analysis of WMAs as a new scale challenges the view that WMAs are community-based projects. The chapter demonstrates that although WMAs operate at the local level, they are not local initiatives and their establishment is predominantly top-down. The chapter has demonstrated how different Western conservation and development agencies have been instrumental in the implementation of the reforms that subsequently managed to alter the scale and reverse power relations thus giving them powers over local natural resource management and utilization. As Bonner (1993) suggests, these actors and their money have as much influence on Africa today as the imperial colonial government would have. Scale narratives have confirmed that the existing tensions among different actors in the establishment of WMAs in Tanzania are a manifestation of struggles for power over local resources. Certainly, WMA scale is not an end to itself but a logical step towards the establishment of African heartlands, ecoregions and TFCAs in Tanzania. The chapter suggests, therefore, that the analysis of the impacts of these WMAs on local communities should consider the broader ecological and economic contexts at which they are established. So too is the analysis of the roles and interest of different actors who facilitate their establishment. Thus Chapter Five focuses on how WMAs in southeastern Tanzania are established by different actors to support the creation of the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

CHAPTER FIVE: SCALE, BORDERS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELOUS-NIASSA WILDLIFE CORRIDOR

5.0 Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how conservation activities in southeastern Tanzania take the expression of the bioregional planning model discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter reveals that WMAs serve as both buffer zones to the SGR and are instrumental to the creation of the wildlife corridor (SNWC). In the context of the scale analysis, WMAs and the SNWC are used to scale-up the status of the SGR to a supra-national unit, namely, the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Whereas the establishment of WMAs was an attempt to scale-down government powers to the supra-village institutions, the TFCA process has necessitated the establishment of the supra-national unit currently operating as a Joint Cross-Border Environmental Conservation Group. From this understanding, the chapter argues that the process of creating the SNWC involves the re-organization of communal land and borders to facilitate the expansion of wildlife areas. Thus the Selous-Niassa TFCA is characterised by the introduction of new borders that promote the displacement and further division of cross-border communities. In attesting this, the chapter analyzes border narratives in southeastern Tanzania in relation to the ongoing establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. The chapter challenges the TFCA idea of the removal of political borders by suggesting that the meaning of borders is selectively applied to support TFCAs.

The chapter is organised in four main sections. The first section analyzes border issues based on local narratives and colonial plans and practices that led to the expansion of the SGR. The section ventilates that human-wildlife as well as the Tanzania-Mozambique borders in southeastern Tanzania are not '*physically erected fences*' but natural features (including rivers and mountains) which are not barriers to the movement of wildlife *per se*. Thus, borders for wildlife areas were and remain metaphors that are supported by the use of map representations, which emphasizes the separation between humans and wildlife. Based on this analysis, the section suggests that political borders that served colonial administrations did not interfere with the movement of people nor did they block wildlife migration. The second section makes the connections between colonial practices and contemporary scaling processes that underpin the establishment of the SNWC. The section demonstrates

how, like in other TFCAs, the Selous-Niassa is linked to the projects of different institutions, thus making different actors to take part in the re-definition of borders. The section leads to the proposition that, as it was during the expansion of the SGR, the creation of the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA are based on the re-organization of local communities and their land uses to create space for wildlife protection and control. Section three demonstrates the process of creating the SNWC and how that process has introduced new metaphors and new meanings of borders that prevent people from accessing resources in communal lands but giving wildlife unrestricted access to such lands. Hence, section four examines the TFCA idiom of borders and its practicality in southeastern Tanzania. The section asserts that rather than removing borders, the Selous-Niassa TFCA has brought new human-wildlife and institutional borders.

5.1 Colonial borders in southeastern Tanzania

As it has been implied earlier in this thesis, one of the authoritative arguments for TFCAs is their potential for re-establishing ecological links as well as re-uniting local communities that were allegedly divided by colonial borders. This section analyses border narratives in the southeastern Tanzania as the basis for understanding the meaning of borders as perceived by both the proponents of TFCAs and local communities. These narratives are, in turn, used to understand the impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on cross-border communities in Chapter Six. In short, the section demonstrates that both wildlife and the Mozambique/Tanzania borders are not physically erected fences but natural features whose meanings are defined by humans. The removal of borders as advocated by the proponents of TFCAs has meant the removal of what is perceived as obstacles to wildlife migration between SGR and NGR. Apparently, these obstacles are local communities and their livelihood activities. Their removal has thus been a matter of urgency for the successful establishment of the SNWC. On their side, local communities perceive borders as a political strategy to prevent them from sharing community natural resources rather than restricting their movements locally and across the river/international border.

5.1.1 Borders for people

Perceptions on borders as captured in local narratives support two types of views. Firstly, that borders existed in pre-colonial society but they neither were lines on maps nor were they physical barriers. They marked homesteads that identified dwellers of the area by their families and land of origin. These borders came about to define chiefdoms where disagreements occurred between migrants and indigenous groups. *Mzee* Swedi Sanangula, a historian in the regional museum in Songea town recounts that;

> *...when tribes engaged in fighting that is when they started defining their territories using homesteads of the tribes and those they concurred...settlements and the people of a certain ethnic group defined Chiefdoms. Before trouble arises, people of different groups and chiefdoms could establish close settlements* (Interview, 10/9/2007).

Historically, the district of Songea was among the first settlements and an indigenous home for *Wandendeule*. Between 1840s and 1862 *Wangoni* migrated into the area following Shaka's rise to power and the growth of the Zulu nation in South Africa (Popplewell and Harcus, 1938, Gulliver, 1974). The Wangoni fought for control over the region and its people thus some indigenous were colonised and integrated into the newly established Ngoni Kingdom while others fled to the neighbouring districts of Tunduru, Masasi and Liwale (Gulliver, 1974). Popplewell and Harcus (1938) suggest also that around 1900s groups of *Wahyao*, *Wamakonde*, *Wangindo* and *Wamakua* crossed Ruvuma river from Mozambique and settled along the river in Tunduru district. Although different ethnic groups had settled permanently across the river by the nineteenth century, each group had its history of migration. For example, Wahyao bear the title of Wahyao-Masininga, which is the name of a hill on the borders of Nyasaland (now Malawi) where they originally migrated. This group crossed Ruvuma river under their chiefs and they settled in the northwestern part of the river, which is the present Tunduru and Namtumbo districts. The following narrative supports this observation;

> *...different groups who at times were involved in the ivory and slave trade between the hinterland and the Kilwa coastal market migrated into the Tunduru and Namtumbo from different areas since the seventeenth century. A group led by Mtalika crossed the Ruvuma from Lichinga in Mozambique and settled in Masasi.*

> *Others led by Satia came from Nampula in the eastern Mozambique and also settled in present day Masasi. These two groups are today Wamakua tribe. Wahyao came from Lichinga in Mozambique led by Kundenda, Mataka and Mtarika and settled in where is now Tunduru. Wandendeule (formally Wandonde/Wandamba) were indigenous groups but they also moved in the area from Ifakara valley* (*in Morogoro,* Tanzania). *Wangoni is a group of Zulu people from the south who came through Zimbabwe; they crossed Limpopo and Zambezi rivers to the northern Mozambique and later crossed Ruvuma and settled in the marshlands nowcalled Songea in Tanzania* (Interview, Sanangula, 5/9/2007).

Stories of the arrival of different groups in southeastern Tanzania are in records and few people remain to narrate them. For example, Sheikhe Mohammed Ilali Mikonga of Msisima village tells his personal story of arrival in the area;

> *...a recent history is Mozambique but my ancestors came from Nyasaland where they fled a family clash…they settled in Mozambique for a long time until the Portuguese came and caused many problems. During this time, ivory and slave trade were the main ways of acquiring wealth; we exchanged ivory for bullets, guns and Marekani*[12] *with Arabs along the coast. Due to problems with the Portuguese, my father's friend called Mataka moved with some people and settled in Tunduru. Later my father (Kwizombe) sent a messenger with two ivories to the chief of Ndonde (now Songea) to request for a place to stay...We then moved from Mozambique and settled in Tanganyika along the Lukimwa river in 1933 when I was six years old (*Interview, 8/11/2007).

There are two elements of the above stories that seem to have particular relevance to the border narratives of the area. Firstly, it is implied in the narratives that migrant groups left relatives behind and they maintained their relationships based on the push factors that ranged from ethnic clashes to trade and recently as a result of colonial oppression. Therefore, the present southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique functioned as one unit before colonialism. Secondly, it is implied throughout the memory and understanding of the narrators that different ethnic groups moved and settled where they are today because there were no borders to restrict their movements; rivers and valleys were crossed not as borders but as part of the landscape.

The second type of narrative relates to the famous perception that African borders are colonial creations that gradually weakened traditional institutions and interactions (see Asiwaju, 1985). Local narratives do not dismiss this claim but they do challenge

12 American cloth mainly used as shroud.

the view that colonial borders disrupted their social relations. It is implied that, rather than borders per se, colonial policies that continue to influence cultural practices such as land administration are responsible for the present ethnic divisions. Mamdani has consistently used this argument to explain ethnic violence in rural areas in Africa and the recent conflict in Darfur (Mamdani, 2009, Mamdani, 1996). As such, the Portugal and German colonial administrations signed the declaration on 30 December 1886 to use the course of Ruvuma from its mouth westwards as an international border to separate the two colonies (Thomas, 1951). For local communities, the border implied that those who remained in Mozambique were officially Mozambicans and those who had crossed the river assumed a Tanzanian identity even though they belonged to the same ethnic group. As observed elsewhere, official borders do not correspond with local realities (Griffiths, 1986). As a result, the border status assigned to the Ruvuma and new nationalities that emerged from it did not fundamentally change the perception of the river by the border communities. For many, the international border remains a natural feature that predates colonialism and, as it was, is seldom an obstacle for people's movements. However, community members acknowledge that colonial policies and laws that defined land administration in the two countries restrained the level of cultural interaction among the border communities (Interview, Sanangula, 5/9/2007).

Literature supports further that even during colonial administration the movement of people between Niassa and Cabo Delgado hinterlands to Tanzania continued and it was neither officially approved nor viewed as undesirable thus making it a spontaneous international migration zone (Alpers, 1984, Redmond, 1975). In 1922, for example, a significant number of *Wamakua*, *Wayao* and *Wamakonde* from Mozambique were recorded in Tanzania (Alpers, 1984). Most recently, InWent and GTZ (2007) established that these cross-border movements continue to date and communities have maintained good ties by participating in different social and economic activities such as weddings, initiations and funerals to mention a few. In fact, Village Councils on the Tanzanian side have powers to issue a written permit as a formal procedure for crossing the border; passport and visas are not a requirement for villagers intending to visit their relatives. Thus the popular perception that colonial borders divided contemporary African communities does not conform to the local

realities in southeastern Tanzania. As a group of Matepwende villagers affirms in the clip below, the international border is not their main problem;

> *...it depends on the water level...we cross freely during the dry season because the water level is low. It is normal to visit relatives and even intermarry…we still speak Kihyao…It is only yesterday that Mhyao from Mozambique married our sister in this village. We did not need a passport to go and celebrate the wedding...so really the border is not an issue for us unless one needs to go further in the country for activities other than socialisation…* (Group Discussion, 7/11/2007).

Conceptually, colonial borders were tools for control over land and other natural resources, and policies focussed on disrupting traditional land ownership and social organisations while creating land use patterns that favoured colonial plans. In Tanzania, competition between the German administration and local communities resulted in the use of force to demarcate and re-arrange native lands thus weakening the powers of traditional institutions over land (Monson, 1998). This is to say that German colonial administration re-arranged local borders and created new ones. Precisely, the colonial administration divided the country into twenty two large districts in 1890 (Chachage, 1988). District administrative borders did not consider ethnicity hence ethnic groups were divided and scattered in more than one district (Popplewell and Harcus, 1938). Wahyao, for instance, were divided and today are found in Tunduru and Songea districts so is *Wamakua* in Masasi and Liwale districts. This way, German administration disrupted traditional settlements and community organisations. Resistance to this forced rule in turn resulted in the organisation of native alliance that broke into Maji Maji rebellion in 1905 throughout southern Tanzania.

When the British took over the colony in 1920 the implementation of indirect rule saw the demarcation of larger provinces where chiefdoms within them were used as administrative units. Native Authorities were created in the same year and their borders more or less overlapped with those of the districts created by German administration (Neumann, 2001, Chachage, 1988). However, in place of traditional chiefs, British rule introduced new tax administrators called Liwali and Jumbe and native authorities became focal points for service delivery; schools, clinics, judiciary, police centres and churches became a catalyst for the establishment of permanent

settlements (www.lindi-mtwara-regions.com). Parallel to this, the British government launched a plan to concentrate native settlements based on medical reports that established the need to separate people from wildlife to control the spread of tsetse and sleeping sickness epidemic (Hoppe, 1997, Kjekshus, 1996). This plan involved evacuation of people from *'tsetse labelled areas'* into new settlements (Neumann, 2001).

By 1927, medical reports had officially established that humans were the vertebrate host for tsetse and the spread of sleeping sickness was spread to humans by human beings. This doctrine informed colonial policies for a decade that followed. In 1940s, however, other medical reports suggested that wild animals were the permanent reservoirs of flies. Overall, these medical reports became scientific evidence for separating humans from wild animals and depopulation became a country-wide policy that facilitated the establishment of permanent settlements throughout the 1930s and 1940s (Kjekshus, 1996). Literature supports also that several game reserves were established between 1920s and 1940s which is around the same time that settlement centres were established. For example, Gombe Stream Game Sanctuary in Kigoma and Mbulu Game Reserve were established in 1920, Dodoma Game Reserve followed in l930 (Chachage, 1988). Other game sanctuaries were gazetted in districts such as Mpanda (1931), Manyoni (1931) and Liwale (1940). As the section below will demonstrate, game sanctuaries in Liwale contributed to the expansion of the SGR. Until the 1960s, settlement patterns in the country had taken clearly a desirable condition that supported the separation of wildlife and people and the expansion of protected areas (Kjekshus, 1996). I argue on the basis of this trend that the new administrative units and borders were a plan carried out at the scale of the territorial state and entailed a fundamental reordering of space. The new order divided and contained human populations, changed their interaction with nature and ultimately produced new landscapes for wildlife (Neumann, 2001, Chachage, 1988).

5.1.2 Wildlife and borders

It goes virtually unacknowledged that most of the land that had once been settlements and farms in southeastern Tanzania was depopulated to establish the current SGR (Rodgers, 1976, Neumann, 2001, Matzke, 1976). For example,

Hingston, (1931: 412) proposed that '*the land in Selous is waste without possibility of settlements; it holds only a scanty native population*'. Popplewell and Harcus, (1938: 36) suggested also that the area around Tunduru is '*sparsely populated by a poor type of Bantu who eke out a precarious existence mainly by fishing and gathering*'. Most recently, Baldus (2006: 1) described the area around the SGR as '*once been home to small clans and lineage groups, which lived an isolated life without any larger tribal structures and coherence and their settlements were separated by considerable stretches of uninhabited bush'*. These descriptions ignore the fact that local communities never reoccupied areas that were heavily cultivated in the late nineteenth century, most of which were labelled as major sleeping-sickness areas. Conceptually, the politics around relocations for wildlife protection have roots from colonial policies and they remain the grounds on which people are removed for the establishment of TFCAs today. As Hingston (1931) advised, the use of land by African communities was to be restricted for the interest of wildlife but the later would not be limited by fences. In proposing the model of protected areas for British East Africa, Hingston 1931: 419 wrote that;

> *It is not intended that game reserves and national parks should be limited by any kind of fencing. The natural increase within the park area should find a free overflow across the boundary. Once over the boundary the animals can be shot in accordance with the game regulations of the country...Time will come when these sanctuaries may provide through overflow across their boundaries the one remaining resort for the sportsman. This has happened in the Kruger National Park...a buffer area has been formed along the border consisting either of unoccupied land or of farms sold or let to sportsmen...the park authorities are relieved of the complaints which would occur if settlement or cultivation were on the boundaries of the park.*

The abovementioned proposal was the basis for the adoption of metaphoric borders that were presented on maps and enforced by laws for all protected areas in Tanzania. Although these metaphors do not divide ecological systems per se, they do support the broad rationales for establishing TFCAs. As the previous chapters established, relocations in and around the present reserve resulted in the displacement of thousands of indigenous people and loss of their ancestral land which was left open for wildlife (Kjekshus, 1996, Matzke, 1976, Neumann, 1998). At first, the German imperial governor's office laid down the size (and not the borders) of reserves, namely the area created by ten hours walk in every direction. By

implication every hunting reserve was to measure approximately 1,000 km² (Baldus, 2006b). Thus the governor declared two hunting reserves in the northern areas of the present SGR called Kisaki and Muhoro amounting into 2000 km² (Baldus, 2006b, Kibonde, 2006). As Figure 5.1 indicates, the two reserves were merged and different names were used; Rufiji, Mohoro or Kisaki hunting reserve. These reserves were to be extended over several decades to assume the present borders of the SGR. As such, the British colonial government inherited the responsibility for wildlife protection consolidated the two hunting reserves to form the Selous game sanctuary in 1922 (Matzke, 1976). Figure 5.1 shows that the reserve was expanded in 1928 towards northeast to include an area of about 6,500 km^2 in Mahenge. Matzke (1976) reports further that during this time (i.e. 1928); elephant population was being contained in the reserve only due to the hunting pressure in the northern and eastern areas. The northern and eastern areas had already been declared unfit for cultivation and since it was uninhibited, a proposal was made to expand the boundaries of the reserve to provide more room for elephants. The proposal became a law in 1931 and, as Figure 5.1 suggests, the reserve was thereafter expanded and new others were gazetted in Liwale district, namely, Matandu and Mtetesi reserves.

As Chapter Three demonstrated, the British government embarked on crop protection against wildlife throughout the 1930s in response to food shortages following the aftermath of the Second World War. Elephant control schemes in the areas neighbouring SGR such as the coastal regions of Kilwa and the Ruvuma river pushed excessive number of elephants towards the southern hinterlands of Liwale, Tunduru and Songea districts (Neumann, 2001, Matzke, 1976). As part of crop protection measures the Mtetesi reserve in the southern areas was eliminated in 1935 and Matandu reserve was expanded in 1936 to accommodate elephants from the south. During this time indigenous settlements were largely abandoned voluntarily following excessive elephant population and crop damages around the reserve (Matzke, 1976, Neumann, 2001, Chachage, 1988).

Figure 5.1: The creation and expansion of the SGR



Source: Modified from Matzke, (1976: 42-48)

By the early 1940s the game department had proposed that the abandoned areas be included in the SGR and others be gazetted as Game Controlled Areas (GCAs). This proposal received support from both agricultural and wildlife policies that sought to

eliminate sleeping sickness. In 1943 settlement in Madaba and Luwegu rivers near Mahenge were declared sleeping sickness zones and villages were shortly evacuated (TNR, 1947). Likewise, people from the south of SGR in Liwale and Tunduru districts were moved towards Songea while others in the east and southeast were moved to a settlement in Njino (TNR, 1947, Matzke, 1976). By 1947, the evacuation plan had created a huge section of uninhabited area along Mbarang'andu river, which was then declared part of the game reserve to avoid the re-establishment of settlements (see Figure 5.1). Further, in 1951, the Matandu reserve was re-opened for human settlement in exchange for other suitable areas for wildlife. This plan aimed at consolidating contiguous units in the southeast into one reserve. Indeed, Figure 5.1 supports that the plan added large areas of miombo woodlands around Mbarang'andu and Luwegu river valleys and the area has since then been described as the best game areas in the present SGR (Baldus, 2006, Kibonde, 2006). Other areas such as Lungonya river were added into the reserve in 1960 shortly before independence.

The post-colonial government inherited most of the colonial game policies and the SGR became an important source of foreign currency through hunting tourism. Thus, wildlife protection became part of the national economic policies. Further expansions of the reserve were envisaged to cater for large wildlife movements and the government endorsed the expansion plan in 1967. In addition, the villagisation program of 1974 supported the elimination of more scattered settlements. Like colonial policies, villagisation aimed at consolidating villages as one of the government strategies to achieve rural development set out in the Arusha Declaration. Villages were to become focal points to facilitate social service delivery and the administration of other government development plans. Notwithstanding other intensions of villagisation, the program supported the creation of contiguous uninhabited lands and a settlement pattern that provided the free overflow of wildlife. After one year of the program, the SGR was expanded towards almost all the directions to give the reserve its current shape (see Figure 5.1).

5.2 Contemporary borders, development projects and transfrontier plans

Even though the official borders for the SGR were adopted in 1975, the bioregional planning activities that focus on creating buffer zones and wildlife corridors are facilitated by the same conduct of pushing local communities further afield to create more areas for wildlife beyond the reserve borders. Details of how different actors converge to redefine borders to facilitate the establishment of buffer zones and the SNWC in the southern section of the SGR are provided later in this chapter. For the moment, I demonstrate that the SNWC is also linked to other development projects, leading to increasing the density of activities and network of actors in the corridor and its related Selous-Niassa TFCA. Essentially, the link between TFCAs and other development projects is not unique to Tanzania. Southern Africa provides ample examples of such links. The Open Africa Project is one of the development initiatives whose activities are aligned to the TFCAs. Open Africa establishes tourism routes and assists with the planning of these routes as a way of facilitating the use of African natural and cultural resources for economic development. The founding member and the Director of Open Africa, Noel De Villiers, acknowledged in an interview that these tourism routes have been used to promote cross-border conservation;

> *…Open Africa seeks to link African splendid on a continuum network of tourism routes across the continent from Cape to Cairo as the best option to get African natural beauty and cultural values into the global market… but the success of this project will, ideally, depend on the conservation of cultural and natural resources in these tourism routes. Who buys into this vision is a complex issue, which explains diversity in programs that focus on the same vision…Anton Rupert was inspired by this vision and founded the Peace Parks Foundation to create trans-boundary parks...* (Interview, De Villiers, 22/6/2007).

Apart from the projects of individual organizations, the link between tourism development and TFCAs has a regional institutional support from SADC. As such, SADC members signed, among others, the Charter of the Regional Tourism Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA) in 1997, the Protocol on the Development of Tourism in 1998 and the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement in 2000 (Buzzard, 2001). This means that SADC not only promotes TFCAs as a conservation strategy but also for regional tourism development. Ramutsindela (2007) supports that there is a concerted effort towards realigning

tourism routes with potential and existing TFCAs in order to promote tourism at the regional level. The main approach for implementing this plan has been the use of road infrastructure which has supported the claim that TFCAs relate closely to the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) (Wolmer, 2003a). The SDI is the brainchild of the South African government which was launched around the same time with TFCAs in the mid 1990s to attract export-led investments within the country and with its neighbours (Maleke, 2003). The SDI has particular emphasis on the establishment of development corridors to promote regional investments in tourism by encouraging public–private partnerships (Rogerson, 2001, Wolmer, 2003a, Draper et al., 2004, Smith, 2003). Like TFCAs, the SDI program has been integrated into regional development initiatives thus getting endorsement as an integral part of SADC (www.sadc-dfrc.org/). Currently, SDIs are a legitimate intervention to achieve regional economic integration and to attract cross-border investments (Zukula, 2003, Smith, 2003, Maleke, 2003, www.sadc-dfrc.org/, Katerere et al., 2001). The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) became the first celebrated cross-border link between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique (Smith, 2003).

Although not all TFCAs are found in SDIs, there is a relationship which is embedded on their potential to expand the size of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through increased flow of tourists, the building of new infrastructure, and the creation of complementary services (African Development Bank (AfDB), 2008). The Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area is, for example, part of the MDC and the two are connected to the GLTFP (Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a). The Kavango-Zambezi TFCA where the Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative (OUZIT) operates is also part of the Zambezi Valley SDI (Katerere et al., 2001, Hanks, 2006, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002, Smith, 2003). Alongside these initiatives, the northern Mozambique and southeastern Tanzania (where the Selous-Niassa TFCA is located) is part of the SDI linked by the Mtwara Development Corridor (MtDC). In fact, this study establishes that the Selous-Niassa TFCA is facilitated within the regional framework of the SDI thus allowing the MtDC to set the scene for the transfrontier plans.

The agreement for the implementation of the MtDC was signed in 2004 while the MoU for the Selous-Niassa TFCA was signed in 2007. Precisely, the MtDC was

established under a multilateral Agreement signed by the Heads of State of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia at Lilongwe on 15 December 2004 (Graham, 2005, Mkapa, 2004). The MtDC aims at opening up socio-economic links between southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique, northern and central Malawi as well as eastern and northern Zambia. At the regional level, the MtDC is among the fifteen SDIs currently implemented within the SADC. Indeed, the MtDC is identified as one of the flagship projects for the SADC-Development Finance Resource Centre's (DFRC) Program (www.sadc-dfrc.org/). The World Bank funds and supervises the project through SADC-DFRC. As confirmed in an interview with the project technical advisor in Tanzania, Dr. P.M Maheshwary, the Tanzania National Development Cooperation (NDC) monitors the project at the local level (Interview, 20/5/2006). The MtDC is expected to create an economic growth zone of trans-border trade and investment, linking the four countries through a transport corridor to be served by the seaport of Mtwara on the Indian Ocean as the gateway for international trade (Smith, 2003, Graham, 2005). Accordingly, the GTZ and the South African Ministry of Industry and Trade facilitated the study in 2005, which acknowledged that tourism is an important business sector in the MtDC. As shown in Figure 5.2 the Selous-Niassa TFCA is a tourism hub and an anchor project for the MtDC (Graham, 2005).

The conceptual plan for the MtDC indicates that the development of tourism through the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA alongside the expansion and modernization of the Mtwara port will facilitate business connections between Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia and the region at large. Alongside these projects are also; the development of mining, construction of roads, bridges and heavy capacity ferries as well as oil pipeline and electricity networks across the borders (Simbakalila, 2002, Smith, 2003, Graham, 2005). At the national level, the MtDC activities are commensurate with the Tanzania tourism plans for the development of the Southern Tourism Circuit (STC). As such, the tourism master plan for 2002 envisages the development of the STC through the establishment of wild adventure trails (that includes the SGR and the surrounding protected areas) and linking these trails with coastal heritage trails (which are in the Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas Transfrontier Marine Park) (Robinson, 2001, URT, 2002b). The MtDC has

thus adopted these plans as stimulants for investments in the provision of hotel facilities, road networks and air transport (Simbakalila, 2002, Graham, 2005).

Figure 5.2: The position of the Selous-Niassa TFCA in the MtDC project



Source: Graham, (2005: 77)

On 29 March 2007 the Regional Administrations and Local Governments of Mtwara and Ruvuma of Tanzania and the Provincial Governments of Cabo Delgado and Niassa of Mozambique signed a MoU on cross-border cooperation to promote regional economic growth, development, the traditions of good neighbourliness and a peaceful environment (www.selous-niassa-corridor.org/trans-frontier-cons.html, MoU, 2007). In practice, the two parties reinforced their commitment to promote the MtDC and, by implication, the Selous-Niassa TFCA. One observation is made on the MoU which is important to the analysis of scale in this thesis; that the MoU was signed not by central governments but local authorities. Nevertheless, by signing the

MoU the two sub-national governments are bound to support both the MtDC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA. This translates that central organs of the state are being jumped while at the same time required to support project plans at all levels. In the context of TFCAs, the jumping/or remote involvement of central institutions have been understood as a strategy for holding national governments responsible for, among others, mishaps of TFCA process and silencing potential community resistance (Ramutsindela, 2007).

Article 1 of the said MoU stipulates the urgent need for the establishment of Joint Working Groups in the areas of environment, conservation and tourism as well as economy, security and public administration. The environment, conservation and tourism issues include the '*management of transfrontier natural resources*'. According to section 2.3 (ii) and annex 1:6 of the MoU, '*the inland areas of Selous and Niassa Game Reserves will be managed as a vast new transfrontier conservation area'.* Notably, the two parties agreed on the establishment of a '*Joint Environment and Conservation Working Group'*, which will oversee the development of the TFCA. The proceeding of the workshop which was held on 20 January 2007 in Veta, Mtwara (Tanzania) confirms the view that the Joint Environment and Conservation Working Group is mainly formed by a few representatives of local authorities, consultants and donors who are essentially the proponent of the Selous-Niassa TFCA (InWent and GTZ, 2007). Echoing my earlier observations about scale jumping, the choice of working groups to oversee the establishment of the TFCA suggests that neither the state governments nor the local authorities that signed the MoU are entrusted with the management and functioning of the TFCA. Instead, the '*working group'* is empowered to take charge of the TFCA process. In the overall context of this study, this confirms that the rescaling and border redefinition processes in southeastern Tanzania has facilitated the creation of space and new institutions which raises pertinent questions on the ownership of TFCAs, their impacts and, in a broad sense, national sovereignty.

5.3 Actors and their roles in the redefinition of borders and the creation of the SNWC

As Chapter Four demonstrates, different actors and their networks in Tanzania converged in scaling down the regulatory functions of the central government which

resulted in the establishment of WMAs as an important local scale for the implementation of bioregional projects of different conservation organisations. Proceeding from this view, this study identifies the German government (through its various implementing agencies such as GTZ/GTZ-IS, InWent, CIM and the KfW) as the main actor in using WMAs to create the corridor that is linked to the Selous-Niassa TFCA. It should be emphasized that these institutions are not NGOs but federal agencies that receive funds directly from the German government. This observation coupled with the history of the German occupation of the southeastern Tanzania and the establishment of the SGR as the first protected area in the country are the basis for the assertion that the German government maintains interest in southeastern Tanzania and that its continued support has facilitated processes that have seen the overall rescaling of the government powers over local natural resources. I demonstrate further how other actors are networked to implement activities that ensure the expansion of the SGR and the subsequent establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

The work of the GTZ/SCP as discussed earlier in this thesis formalised the view that the wildlife corridor between Selous and Niassa Game Reserves was important for the establishment of a vast cross-border protected area (Siege and Baldus, 2000, Hoebart, 2004). This study asserts that the GTZ/SCP which established buffer zone areas around the SGR was the first phase of the implementation of the envisaged cross-border protected area. Thus, the end of the GTZ/SCP was the beginning of the wildlife corridor project. As figure 5.3 indicates, buffer zones are central to the expansion of wildlife areas beyond the SGR borders and have reduced land available for other uses in the neighbouring villages and districts. Although it remains officially unacknowledged, changes in the size of areas available for wildlife have meant superimposition of wildlife land use over villages and district administrative borders. In practice, new wildlife areas in the villages are a form of land control and it remains the case hitherto that they are practically more commanding since they determine areas available for other land uses.

Figure 5.3: Buffer zone projects around SGR



Source: Adopted from GTZ (1998: 1)

Since the SNWC project is an important phase of the TFCA, different actors have come in to redefine borders to ensure the creation of the wildlife corridor in the southern section of the SGR in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts, which borders the NGR in Mozambique. The summary of the main actors and their roles in the creation of the SNWC as provided in Table 5.1 guides the analysis of the interests of different actors. This analysis reveals that skills, experiences and connections that existed

through the GTZ/SCP were instrumental in the conceptualization and design of the SNWC. Since the government of Tanzania is the authority with explicit mandate over land and wildlife in the SNWC area, the Wildlife Division and Districts Councils are the project executing agencies. As it has been discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the Wildlife Division plays a greater role in creating the policy environment for the implementation of the project. The Division has also been central to the negotiations between donors, private investors and local communities, the area that has been targeted by the allegations of inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption (Baldus et al., 2004, Brockington, 2003, Kideghesho, 2008a). At the village level, however, Village Councils in whose land the SNWC project is implemented should have been the government representatives in executing the project but their roles are taken over by the newly established CBOs that represent WMA governments. This confirms the argument about the scaling-up of local natural resources governance and that the WMAs are a preferred scale for the implementation of the SNWC project.

Table 5.1 indicates further that different German government agencies are actively involved in financing and, at the same time, operate as consulting agencies paid to supply facilities, raise funds from other sources, engage in cross-border dialogue and in providing technical expertise for the SNWC and beyond[13]. In general, Germany is closely linked to many key actors in TFCAs, including Anton Rupert, one of the strongest advocates for and financier of TFCAs in Africa (Ramutsindela, 2007). Further details of Rupert's work through the PPF and its links to Germany are well documented (see Dommisse and Esterhuyse, 2005, Ramutsindela, 2007) To start with, the GTZ led the research in 2003 that became instrumental in designing and securing funds for the development of the corridor (GEF/UNDP, 2004, Graham, 2005).

13 It is important to note that the involvement of the German government in Tanzania is not only in wildlife protection but also in other development cooperation areas such as in education, health and water supply (for more details of this see www.daressalam.diplo.de). Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis is on the wildlife-related projects in Selous-Niassa area

Table 5.1: The main actors in the establishment of the SNWC

Name of the Actor	Key responsibility	Activities
German government	Donor GTZ	Design and conceptualization of the SNWC
	KfW	Funding for the establishment of WMAs and infrastructure development in the SNWC
	InWent	Local trainings and cross border dialogue
	CIM	Placement of technical experts and top-up of their local salaries
	GTZ-IS	Implementing agency/consultant for the GEF/UNDP funds for the SNWC
GEF/UNDP	Donor	Funding for the establishment of WMAs and creation of the corridor
JBG Gauff Ingenieure and Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST)	Consulting agencies	The coordination and implementation of the KfW fund–land use planning and border demarcation for WMAs, infrastructure development (construction of natural resource offices, roads, communication facilities)
The government of Tanzania	Executing agency Wildlife Division Districts Councils WMA-CBOs	Policy support and rule enforcement for the establishment of WMAs and the SNWC
External experts placed by GTZ and CIM to facilitate the SNWC[14]		
Time	**Name**	**Position**
1987/1988	Rolf Baldus	GTZ/SCP Program Coordinator
	David Kaggi	GTZ/SCP Rural Development Officer
	Hubert Krischke	GTZ/SCP Community Wildlife Advisor
1993	Baldus leaves Tanzania	-
1993	David Kaggi replaces Baldus	GTZ/SCP Program Coordinator
1996	Krischke leaves Tanzania	-
1996	Rudolf Hahn replaces Krischke	GTZ/SCP Community Wildlife Advisor
1998	Baldus returns to Tanzania	Community Wildlife Management (CWM) National Advisor (New post)
2002	Hahn leaves Tanzania	-
2005	Baldus leaves Tanzania	-
2005	Hahn returns to Tanzania	SNWC Technical Advisor

14 Compiled from www.wildlife-baldus.com/selous_niassa.htm/. Accessed on 8/6/2009.

Precisely, the GEF offered USD 1 million on 27 April 2004 for the implementation of the SNWC project (GEF/UNDP, 2004, Schuerholz and Bossen, 2005). Since the project cost was estimated at USD 2 million, the GTZ/SCP committed about USD 0.5 million (GTZ, 2003a) while the Institute for Zoo Biology and Wildlife Berline (IZW[15]) committed USD 0.34 million (GEF/UNDP, 2004, www.tz.undp.org). The government of Tanzania committed USD 1.6 million, the amount to be paid in kind through personnel time in two districts of Namtumbo and Tunduru (URT, 2003a). It is envisaged that by the end of the project in 2010, about 15,000 hectares of land will be protected as WMAs in village lands that lie between SGR and NGR (GEF/UNDP, 2004).

In connection with the above, the German government recently provided separate financial support of about Euro 5 million for the '*protection'* of the SNWC (KfW, 2006). The financial agreement was signed between the German Development Bank (KfW) and the government of Tanzania on 10 March 2006, with the later required to contribute Euro 1.5 in kind (KfW, 2006, KfW and URT, 2006). Like other agencies, the KfW aims to support the establishment of WMAs in order to create the SNWC (Schuerholz and Bossen, 2005). As discussed in Chapter Four, the KfW funding facilitates training on land ownership, land use planning and border demarcations as part of creating WMAs and scaling-up the functions of village governments over natural resources (GTZ-IS, 2007). Other important activities under the KfW fund include infrastructure development and the facilitation of transfrontier collaboration between Tanzania and Mozambique (Begg et al., 2007, Bloesch and Mbago, 2006, KfW, 2006). The cross-border dialogue is facilitated by yet another German government agency InWent (GTZ and InWent, 2005). Apparently, InWent had in 1999 started to assist policy development and capacity building targeting the southern and eastern Africa region which was then to encompass Tanzania and Mozambique (InWent, 2007b). Admittedly, InWent launched the capacity building program, called Trans-boundary and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (TRANSNET) in 2005 to facilitate cross-border dialogue in the SADC and East African Community (EAC) regions (InWent, 2007b, www.wildlife-baldus.com/selous_niassa.htm/). As a dialogue and training program TRANSNET

15 Also referred to as IZW/GTZ in SNWC project.

assists institutions in the two regions to foster regional cooperation in the management of shared ecosystems (Earle and Malzbender, 2007). Within Tanzania, InWent and GTZ jointly supports the College of African Wildlife Management as the regional convener for cross-border dialogues (www.selous-niassa-corridor.org/gtz-inwent-dialogue). Through this network InWent continues to facilitate transfrontier collaboration as part of the SNWC project (InWent and GTZ, 2007).

Due to the multiplicity of actors, the SNWC project activities are coordinated to ensure consistency in approaches, overall objectives and specific targets and goals, namely, the creation of the SNWC across local and international borders (KfW, 2006). Effectively, the joint committee was agreed upon and signed on 17 November 2006 between the Wildlife Division, the GEF/UNDP and the German Development Co-operation to coordinate funds and project activities (KfW, 2006). It is not surprising, therefore, that former GTZ/SCP experts play key roles in streamlining different project activities today. Specifically, Mr Rudolf Hahn - formerly placed by the German Centre for International Migration (CIM) as the GTZ/SCP expert - serves as the Technical Advisor and a consultant for SNWC. Unlike in the former project, Hahn is currently placed by the GTZ-International Services, the business arm of the GTZ which is currently contracted as an implementing agency for the GEF/UNDP fund for the SNWC project (Interview, Dorken, 19/2/2008). Against this background, the expansion of wildlife areas and the scaling-down and scaling-up of government regulatory functions over natural resources in southeastern Tanzania remains the brainchild of the German government. These rescaling processes are the force behind the successful creation of WMAs as a local scale which supports the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Whereas WMAs are managed by supra-village institutions, the Selous-Niassa TFCA is a supra-national scale supported by the regional body (i.e. SADC). Ramutsindela (2007) observes, however, that the tendency of jumping the state in the establishment of TFCAs leaves state governments and local communities with no direct role to play in the management and utilization of TFCAs.

The foregoing discussion suggests also that the German government has been among the major partners of the PPF in the development of TFCAs in southern and eastern Africa. It stands to reason that the PPF facilitated the establishment of the

regional platform in SADC which is used as a launch pad for TFCAs in southern Africa in which Tanzania retains membership (Ramutsindela, 2007). Through this platform, the PPF identified three transfrontier zones in SADC within which about twenty two TFCAs are envisaged (Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002). Among these zones are the Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa ecosystem which transcends the borders of Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. There are at least five individual TFCA projects planned in the Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa zone, one of which is the Selous-Niassa TFCA[16]. As in Tanzania, the German government through KfW facilitated the realignment of borders that culminated in the establishment of the Limpopo National Park (LNP) in 2001 in Mozambique and the development of the wildlife corridor between the LNP and the Banhine National Park (BNP), which were critical steps towards the creation of the Great Limpopo TFP (GLTFP). Specifically, the KfW granted 12 million Euros through the SADC secretariat and the PPF in 2001 (www.limpopopn.gov.mz). So too, InWent facilitated the resettlement of about 6,500 inhabitants of the LNP in Shingwedzi River Basin to give way for the GLTFP (www.limpopopn.gov.mz, Spierenburg et al., 2008, Spenceley, 2006, Ferreira, 2006).

5.4 Borders and the Selous-Niassa TFCA

Practices in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts represent a scenario where particular types of borders are removed while others are erected. Figure 5.4 demonstrates how the SNWC is formed by the merger of five WMAs, which are literally village lands. As implied in the previous chapters, however, the CBOs, which are responsible for the management of individual WMAs, have powers to decide on the amalgamation of WMAs. The point worth stressing here is that once WMAs are merged to create a single unit, village borders that transcend them (which are mostly mountains, valleys and rivers) cease to function and new borders re-define the new space. Figure 5.4 illustrates that WMAs are merged precisely on the border between the Namtumbo and Tunduru districts thereby forming the SNWC that transcends the district border. In the same ways that village borders cease to function, the district border is silenced to allow the re-definition of new borders for the wildlife corridor. Conceptually, local land uses and administrative borders are removed, only to be followed immediately by the drawing of new borders that re-define wildlife areas in the villages. The wildlife

16 Others are Mnazi Bay Quirimbas Marine TFP, the Nyika TFCA, Vwaza-Lundazi TFCA and Liwonde-Lichinga TFCA.

corridor represents a supra-district space whose ownership and use can no longer be determined by Village or District Councils. The consequences of the wildlife corridor on local residents are discussed in Chapter Six.

There is a perception that wildlife borders are political strategies that aim to restrict the use of natural resources by the local communities. For example, Mzee Cosmas implied that all borders are political and politics are for people and not animals;

> *…there have never been borders to stop elephants from moving from one forest to another when they needed to, they do not understand these village or district borders and it doesn't matter for them if they were Mozambicans or Tanzanians. Animals are many in these farms as we speak, they left their areas and no one punishes them for trespassing… it is surprising that when they come to our farms and destroy crops we are not allowed to kill them…To be sure, our muzzle loaders for scaring them were confiscated in 2006. Therefore, it is us who are restricted to go there…* (Interview, 5/11/2007)

Figure 5.4: The structural design for the SNWC



Source: Adopted from URT (2003b: 16)

The perception that wildlife borders are a political strategy is supported by the survey data, which reveals that even though the study villages are within the SNWC area, only 54% of respondents acknowledge knowing the existence of wildlife migration between Selous and Niassa Game Reserves. When these respondents were asked whether these routes have changed, about 55% did not know while 34% of them said the routes remain the same since they knew them. A closely related question asked was whether villagers knew the SNWC project and the actual borders of the corridor. Nearly 90% of respondents knew about the project but 70% said they did not know the borders of the corridor. These responses reflect the difference in border perceptions and use between the local communities and the proponents of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. As other sources of data support, WMAs that create the SNWC are in place and yet most villagers do not know the borders of the corridor. WMAs are set aside for wildlife but animals are obviously in farms and residential areas. This confusion confirms that borders between people and wildlife in Tanzania are drawn on maps with objectives similar to those of other political borders, namely, the territorialisation. Their non-existence on space gives wild animals freedom to cross them as part of the ecosystem while creating barriers for people. It is on this basis that villagers in southeastern Tanzania hold that there have not been wildlife borders in their area.

5.5 The idiom of the border in TFCAs

The analysis of the process that creates the SNWC challenges the TFCA claim of removing borders to re-unite local communities and re-establish ecological links. The previous section supports the claim that the Selous-Niassa TFCA process has created more borders in southeastern Tanzania. As such, there are wildlife land uses (such as WMAs) that have not been in communal areas before. The use of WMAs for the creation of the SNWC has meant the silencing of village and district borders. These borders reflect the emerging forms of control over nature beyond core protected areas. In fact, once WMAs are established they are declared '*restricted zones'* for villagers. This means that these are borders for the SNWC and, for that matter, the Selous-Niassa TFCA. This confirms that the meaning of borders is selectively used to promote TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007, Singh and Houtum, 2002). The chosen meaning remains the state political borders whose removal relates closely to the ceding of control over cross-border areas. However, the use of African

political borders as remnants of colonialism to justify their removal for TFCAs ignores the fact that TFCAs have largely depended on the creation of local borders that facilitates the acquisition of private and communal lands. Obviously, once space is created it is not without borders. Hence, WMAs through which the SNWC is created is a bounded space. On the basis of this observation the TFCA claim for re-uniting cross-border communities becomes questionable. In my view, the communities that should have been re-united are displaced and even divided further by new borders. In fact, the Selous-Niassa TFCA has revived colonial expansionism plans for control and influence over space and wildlife resources in southern Tanzania and it is the ground on which local communities are currently removed from their ancestral lands. In other words, local community relocations and associated impacts are embedded on the scale and border redefinition processes that create the Selous-Niassa TFCA.

It is important to emphasize that the removal of borders in TFCAs symbolized cutting off fences to re-establish ecological connectivity. However, this study challenges the TFCA border symbolism because neither state nor protected area borders are fences in southeastern Tanzania. Studies on wildlife movement in the area verify the existence of wildlife migration between SGR and NGR (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Mpanduji and Ngomello, 2007). Therefore, as Figure 5.5 suggests, wildlife movements have not been disrupted by the river and the status of the river as the political border was not changed. The removal of borders as implied by proponents of the Selous-Niassa TFCA has thus meant the removal of sub-national borders and local communities to create space for the TFCA. The study establishes further that the Tanzania-Mozambique border is not only the colonial border of the state but is also a regional border for East Africa. However, proponents of TFCAs do not temper with it as a regional border because they do not advocate for trans-regional conservation areas. Against this background, borders in the study area are a tool for creating new space for wildlife and, by implication, new institutions for their management.

The TFCA notion of borders as physical objects ignores the existence of non-physical borders. Yet this study confirms that there are borders between different actors in Selous-Niassa TFCA. It should be noted that the PPF and the German government share interests in developing TFCAs but there are institutional borders

between them and with other actors. For example, the PPF has not facilitated TFCAs in East Africa. The PPF remain dominant in southern Africa and the German government has a stronghold in eastern Africa. The SNWC expert acknowledges the existence of this institutional border alleging that;

> *…SNWC project is not related to PPF…We do not work together…The SNWC and what PPF does are completely different things…PPF is a high profile organization with support from high profile individuals, organizations and country Presidents. SNWC is a different thing all together…* (Interview, Hahn, 12/9/2007).

Figure 5.5: Tanzania-Mozambique border and an elephant crossing the river



Source: Main photo taken by the author (9/9/2007), the insert adopted from (Baldus *et al.*, 2006: cover page)

Mindful of the existence of institutional borders, the German government and the GEF/UNDP support for the Selous-Niassa TFCA does not extend beyond the Tanzania-Mozambique border. Rather, the Fauna and Flora International (FFI)

facilitate activities in the NGR albeit with the same goal of establishing the Selous-Niassa TFCA (GEF/UNDP, 2004). This translates into the fact that in the overall discussions about TFCAs and the notion of removing borders, the institutional borders that define areas of operation between different actors are maintained and considered unproblematic. These borders echo the colonial history and they serve the same purpose as borders that divided Africa among different colonial powers.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the process and the main actors in the creation of the SNWC which is the prism for understanding the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Through the analysis of the process that established the present borders of the SGR the chapter demonstrates that the creation of space necessitates the re-definition of borders and that the Selous-Niassa TFCA is not immune to this reality. The chapter confirms that the WMA scale is used by different actors as a ladder through which TFCAs and other bioregional projects will be created in Tanzania. In the case of the Selous-Niassa TFCA, the German government uses WMAs as buffer zones to the SGR and the way through which the SNWC is created. The chapter demonstrates that the Selous-Niassa TFCA process has inevitably created borders thereby challenging the view that TFCAs are a tool for re-establishing ecological and cultural connections that were interrupted by colonial borders. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests further that land control is central to the establishment of TFCAs thus the quest for the removal of political borders only serves that purpose. As such, rather than borders per se, local communities were divided by colonial policies that continue to determine resource ownership and control. Yet, TFCAs are far from promoting local land administrations that could re-unify border communities. Instead, the emerging borders promote division and add to the displacement of local communities. In the next chapter, I elucidate how the newly created SNWC and its resources are connected to the neo-liberal projects of elite businesses rather than the local needs.

CHAPTER SIX: ECOLOGICAL INTERGRITY, DISPLACEMENT, THE REALLOCATION OF RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the local communities on the Tanzanian side. In particular, the chapter focuses on how the establishment of WMAs and the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (SNWC) influence change in local land use and livelihood strategies. The main objective of the chapter is to demonstrate that the introduction of wildlife conservation areas in the villages has meant loss of land, which is the base of community livelihood and identity. Proceeding from this view, the chapter considers the cost of the foregone use of land (crop cultivation and settlements) as central to the debate about the impacts of wildlife to the local communities. It also highlights conflicts which emerged from WMAs and SNWC. The analysis of the land use plans for Mbarang'andu WMA is used to elaborate these points.

The chapter is organised in two main sections. The first section briefly reviews the discussion on conservation and people paradox with the focus on the recent trend on local communities' displacements in and around major conservation areas. This discussion provides the basis for the view that protected areas are not an end by themselves but the means through which nature is commoditised. In addition, the section highlights that commercial projects that replace indigenous activities could be more ecologically destructive thus the blame on local threats rather than external economic motives is misguided. The second section uses empirical data to demonstrate how WMAs and the SNWC that support the Selous-Niassa TFCA have imposed limitations on the use of land, wildlife and forest resources by local communities. This section indicates that increased wildlife population in communal land limit human activities while, at the same time, encouraging the expansion of wildlife areas to support commercial and tourist hunting. Relative to other studies that have shown benefits of wildlife commercialization in, for example, Botswana, Namibia and even in some parts of Tanzania, the promises of commercial benefits have been lost to the people of Mbarang'andu who are left with significant economic opportunity costs. The chapter concludes, then, that since indigenous people have lost their land and commercial activities are not directly beneficial to them, the

Selous-Niassa TFCA is potentially the source of further displacement and community marginalization in southeastern Tanzania. The third part discusses the conflicts, which emerged from institutional restructuring, and changes in governance structures at the local level.

6.1 Conservation and people paradox

The debate about conservation and human welfare (poverty or development) has attracted considerable research and international policy discussions following the growth in number and coverage of protected areas globally. It is estimated that by 2005 protected areas covered over 12% of the earth's land surface (Chape *et al.*, 2005). Protected areas coverage has not only been adopted as an indicator for measuring the progress in biodiversity protection but also an indicator for success in achieving the Millennium Development Goal 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability), Target 9 (integrate the principles of sustainable development (United Nations, 2005b). In both cases, the indicator is defined in terms of areal extent (Chape *et al.*, 2005). While the ecological ground for the expansion of protected areas is well found, concerns have emerged that the total extent of protected areas is not an effective measure of those aspects of environmental quality and accessibility relevant to poverty alleviation (Adams *et al.*, 2004). Accordingly, the net local impacts have remained strongly negative with the rise in number and extent coverage of protected areas (Upton *et al.*, 2008).

Conservation in its broadest sense has ecological, social-economic, and by implication, political consequences. The typical ecological consequences of conservation revolve around improved biodiversity habitat and population thus the motivation for expansion of protected areas has remained the aspiration to increase wildlife abundance (Johannesen, 2007). The socio-economic impacts relate closely to the need for land to accommodate and manage increasing biodiversity. The outcomes of these ecological achievements are not necessarily beneficial to local communities, and where benefit occurs can seldom be generalised (Adams and Hutton, 2007, McDermott, 2009, Brockington, 2003). There are cases where conservation activities have benefited local community members as individuals and as a nation through the provision of basic needs, employment and foreign currency that contributes to the national income and welfare. Bray *et al*., (2003) and

Bajracharya *et al*., (2007) studied cases in Mexico and Nepal where forest protection has been considered a model for sustainable development. Others have also reported benefits of conservation spin-offs in Botswana and South Africa where local communities have opportunities to negotiate benefits of wildlife commercialization (Arntzen, 2003, Fakir, 2003, Motlopi, 2006). Elsewhere, including in Nepal, Peru and Tanzania, communities receive limited conservation benefit in the form of improvements in access to basic infrastructure for water, health, education and other social services (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006, Bray et al., 2003, Kikoti, 2001, Barrow et al., 2000). Conceptually, however, the foregoing is among the examples where rhetoric around benefit sharing has generally remained contestable. As Wynberg and Laird (2007) argue, benefit sharing has, almost without exceptions, focused on bilateral and contractual agreements between commercial companies or institutions interested in resources and the state and the benefits are defined in terms of how much money is paid (Wynberg and Laird, 2007). This interpretation of benefits ignores the nature and distribution of such benefits between different actors, and more importantly, the local community's use of land and related resources for their livelihoods. Therefore, comparatively, communities have largely experienced negative impacts associated with wildlife protection, forest, water and fisheries to mention a few.

Case studies that examine negative consequences of forest and wildlife protection are far from limited to one geographical area. A range of countries of different political orientations has experienced the removal of people during the establishment and expansion of protected areas in the form of involuntary and voluntary relocations. Whereas involuntary relocations involve use of force, the involuntary relocations involve community displacement through restricted access to important resources such as land, water, forest and wildlife. An overwhelming literature exists about forced relocations in Latin America (Bodmer and Puertas, 2007, Siurua, 2006), Asia (Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006, McElwee, 2006, Ghate and Beazley, 2007) and Africa (Spierenburg et al., 2008, Neumann, 1998, Brockington, 2005, Wynberg, 2000, Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007, Ramutsindela, 2004b). Drawing the example from Tanzania, the *Maasai* pastoralists were evicted from Serengeti National Park, Mkomazi Game Reserve and Ngorongoro Conservation Area (Brockington, 2005, Shivji, 1999, Bonner, 1993), *Wameru* agro-pastoralists

were evicted from Arusha National Park (Neumann, 1998) while *Wangindo*, *Wahyao* and *Wamakuwa* were evicted from the SGR (Kjekshus, 1996, Rodgers, 1976, Neumann, 2002, Matzke, 1976). In all these cases, indigenous people have lost their sacred places, grazing and hunting areas as well as important water sources for domestic and livestock use. It is also known worldwide that when water has to be conserved through construction of large dams local communities experience social and economic costs resulting from relocations. These include, for instance, loss of fertile valleys and safe drinking water, the spread of waterborne diseases, the destruction of vital fisheries as well as increased disasters caused by the collapse of dams (Cernea, 2006, Phadke, 1999, Caspary, 2007). Similar instances are recorded in marine protected areas where communities experience restrictions on land-based activities adjacent to the marine parks and have limited access to marine resources such as coral mining and fish (Mascia and Claus, 2009, Micheli et al., 2004).

There is a general agreement that the common problem in the relocations (voluntary or involuntary) is the displacement of human communities. Displacement is defined to include not only the impacts of physical removal (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001, Geisler, 2003, Ghate and Beazley, 2007, Adams and Hutton, 2007) but also the restricted access to natural resources (McElwee, 2006, Geisler, 2003). It seems, therefore, that although conservation does not always involve actions against local communities it has historically done so and it still does today. Accordingly, Brockington and Igoe (2007) suggest that the eviction trend explains the surge of recent publications on the debate about 'local people and conservation'. Indeed, this debate is captured in published works with suggestive titles such as '*Imposing Wilderness'* (Neumann, 1998), '*Who Owns Paradise'* (Honey, 1999), '*Whose Heritage is it '* (Jalais, 2007, Bonner, 1993), *'Your Park, my Poverty*' (Geisler 2003), '*Your Biosphere is my Backyard'* (Kaimowitz *et al.*, 2003), so to mention a few. It also suffices to say that the wisdom of the Millennium Development Goals in using the extent of protected areas as an indicator of progress in achieving the livelihood dimensions of sustainability is questionable.

The conservation and livelihood question is critiqued by Geisler and De Sousa, (2001) who use the trend of land conversion to analyze the significance of costs that humans incur through exclusionary conservation. The analysis indicates that nearly

two-thirds of the human population in Africa, which is still rural and characterised by poverty, occupies land eyed for expansion of protected areas thus making rural poor the most affected by conservation commitments (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001). It follows that, the land coverage for the IUCN strict protection categories I-V alone doubled from 423 million hectares in 1985 to 841 million hectares in 1997. During this period, Africa's protected areas grew in number from 443 (3% of the continent's land mass) to 746 (5.2% of total land mass) (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001:161). Comparatively, the United Nations Economic Programme's Human Development Index (1985 and 1999) indicate that African countries with the highest indices of poverty including Tanzania, Mozambique, Chad, Niger, Zambia, Mauritania, and the Central Republic of Africa have the greatest extent of protected areas in IUCN protected area categories I-V compared to richer African countries (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001, Geisler, 2003). In fact, the land designated as protected areas in these poor countries exceed croplands. During the 1990s, Chad's protected areas increased from 0.1% of the national land base to 9.1%, and Mozambique's grew from 0.01% to 6.1%. Tanzania, whose agricultural sector is the backbone of the economy and 80% of the production is carried out by peasants in the rural areas (URT, 2001a), had about 14% of the total land under protected areas by 1990 (Geisler and Sousa, 2001). This amount doubled to 30% in 2008 (TANAPA, 2008). As such, the government of Tanzania spends more money per capita on wildlife protection than the United States (TANAPA, 2008).

Geisler and De Sousa's analysis suggests further that the trend and extent of protected areas and national wealth in Africa are not correlated. Based on this view, victims of conservation projects are poor and made worse off by the restriction of access to natural resources (Upton et al., 2008, Geisler, 2003, Cernea, 2003). Indeed, protected area coverage globally is equal to roughly half the earth's endowment of agricultural land, which is the source of livelihood and employment for almost half the world's labour force (ILO, 1997), (Geisler, 2003). More specifically, the progressive growth of protected area coverage signifies food insecurity and labour displacement. Often, victims experience forced removal from their homelands without notice, consultation or proper compensation causing them loss of many kinds of assets – shelter, social networks, identity, livelihood, rights and social security (Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006, McElwee, 2006, Neumann, 1998, Brockington,

2005). Following criticisms from researchers and human right movements, the World Bank set out a resettlement policy in 1990. The policy goal was to improve the income and livelihood levels of people affected by resettlements. The policy specified that all resettlements should be conceived and executed as development programs and people resettled be provided with sufficient investment resources and opportunities to share in project benefits (World Bank, 1990).

The review of the World Bank's resettlement policy suggests that the policy limits the cost of resettlement to direct economic and social impacts resulting from taking of land, relocation of shelter and loss of assets and income sources (Downing, 2002). Thus the policy ignores the fact that the displacement includes restricted access to resources. For example, where there are no physical removals proponents of protected areas could argue that there are no displacements. In fact, pro-conservation arguments could be made for protected areas that still have people. In reality, however, people are not only restricted access in such areas but also their activities are limited and they remain under the constant threat of being at any moment physically relocated (Cernea, 2006). Eventually, the World Bank redefined its guidelines on resettlement in 2004 to extend the definition of involuntary resettlement to include the restriction of access to resources in protected areas (Adams and Hutton, 2007, Cernea, 2006). The revised policy recognises restricted access to certain natural resources as a form of involuntary displacement, even if the affected groups are not physically relocated (Cernea, 2006). This redefinition broadens the understanding of resettlement beyond its usual acceptance as geographic relocation, to include restricted access to basic needs as a form of displacement (Cernea, 2006).

The conservation and people paradox remains unresolved and it is currently dominated by the question of whether human displacement for protected area establishment improves conservation. This question reflects the general debate about relocation and conservation performance, which is characterized by strong divisions of opinion. On the one hand, relocations are perceived as a solution to threats to protected areas while on the other, critiques have emerged that the blame on local pressure rather than external economic and political motives is misguided (McElwee, 2006). The later view, which is the position of this study, holds that all

forms of displacement involve change in social relations of resource access and control and, by implication, reallocation of property rights (Mascia and Claus, 2009, Cernea, 2006, Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, McDermott, 2009). This means that indigenous activities are replaced by new groups and the rights to natural resources are reallocated. Yet, the discussions about nature protection and local community displacements have predominantly focused on one side; the side excluded and deprived of resource use. It is important that critical analysis should consider the side of the empowered (who gain rights) in order to establish whether conservation empowers actors who are more marginal or the powerful actors are gaining additional rights through the loss of some rights by marginal actors (Mascia and Claus, 2009). Hence, the focus on rights reallocation rather than displacement *per se* should bring new insights and allow one to differentiate between the process through which protected area rights are reallocated and the impacts of this reallocation to different actors (Mascia and Claus, 2009).

6.1.1 Reallocation of rights

In the context of this study, rights reallocation has been part and parcel of the process of constructing new scales. As discussed in the previous chapters, the reforms in the natural resource governance in Tanzania redefined powers and access to forest and wildlife resources in the village lands. As will be discussed further in the section below, the newly created WMAs and the Mbarang'andu WMA in particular, are protected areas. This status does not only call for changes in traditional natural resource management but also restricts community access and control over land while at the same time giving the government and private sector actor's additional rights to the wildlife and forest resources in the WMAs. Put it in another way, the land that is acquired from displaced smallholder peasants is taken over by the state and leased to the private sector actors who provide capital for running protected areas on a commercial basis. However, local communities are not directly involved in these commercial activities and have no opportunities to negotiate conservation benefits in their village lands. Instead, the transaction is made between the Wildlife Division and commercial and tourist hunters. Admittedly, nature is commoditised, society-nature relations regulated while, at the same time, community rights are reallocated (Logan and Wekerle, 2008, Robertson, 2007,

Mascia and Claus, 2009). As argued by many, human displacement, more than other aspects, has come to portend the relationship between protected area expansions and neo-liberal projects (Geisler, 2003, Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Logan and Wekerle, 2008, Mansfield, 2007, Adams and Hutton, 2007). This takes the expression of economic transformation, which does not necessarily put conservation at the forefront as private investments are driven by profit maximization.

The growing trend in the replacement of local land uses with commercial private investments in Africa and elsewhere affirms to the importance of rescaling in facilitating the redefinition of rights and power over natural resources. The following examples elaborate this point. Recently in 2000 the private park management institution named Africa Parks Foundation (APF) took responsibility for the management of five protected areas covering a total area in excess of 2,500,000 hectares in Ethiopia, Zambia, Malawi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and set them up as secure businesses (www.african-parks.org). The APF was implicated in the eviction of residents, with the Nech Sar National Park in Ethiopia being the most contested case (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Brockington and Igoe, 2006). Related to this is the case where the AWF has taken over an area of about 17,807 hectares of Manyara livestock ranch in Tanzania which was previously run by the National Ranching Company (NARCO) (Sumba *et al.*, 2005) and is now run as a wildlife protected area (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). As it was hinted in Chapter Four, the ranch remained open for wildlife and pastoral activities of the *Maasai*, *Mbugwe* and *Barbaig* ethnic groups since its establishment in 1970s. To date, the Manyara ranch is a grazing ground for community livestock amounting to about 26,500 and even the community primary school is still located within the ranch (Sumba *et al.*, 2005). Whereas the main objective of the privatization was to acquire the ranch area which is considered critical for wildlife migration, livestock and human population around the ranch are considered the most significant challenges for the new ranch management (Sumba *et al.*, 2005). Obviously, there are no prospects for human-wildlife-livestock co-existence especially because livestock will need to be excluded from sections of the ranch that may be dedicated to private enterprises in future.

Another case of indigenous replacement in Tanzania involves the company called Grumeti Reserves Ltd that took over the management of three state sponsored game reserves (Ikorongo, Grumeti and Fort Ikoma Open Area) covering an area of 140,000 hectares in Western Serengeti (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Funded by American business Paul Tudor Jones since 2004, the Grumeti Reserves Ltd took over the three reserves that had once been homes to thousands of indigenous people, grazing grounds and crop lands before evictions and the establishment of state run game reserves (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Currently, the Grumeti Reserves Ltd partners with Singita, the southern African tourism and leisure operators, to run among others the seven star Sasakwa Hill Lodge (*PR Newswire*, 2007). There has been a strong opposition for Grumeti Reserves Ltd from both lobbyists and local communities for two reasons; firstly, that the project is not only in ancestral land of thousands of evicted people but also its plans for expansion depend on village lands especially those already set aside as WMAs. Secondly, that the project proposes the construction of an international airport and a road across Serengeti National Park, which is considered much more ecologically destructive than the small scale activities of the evicted communities (*The East African*, 2007). The investor has been accused of harassing villagers, preventing them from pursuing their legal livelihood strategies and attempting to halt community conservation initiative that provides game meat at an affordable price (Kideghesho, 2006). The narrative below is worth quoting as it suggests that memories of relocation from Serengeti National Park are still fresh to the villagers around the park and the private investors are considered the agents of marginalisation and a backdoor through which colonial oppression has returned to Tanzania (Kideghesho, 2006).

> *…History has taught us a lot. We were forced out of Serengeti (National Park). The boundary was moved from Naabi Hill to Banagi River in 1950s. Then, in 1960s Mochatongarori became the new boundary. In 1970s we were pushed to Romoti River. In 1974 Ikorongo and Grumeti were set aside as Game Controlled Areas and we were promised to remain in and continue to enjoy resources critical to our households. In few weeks, we were relocated because of the so-called villagisation policy. Our attempt to go back and make living from our lands in Ikorongo and Grumeti after failure of villagisation policy was defeated by the government in 1994 by mere baptizing the areas as Game Reserves. We were then forced out of the reserve and we lost Manchira River, which was the source of water and salt for domestic use and livestock. Further to this, we lost our grazing land, settlements, sacred sites and mining areas that served as a source*

> *of employment to our youths. Today they want to baptize our land again as WMAs. As usual, WMAs will change the name and we will be forced out. Can't these people (government officials) be advised that we are fed up? What is the difference between the WMA policy and several other government policies that we have had? Where is villagisation? Where is Arusha Declaration?* (Cited in Kideghesho, 2006: 162)

Conceptually, relocations for TFCAs have taken different forms in different areas. In Asia, for example, forest areas traditionally belonging to indigenous peoples of Borneo Island were included in a Trans-boundary Protected Area (TBPA) created along the Indonesian-Malaysian border which brought together three national parks; Betung Karihun, Kayan Mentarang and Danau Sentarum National Parks. Chai, (2005) and Brookfield et al., (1994), provide further details of this case. In short, the project was initiated as a strategy to protect *orangutan* animal species following reported habitat fragmentation associated with human dependence on forest resources (McElwee, 2006, Chai, 2005, Brookfield et al., 1995). In 2005, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) created from Borneo island an area of 1.8 million hectares for oil palm plantation (McElwee, 2006). To date, the project's main objective remains to secure forestland that would ensure sustainable timber trade (www.itto.or.jp).

In the famous GLTFP, approximately 6000 people living within the borders of Limpopo National Park in Mozambique were resettled and there are reports that the new status of the area currently constrains livelihoods of about 27,000 (Spierenburg and Wels, 2006, Draper et al., 2004, Dzingirai, 2004, Ferreira, 2006, Spierenburg et al., 2008). These people cannot clear new fields for cultivation or access pasture and fishing grounds because these are illegal activities in the national park. On the Zimbabwean side of the GLTFP, the land of the Sengwe community, which was relocated to create the Gonarezhou National Park in 1975 was fenced to give way to the wildlife corridor that links Kruger, Limpopo and Gonarezhou National Parks (Metcalfe, 2003, Dzingirai, 2004). The Sengwe community was promised the control over wildlife, revenue and other services generated from wildlife-based activities in their land. Recently, however, the government of Zimbabwe has been under pressure to find suitable land to resettle Sengwe residents as a pre-requisite for the procession of the GLTFP (*Zim Standard*, 2006). As it has been argued above, these examples elaborate the complexity of people-nature relationship and points to the

importance of scale in manipulating local community rights. Redefinition of power and rights over natural resources remain a central issue and fuels the conflict between displaced people, state governments, the proponents of conservation and the private sector businesses (Adams and Hutton, 2007, Igoe and Croucher, 2007, Spierenburg et al., 2008, Kideghesho, 2006).

Recalling the discussion in Chapter Five, the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA depends entirely on the creation of the SNWC in the communal land which is currently under the administration of twenty-nine villages. Figure 6.1 shows the location of some of these villages within the wildlife corridor (GTZ/Selous Conservation Program, 2001). In view of that, the village lands targeted for the wildlife corridor will be under some sort of protection by 2010 (Hahn, 2004, GTZ and InWent, 2005, KfW and URT, 2006). Since the land and wildlife laws do not provide for restitution, the issue of community rights to access and use village areas becomes the basis for the analysis of the actual and potential impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA to the indigenous people in Tanzanian side. The following section uses empirical data from the fifteen studied villages to elaborate on community rights. Examples that are more detailed are particularly drawn from the villages forming the Mbarang'andu WMA.

Figure 6.1 Villages in the area of the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor



Source: Adopted from GTZ/Selous Conservation Program, (2001)

6.1.2 Displacement from ancestral land

The core of the loss of indigenous land rights in southeastern Tanzania was the relocation from well watered fertile lands and sacred places throughout the creation of the SGR. The consolidation of wildlife land use that culminated in the official reserve borders of 1975 curtailed any possibility of recovering lost land rights. As the previous chapters suggest, the relocated people established new settlements along the new reserve borders and were officially registered during the countrywide villagization program. Although loss of access to land in the reserve had significant livelihood impacts, there was still land available outside the reserve where greater demands were made on the fertile lands for the re-establishment of croplands (Ashley *et al.*, 2002). Even though land is available, the impacts of relocation are not any less. The recent emphasis on protection of wildlife outside protected areas has, ironically, targeted the land occupied by the same people who had lost land during the creation of the reserve. This study reveals that the creation of buffer zones and the SNWC have, so far, formally demanded the relocation of settlements. More importantly, however, the village lands have become WMAs where neither crop cultivation nor collection of forest resources and hunting are allowed for villagers. Resettlement and land use restrictions in the newly established wildlife areas amounts to displacement, which has not been acknowledged even though they have as much impacts on the community livelihoods as the previous relocation schemes.

This study establishes, for example, that in 2002 the government denounced the settlements of about 30 families with approximately 150 members in an area called Mwembenyani between Huria and Kilimasera villages. With the assistance of village guides, I visited Mwembenyani area and observed that this former settlement still has fruit trees such as mangoes and coconuts, which are a typical feature of other settlements in the study area (see Figure 6.2). The area is almost at the edge of the district border hence some families moved to Kilimasera village in Namtumbo district while others went to Huria village in Tunduru district.

Figure 6.2: Former settlements in Mwembenyani area

Source: Photo taken by the author, 11/9/2007

My observations as well as interviews conducted with former Mwembenyani residents as captured in Figure 6.3 confirmed the said relocations. Most recently, the Mwembenyani area became part of the Nalika WMA, it was marked as the core of the wildlife corridor between Selous, and Niassa Game Reserves (see Figure 6.4). In addition to this new land use, the official communication from the Tunduru District Natural Resources office instructed the Huria village in a letter dated 23 July 2008 to keep Mwembenyani area free from human activities (including crop cultivation and forest resource collection) to facilitate wildlife migration (Mali Asili-Tunduru, 2008).

Figure 6.3: A visit to the new settlements in Huria village

Figure 6.4: Wildlife migration sign post between Huria and Kilimasera villages

Source: All photos taken by the author, 8/8/2008

Other settlements similar to Mwembenyani have recently been put under relocation plans. On 29 June 2006 the SNWC technical advisor, Rudolf Hahn, proposed a resettlement plan to the government in a letter directed to the Namtumbo District Executive Director (Hahn, 2006). The letter proposes that *'the government should facilitate the realization of the SNWC by relocating unplanned settlements and farms in the core areas of the project'*. Among the settlements proposed for relocation, are Semeni and Jiungeni in Likusanguse village and Bwawa la Jiwe in Marumba village. According to the said letter, Semeni settlement has a population of around 15 families and a total number of 100 inhabitants. The same letter estimates the population of Jiungeni settlement at 70 inhabitants[17]. Like in Mwembenyani, reasons given to support the proposed scheme include that the settlements are located on the main elephant migration routes and that these settlements are not reachable by game rangers. As a result, villagers are allegedly hosts for poachers (Hahn, 2006). In addition, these areas are claimed to be prone to malaria and the soil is too poor to support human habitation. On 20 September 2007, I visited the Semeni settlement. Contrary to the arguments raised by the SNWC office, the observations and interviews revealed that there are 332 inhabitants (up from 100 provided by the SNWC office) (Interview, Anonymous Informant[18], 20/9/2007). As Figure 6.5 confirms, the settlement is well developed with fertile farms and, among others, a modern primary school which has been serviced by the government since 2002 (Interview, Kimolo, 11/9/2007).

Surprisingly, the problem described for the Bwana la Jiwe case is that the settlement '*is located in one of the world's most magnificent and spectacular view, overlooking the entire corridor area deep into the Niassa reserve'* (Hahn, 2006). For this reason, the SNWC project office advised that the government should declare this area '*unfit'* for settlements (Hahn, 2006). Based on my analysis, the status of being unfit actually means that the area is not for people but wildlife. Indeed, the Namtumbo District Commissioner confirmed in an interview that the said villages are within the core area of the SNWC and that the government will facilitate their relocation (Interview, Kimolo, 27/11/2007). The same source confirms also that, since the government owns the land compensations are only expected for perennial

17 The number of inhabitant for Bwawa la Jiwe was not readily available.

18 Resident of the Semeni village.

crops and permanent building structures (if any). Villagers are at liberty to choose any other area, which is not earmarked for wildlife. At most, the government will provide social services such as water, schools and health facilities in the new settlements.

Figure 6.5: Crop fields and the school at the Semeni settlement

Source: All photos taken by the author, 20/9/2007

The discussion in this section testifies that the establishment of the SNWC has necessitated the redefinition of borders. Hence, the resettlement schemes in the SNWC area are a result of scale and border redefinition processes that focus on creating space while redefining powers and control over such space. Indeed, the completion of the SNWC (which is scheduled for 2010) will mark the major step towards the creation of the area devoid of humans, the Selous-Niassa TFCA (KfW, 2007, GTZ-IS, 2007). It should be noted here that as wildlife overflowed from the SGR, they do so from the SNWC area and villages are on the verge of becoming enclosures thus ruling out possibilities for development of their livelihood activities. Local communities interpret the newly created wildlife areas and their borders as politics that seek to create barriers for indigenous people while giving wild animals the freedom of movement. Part of the story from Mwembenyani relocated villagers reaffirms that indigenous people and their activities are replaced by wildlife;

> *...we settled there* (Mwembenyani) *because of the soil fertility and access to the Tunduru-Namtumbo road. We settled there when these animals were also there…The soil was fertile so we did not need fertilizers. We harvested anything we sowed and our children played with food all the time. After these things happened* (relocations), *our land was made a home for animals; east and west is reserved for elephant migration, on the south is a bee reserve and if you go north is the Selous reserve. Wildlife signposts are everywhere around us. The land here* (new settlement) *is small, dry and useless without fertilizers. We remain poor, hungry and our children are malnourished. We are not asking for food but our land to produce food…* (Group discussion, 8/8/2008[19]).

As it is elsewhere in southern Africa, the introduction of wildlife land use in communal lands in southeastern Tanzania is presented as a means to foster social and economic development of the communities, particularly, through tourism (Baldus, 2008, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004, Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007). This claim does not consider the foregone land use alternatives such as agriculture even though wildlife replaces actual and potential agricultural land that forms the main source of local livelihoods. Based on this view, this research considers that the 15,000 hectares of community agricultural land, which is to become the wildlife corridor, is central to the debate about the impacts of the corridor to the local communities. As such, the study analyzes land use plans for Mbarang'andu WMA to elaborate this view. In the meantime, the review of other

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research works have revealed that restricted access to WMAs across the country have caused failures of local communities to sustain livelihood in their own village lands (Ashley et al., 2002, Neumann, 2001, Kideghesho, 2006, Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Specifically, Ashley *et al*., (2002) reports that in the northern sections of the SGR, communities lost prime pasture and agricultural land that was set aside as JUKUMU WMA (which is now one of the hunting blocks under the Wildlife Division and already leased to the tourist hunting company). Contrary to the community expectations, the tourist company pays block fee to the Wildlife Division. Thus direct benefits from wildlife remained much lower compared to crop cultivation and livestock keeping thereby causing food insecurity. Besides loss of agricultural land, people suffer from losses on account of wildlife movements in the villages since WMA borders are only in the maps and do not block wild animals. Consequently, animals such as baboons, elephants, and vervet monkeys cause untold crop damage while leopards, lions and hyenas account for large number of livestock and human mortality (Rustagi, 2005, Kideghesho, 2006, Songorwa, 1999).

6.1.3 Interrupted livelihoods and conflicts

As it was pointed out in Chapter One, two of the seven GTZ/SCP project districts (Namtumbo and Tunduru) are the study area for this research. Four villages (two from each district) were included in the sample of the fifteen villages presented in Table 1.2. The Namtumbo and Tunduru districts share the southern section of the SGR and are part of the Rufiji basin discussed earlier in Chapter Three. As in other parts of the basin, the two districts are permanent sources of water, which lead to the concentration of different wildlife species and their spread over large areas of village lands during dry seasons. Indigenous people of the area are crop cultivators but they have a long tradition of game hunting as an alternative source of food and household income (Kaggi, 2006, Ashley et al., 2002). Thus, the subsistence hunters (locally called *Warumba*) use locally made weapons such as muzzle loaders, spears, arrows and other techniques such as snares and pits. Obviously, these tools and techniques differentiate subsistence hunting from commercial poaching. It is important to note that the GTZ/SCP brought changes that had direct impacts on these local hunting practices. As such, subsistence hunting was labelled as poaching and the GTZ/SCP put emphasis on anti-poaching activities. Since GTZ/SCP operated around the same

time that poaching had raised concerns nationally and at the international level stringent rules were applied to both commercial poaching and subsistence hunting.

Studies have confirmed that local communities had no influence over the changes brought about by the GTZ/SCP as these changes were generally part of the broader conservation objectives set by the donor (Songorwa, 1999, Ashley et al., 2002, Nelson, 2007). However, a few people in every village were literally hand-picked and trained by GTZ/SCP to work as community representatives in the project (Ashley *et al.*, 2002). It is reported, for example, that in total the project had 300 village game scouts in addition to the five members of environmental committee in each village (Baldus, 2006b). This is to say that an average of ten people would represent the village in decisions made by the GTZ/SCP. Based on the village populations presented in Table 1.3, ten people would be less than 1% of the total village population. All the same, the GTZ/SCP committees took primary responsibility for monitoring wildlife in village lands. Upon being instructed and equipped, village game scouts conducted patrols that led to the arrest of subsistence hunters/poachers and confiscation of hunting weapons. Methods used in confiscation varied from use of force, fearful surrender and incentives that were provided to community members who facilitated the identification of poachers/traditional hunters. Generally speaking, confiscation of subsistence hunting tools and monitoring of stringent rules posed threats on household economy and food security and became a source of conflict and division between those working for GTZ/SCP (considered to be project employees) and other civilians (including village government leaders). Although the GTZ/SCP was conceived from outside the community, the use of few village members assumed community involvement and the project used these members to influence desirable changes.

The second livelihood change brought about by the GTZ/SCP was village land use planning which formed an important step towards setting aside specific village areas for wildlife protection. In this activity, the GTZ/SCP obtained much of the support from the government in that there had been a national land use plan initiative that aimed at granting single right of occupancy to the Village Councils since 1987 thus requiring demarcation, survey and registration of village lands (Ashley *et al.*, 2002). Apparently, the national project became expensive and it was constrained by legal

and procedural problems (Interview, Tibasana and Shilungushela, 29/2/2008). Therefore, donor projects such as the GTZ/SCP were required to undertake village land use plans, which could later contribute to the government project. To this end, the GTZ/SCP land use plans were submitted to the Wildlife Division as the basis for the initial designation of village areas that became provisional wildlife reserves (GTZ/SCP, 1995, Ashley et al., 2002). In particular, the GTZ/SCP prepared village land use plans for 1991/2006 period.

Ideally, wildlife land uses were established on a village-to-village basis but this was not the scale envisaged. Since wildlife moves over large areas, and many species range would inevitably stretch over many village lands, several village wildlife areas were pulled together. Overtime, however, these areas were leased out as single hunting blocks (Ashley et al., 2002, Nelson, 2007). It should be emphasized that hunting blocks in Tanzania are leased to hunting tourists and administered by the Wildlife Division. Thus most of the village areas became inaccessible to villagers with the exception of few where the Wildlife Division considered granting limited rights of use by providing quotas through the arrangement designed by GTZ/SCP. Where the Wildlife Division provided quota, villages could choose to hunt or sell to the tourist hunting operators (Baldus et al., 2004, Nelson, 2007). In case the village chose to hunt, game scouts under the supervision of the District Game Officer could hunt. Even then, village meat would not be provided for free but at a cost slightly below the market price for other alternatives such as beef (GTZ, 1998).

Conceptually, the GTZ/SCP influenced communal land use changes and transformed subsistence hunting from a livelihood activity to commercial lease holding. At the community level, the sale of game meat was considered the project's success story and the first attempt to provide communities with legal access of game meat, which was also intended to generate development funds. This is irrespective of the fact that not all villagers could afford the meat and that the funds generated in this scheme went back towards the recurring expenses for hunting, including the purchase of ammunition and food for hunters (Interviews, Alois and Mdoo, 18/11/2007). Consequently, villages could neither manage to hunt the quota provided annually nor could the sale of meat support community development. This study establishes that the most profound legacy of the project was the increased

wildlife numbers, which is supported by 65% of respondents involved in this study. Of these, 38.5% sees no benefit at all of the increased wildlife numbers following the growing human-wildlife conflicts that constrains local livelihoods further. The remaining 26.5% of respondents appreciate the improved social services such as schools, dispensaries as well as milling machines. However, this response is based on the fact that since villages could not make substantial amounts of money from game sale the GTZ/SCP continued to support development activities directly from the project funds (GTZ/SCP, 1996; Interview, Mdoo, 21/11/2007). The consequences of this arrangement were that when the flow of direct funds ended with the project in 1998 village lands remained wildlife areas protected by law and hunting blocks leased to tourists.

The study could not quantify all the livelihood impacts of the recently established WMAs in the study villages but the analysis of surveys, in-depth interviews and observations support the view that local livelihoods are generally constrained by the restrictions imposed on the use of land, wildlife and forest resources in the WMAs. As other chapters demonstrate, the conversion of village lands into protected areas of varying degrees (WMAs, wildlife corridor and the TFCA) has particularly focussed on increasing wildlife numbers to support commercial and tourist hunting activities. Nevertheless, surveys reveal that agriculture is still the main livelihood activity for communities in the SNWC area. As Table 6.1 indicates, about 97% of respondents have crop cultivation as their main household occupation while less than 3% are involved in petty businesses (on food grains, retail kiosks and tailoring). There is not one respondent for whom private sector or self-employment is a livelihood option.

The survey revealed further that even though farmers are faced with a complex array of constrains resulting from wildlife crop damage, lack of farm inputs and market, almost all the respondents (99%) still consider agriculture as the best use of their land since it serves immediate household needs (see Table 6.1). As such, only less than 1% considered other uses such as wildlife conservation as the better land use alternative. This data communicates that although study villages have been involved in conservation for the past two decades, wildlife land use has not played a major livelihood role. In fact, the majority of the respondents who depend on crop

cultivation (80%) own small farm plots of between one and five acres but they are still considered more important for family cash and food security than wildlife. Despite the small sizes, family plots are kept separate as a strategy for risk management for crop damage (in case one plot is destroyed by wild animals the rest will serve the household from hunger) and also because different parts of the villages are suitable for different types of crops. Elderly people revealed in the interviews that, since they settled in the area after the relocation from the SGR in 1920s and 1930s, their livelihoods have mainly depended on shifting cultivation between valleys for paddy (locally referred to as *madimba)* and flood plains for maize, beans, cassava, groundnuts and sesame as well as cashew nuts and tobacco as cash crops.

Table 6.1: The current livelihood activities and the preferred future land uses

Main activity	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Crop cultivation	642	96.7
Livestock keeping	4	.6
Fishing	1	.2
Hunting	1	.2
Carpentry/Tailoring	13	2.0
Civil servant	3	.5
Total	**664**	**100.0**
Alternative future uses of land as preferred by villagers		
Land use option	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Agriculture	658	99.1
Wildlife conservation	2	.3
No response	4	.6
Total	**664**	**100.0**

Source: Author

Local sentiments suggest that rather than benefits, wildlife protection has resulted in increased problem animals, and at the same time, crop and people protection have silently been withdrawn. In particular, wildlife-related revenues are considered too little, sporadic and are used for community development projects (such as schools and dispensaries) but do not serve immediate household needs for food and cash[20].

20 Community consider service provision as the role of the government and the right of all citizens with or without wildlife in their land.

As the following interview clips opine, wildlife has become a negative factor for household development, cultural practices and safety of village members.

> *...Selous has come to our backyards. Wildlife feeds on our gardens and granaries. We no long have our traditional weapons, they were confiscated…we cannot scare elephants in the farms and granaries and nor can any of us kill a lion taking a child from the house. Our roles as village men are all reduced to shouting like women… Does shouting scare a lion that is about to feast or an elephant enjoying the cassava meal?* (Interview, Matomola, 7/11/2007)

> *...bringing elephants close to my home and farm? You want me to say I like that? No, it is for those who come to see these elephants for one day and go back to the cities. This is my home together with these elephants. Mine is a struggle for survival and theirs is leisure…This place is my cassava field, my children's future; the graveyard…is everything to me and my children...* (Interview, Chona, 18/11/2007)

As noted elsewhere in the country, the new legal framework for natural resource management that create wildlife areas in communal lands has not only disrupted livelihoods and increased human-wildlife conflicts but also destabilized local resource institutions. As discussed in Chapter Four, power struggles between the conventional and new institutions have widened the gap between local institutions and have also caused confusions and uncertainties among the leaders and members of their communities (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007). This was indeed apparent in Kilimasera village where a meeting was held with both the members of Village Council and the representatives of Mbarang'andu CBO on the 21 November 2007. At that meeting, each group blamed the other for infringing on areas of operation that had institutional and financial implications. On the one hand, representatives of the Village Council expressed their views that;

> *…the Village Councils environmental committee supervised hunting and the money from the sale of meat came to the village office. We managed to build a primary school using village funds. When Mbarang'andu emerged in 2000, a new committee was formed that took all the village wildlife-related responsibilities. Since then, village wildlife funds are remitted to the Mbarang'andu office and the money no longer comes to the village office. Yet, the Village Council is required to contribute more money for the construction of the Mbarang'andu office.*

On the other hand, the CBO committee complained that;

> *…the problem is that our responsibilities include overseeing activities of the Village Council environmental committee on issues related to wildlife…For us, this has become a burden because we don't have an office in the village and we don't own the land where wildlife are found. The Village Council have land rights and we work from the village office. So the allocation of hunting funds from the Wildlife Division comes to the Village Council and the village environmental committee gets the share of that money but not us…*

6.2 Insights from Mbarang'andu WMA

The analysis of data for Mbarang'andu WMA confirms that relocations and the increased wildlife numbers coupled with the restricted access and use of land have become the main push factor for indigenous people who are currently considering voluntary relocation to seek alternative livelihood strategies outside the villages. Indeed, land use data for Mbarang'andu WMA support the villager's claim that wildlife has taken the best in their cultural and economic landscape. As described in the previous chapters, Mbarang'andu WMA is a land contributed by seven villages for wildlife conservation. Until 2002, there were 28,526 people in the seven villages all of whom fully depended on agriculture (Mbarang'andu, 2003). Through the GTZ/SCP, villages were assisted in planning their land use, which was a pre-requisite for the establishment of the WMA and its registration as a CBO. On 18 February 2004, Mbarang'andu was eventually registered as a CBO responsible for the management of the WMA on behalf of the seven villages. According to the official files, village land use plans were carried out by villagers who endorsed that all areas five kilometres away from the village centre in all the directions should be given for other uses (including wildlife and forest conservation). Practically, the five-kilometre radius would be an area for residence and farms and that was officially recorded as the border between communal land use and wildlife areas. Village elders who participated in the border discussions confirmed this during in-depth interviews. However, these elders lament that the aim of the land use plan was not made clear to them and that the five-kilometre radius is by no means enough for present and future human needs because the population is growing. Moreover, wildlife does not observe these borders; they use all the areas including those for residence and farms. A group discussion with elders in Huria village captures these sentiments;

> *...we did not know how that could soon affect us…Wahifadhi (GTZ conservationists) came and asked us indirectly. How many miles do you walk to your farm? Most of us said five without knowing why we were asked. The five miles*[21] *are now set as borders for agriculture and wildlife in every direction…wildlife postings are everywhere around the village and that is already included in their maps. We remain a small island in an animal ocean. As we speak, animals are everywhere in these farms and the number is increasing fast. They (animals) do not know these borders and surprisingly, conservationists are not bothered about our safety and crops…* (Interview, Chona, 18/11/2007)

The story above confirms two observations made earlier in this study. Firstly, that rather than removing borders, borders in southeastern Tanzania are a tool for acquiring communal land for wildlife protection. The second observation relates to the fact that these borders are not obstacles for wildlife movement but they set limits for people. Unlike people, wildlife crosses these borders. The border drawing process that limits people to a five-kilometre radius while allowing wildlife to overflow in the neighbouring areas is an indication of further constraints to human survival and a silent call for relocation. As discussed in Chapter Five, this has since the expansion of the SGR been a strategy to clear humans from areas earmarked for wildlife. Mzee Cosmas of Milonji village believes that villager's participation in land use planning and border demarcation is largely driven by politics of '*community involvement*' and it serves to block people from demanding compensation for the damages caused by wildlife. According to him, the government was part of the GTZ/SCP and it owns the land, forests, wildlife, and villagers were obliged to participate in drawing WMA borders. He narrates that;

> *…After all, you can only have control over what you own. We own neither the land nor wildlife on it. The government does. So projects come, not because we are here, but because the land has wild animals. The government and conservationists come to protect animals against us, not the vice verse…We are responding to the government voice because ours cannot be head above the government's. However, the government is listening to the foreigners (GTZ) and not us. In fact, it is selling our land to the foreigners through us... we are literally assisting in getting our land sold to whites and they will rule us again...Selous will rule us again. He initially acquired the Selous reserve and now his children are expanding it…But how can we let Selous expand the area up to our beds?...*(Interview, 5/11/2007)

21 Official documents indicate 5 kilometers.

Land use plans for Mbarang'andu WMA were prepared for a ten year period from 2003-2013. As Table 6.2 and Figure 6.6 indicate, wildlife and forest conservation occupies most village areas with only small fractions of land set aside for agriculture and residents. Songambele village stands out as an exception with 49% of its land in agriculture while six villages have less than 10% of the total land for agriculture[22]. Conceptually, areas set aside for wildlife and forest in each village are what forms Mbarang'andu WMA. In fact, wildlife and forest areas combined occupies 385,469.5 hectares (84.2% of the total area) while agriculture occupy only 43293.5 hectares (9.5% of the total area). Residents (which include institutional and public spaces) occupy 28569.3 hectares (6.3% of the total area). As would be expected, human and wildlife populations are growing. Projections indicate that human population in the villages forming Mbarang'andu WMA is increasing by 3.4% per annum (see Figure 6.7). Put other way, by 2015 the population will have increased 1.5 times that of 2002 when the land use plans were drawn.

Table 6.2 Land Use proportions for Mbarang'andu WMA (2003-2013)

Land Uses (ha) Villages	Residential	% of total	Agriculture	% of total	Village forest areas	% of total	Village wildlife areas	% of total
Kilimasera	75	0.47	1450	9.13	8875	55.91	5475	34.49
Mchomoro	561	0.5	5789	5	29964	25.2	79991	68.8
Nambeche	205.5	0.5	3571.5	7.9	28705.1	63.9	12476.25	27.7
Songambele	2455	5.8	20836	49.1	1344	3.2	1779	41.9
Kitanda	378.7	0.4	4275	4.4	55153.5	56.6	37535	38.6
Likuyuseka	24251.6	27.3	2156	2.4	21919.4	24.7	40566.5	45.6
Mtelawamwahi	642.5	1	5216	7.7	21685.75	32.1	40000	59.2
Total	**28569.3**	**6.3**	**43293.5**	**9.5**	**167646.75**	**36.6**	**217822.75**	**47.6**

Source: Mbarang'andu, (2005)

22 This difference is a potential conflict over benefit sharing between those villages with more wildlife areas and those with more land under agricultural since Article 7 of the CBO constitution states that wildlife-related benefits will be shared equally among member villages.

Figure 6.6: Combined wildlife and forest areas in relation to other land uses



Source: Source: Mbarang'andu, (2005)

Official records for wildlife population in the village lands are not yet established. However, villagers report that elephant population in their surroundings has grown substantially in the past few years. According to the village game scouts in Kilimasera (preferred anonymity), the increased wildlife numbers in the village is associated with their protection and restricted movement of people and farming activities. As one of the village game scouts tell informally *'…It is a simple logic. Animals are protected, few dies while many are born. Villages are given six animals to hunt per year, which we cannot even hunt because of either this or that. Remember there are those animals like elephants which are never hunted but are the most destructive'* (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 19/11/2007). By villager's standards, one can meet a group of elephants in a less than a kilometre from the village centre compared to three or four in the past five years. This distance is far below the five kilometres set as the human-wildlife border. This implies then that borders limit human activities but wild animals have freedom to roam in any area of

the village including those set aside for agriculture and settlements. This has become the main concern for many villagers who watch as wildlife replaces their livelihood activities faster than they expected.

Figure 6.7 Population census and projections



Source: Mbarang'andu, (2005)

While conservationist's focus is on wildlife protection to increase the numbers, people and crop protection is left for individuals and village councils that are known to be financially and technically incapable of doing so. For example, section 4.6 of the Mbarang'andu WMA land use plan declares that since farms and residents are not part of WMA, the protection of people and their croplands is the responsibility of Village Councils (Mbarang'andu, 2003). As Neumann (2002) suggests, the withdrawing of crop and people protection has long been a conservationist's strategy for indisposing traditional land uses in favour of wildlife. An elderly villager of Likusanguse did not miss words for this injustice;

> *…It is clear to me that conservation has nothing to do with us. When we report crop damage by elephants, district game officers respond after five days. When we report that there is a dead elephant, it is a matter of hours, they will be here to*

take everything (the report, meat and ivory). When a person is killed by an elephant that is not the game officer's business, it is a police case… (Interview, Ambuje, 13/8/2008).

The Mbarang'andu WMA is typical of conservationist discourse that, in my view, has created paradise for wildlife while creating human enclosures that will suffocate the community that already has a long history of displacement. Apparently, not many community members have realised this future predicament as they still portray WMA land use as something they could legally break should they not benefit. However, the registration certificate for the Mbarang'andu CBO is accompanied by the certificate of incorporation under the Trustee's Incorporation Ordinance (Chapter 375) which states that; *Firstly, such body corporate (Mbarangandu CBO) shall not, without obtaining consent from the Administrator General of Trustees in writing acquire any estate or interest in land. Secondly, such body corporate shall not, without consent, use or permit use of any land vested in it otherwise than in direct fulfilment of the trust for which the body corporate was established*. This section of the certificate confirms that, the land set aside as WMA shall not be influenced by village needs anymore and that it is a permanent and irrevocable change in land tenure.

6.3 Commercialization and community hunting rights

Contradictions have surrounded efforts that seek to balance between local subsistence needs and commercial investments in the growing demand for nature commodification. Wildlife and forests are no longer viewed merely as subsistence resources for rural households, nor as simply areas of rich biodiversity for the concern of conservationists but are seen as commercial assets on which enterprise, investment and growth should be built (Ashley and Wolmer, 2003). For Tanzania, wildlife is currently the key asset in the tourism industry worth an estimated USD 862 million as of 2006, which makes it a leading contributor to the national foreign exchange reserves (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), 2008). Nevertheless, tourism is considered a sector whose potentials for poverty alleviation have not been well exploited. While this concept is highly disputed, it is worth attention since it has become the essence of wildlife commercialization in Tanzania. The focus here is, however, the potential of wildlife commercialization as a vehicle for rural development. I use the case of Mbarang'andu to demonstrate that WMAs which are presented as the development choice of the local communities around

protected areas in Tanzania are far from reaching the conditions that can enable these communities to negotiate conservation benefits. The possibilities of benefits from conservation which are seen in other countries such as Botswana and South Africa are supported by the fact that local communities have ownership of resources such as land and wildlife and they can work in partnership with private sector thereby controlling revenues derived from tourism. Botswana and South Africa have different resource ownership systems which can elaborate this point.

Like in Tanzania, land in Botswana is administered under the State Land Act (1966) which empowers the President to make and execute grants of any land or of any interest therein (Mathuba, 2003). Nevertheless, Botswana's Wildlife Conservation Policy No.1 of 1986 and the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 provides for the creation of Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) and WMAs in villages around major protected areas (Hachileka, 2003). The two land use categories are specifically designed to benefit local people and foster rural development. The CBNRM policy, which evolved around the same time as that of Tanzania, encourage villages in CHAs and WMAs to form Trusts which becomes legal entities qualified to get leases for CHAs thus allowing communities to enter into legal contracts with the private sector directly. Communities can also sublease their areas for joint ventures and receive grants directly from donors (Hachileka, 2003). In both CHAs and WMAs, traditional rights are recognised. In fact, the use of natural resources in the WMAs is subject to consultations between the residents, local authorities, government entities in the area concerned and the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. These consultations are guided by the Joint Venture Handbook of 1999 (Hachileka, 2003, Phuthego and Chanda, 2004, Mathuba, 2003).

The Makuleke community of South Africa represent a different scenario. Ramutsindela, (2002) provides a detailed analysis of community land claims that resulted into the recognition of community rights to the land currently forming the Kruger National Park (KNP). Others have analysed how the community has exercised the land rights for the partnership with private investors in the GLTFP (see Buzzard, 2001; Fakir, 2003; Ferreira, 2006). In 1969, the Makuleke people were relocated from the area called Pafuri, which became part of the KNP. The area had since the first establishment of the KNP in 1898 been targeted for the extension of

the park. There were also other conflicts of interest over the Pafuri area with individuals, private companies and government departments contending for different interests including mining, settlement, farming and wildlife conservation (Ramutsindela, 2002). As elsewhere, the Makuleke people were portrayed as hostile to nature that became the basis for their removal. However, in 1995 the Makuleke community laid claim to their land, which had already been incorporated and declared part of the KNP. The land claim was settled in 1998 where the community was given a Deed of Grant to their land, meaning that the Pafuri area became a contractual park managed jointly by the South African National Parks and the Makuleke community (Ramutsindela, 2002). Since then, and as the KNP became part of the GLPTFP, the Makuleke community retain rights to the economic benefits accruing from the use of land and the rural development initiatives have been incorporated as part of protected area projects (Fakir, 2003, Ferreira, 2006, Buzzard, 2001). As such, the community negotiate directly with private investors over the commercial use of their land. This model is not applied throughout South Africa for reasons beyond the scope of this thesis (see Benjaminsen *et al.*, 2008).

The difference between Tanzania and the two examples above is the fact that the Tanzanian state retains the central ownership and control of resources, the management as well as the utilization, which blocks any attempt for fair benefit sharing between the government and local communities. Yet, the examples from South Africa suggest that resource ownership is an important condition for communities to benefit from commercialization of natural resources. This condition is therefore lacking in Tanzania despite the decade long process of governance reforms that aimed at devolving the ownership of resources to the local communities. As the data from Mbarang'andu WMA will demonstrate later in the section, this implies that local communities are far from benefiting from wildlife commercialization. Besides, the ownership issue raises even more concerns as communities can neither be compensated for the loss of land and nor for the damages caused by wildlife. The analysis of laws regulating tourism activities coupled with the empirical data provide me with an argument and theoretical perspective that WMAs in Tanzania are not intended to empower local communities economically but are tools for expansion of protected areas and provision of revenue to the state and its conservation agencies.

Wildlife tourism (consumptive and non-consumptive) is the most viable and, so far, targeted investment in WMAs across the country. Through tourism, villages are expected to increase revenue and ultimately alleviate poverty. In particular, tourism revenues are to improve diet, availability of social services (roads, hospitals, schools) and employment opportunities (Baldus, 2008, Baldus et al., 1994, URT, 2002c). Conceptually, emphasis on tourism expansion as a strategy for poverty alleviation has been used to conceal the need for relocation of people from targeted wildlife areas and instead advocating for co-existence. Notably, commercialization of wildlife is used as an incentive for the communities to set aside their land for wildlife conservation. It should be emphasized, however, that the central government through the Wildlife Division continues to regulate wildlife utilization in game reserves as well as in the WMAs. This means that tourist and resident hunting, game viewing, photographic as well as camping activities in communal lands are controlled and paid for in the Wildlife Division. By implication, the Wildlife Division can allocate to a tourist an area of the WMA as a hunting block without consultations with CBOs, which manage such areas.

This study establishes that as long as the Wildlife Division controls wildlife utilization in communal lands, tourism is not a livelihood option for local people. Precisely, the commercialization of wildlife through hunting tourism has not demonstrated the support for development of specific geographical areas where wildlife exists. Instead, hunting has become a strategy for accumulation of revenues by the central government and institutions charged with wildlife management. It should be recalled that the Tanzania's wildlife policy of 1998 recognised community WMAs as a new category of protected areas in the village lands where communities would be given *full mandate* for wildlife management (URT, 1998b). However, the revised wildlife policy of 2007 describes such WMAs as a mechanism for securing wildlife habitat and halt degradation (URT, 2007c). The revised policy states further that *'the government will ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits that considers stakeholder roles in relation to categories of land and efforts invested by the institution in conservation*' (URT, 2007c: 28). In practice, community WMAs are protected areas and, by this understanding, they fall within the jurisdiction of the

Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and not CBO or Village Councils (see Chapter Four).

New set of regulations for wildlife utilization (non-consumptive tourism) were formulated alongside the new focus of the wildlife policy. The regulations were issued in September 2007. These regulations give powers to the Director of Wildlife to control wildlife use on village land and set out schedules for the payment of fees and other applicable charges at the Wildlife Division in Dar es Salaam (URT, 2007b). Since consumptive tourism (hunting) has always been regulated by the Wildlife Division (even when hunting blocks are located in the village lands), both consumptive and non-consumptive tourism regulations leave communities with no role to play in tourism revenue collection. As a result, communities accrue minimum benefits from wildlife utilization in their land. For example, in 2006 the Wildlife Division earned TShs 15.3 billion (approximately USD 11.5 million) from sustainable wildlife utilisation and allocated 1.96 billion (12.8%) (approximately USD 1.4 million) back to 41 District Councils that neighbour the tourist hunting areas (URT, 2008). Likewise, TANAPA earned TShs 69 billion in 2007 of which it allocated 1.24 billion (1.8%) for communities around the fifteen national parks (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), 2008).

The application of new wildlife utilization rules in southeastern Tanzania leave indigenous people with more challenges associated with not only the changing role of wildlife as a traditional source of livelihood but also the unjust nature of wildlife business. In Mbarang'andu, as it is for other four WMAs in the Selous-Niassa area, consumptive wildlife utilization (tourist and resident hunting) is the main commercial investment option since non-consumptive wildlife activities such as photographic and game viewing are limited by the remoteness and accessibility of the area (Graham, 2005). Details of resident hunting will be provided later in this section. As for commercial and tourist hunting, the Wildlife Division has allocated the five WMAs in the Selous-Niassa area (including Mbarang'andu) as hunting blocks leased by different private companies. The blocks are namely Mbarang'andu (which is by itself a name of the WMA), Mtungwe Central, Ruvuma Open Area and Mtungwe South. Game Frontiers of Tanzania Ltd (GFT) and Maasai Hunting Company Ltd (MHC) jointly lease Mbarang'andu and Mtungwe central blocks while Mtungwe South is

leased by M.S.K Hunting safaris. The Ruvuma Open Area is leased by Bushmen safaris.

As noted earlier, hunting concession holders pay for block fees at the Wildlife Division in Dar es Salaam and are granted five-year leases[23]. With this understanding, neither village governments and nor CBOs have access to funds generated from tourism hunting in their land. Private concessionaires are at most required to contribute to village developments and they do so in varying degrees because there are no legal obligations to that rule. In fact, Chachage, (2000) argues that the negotiable nature of this obligation is a locus of corruption in the allocation and hunting activities in the blocks. As a result, the proportion of hunting funds that reach village councils is small, provided irregularly, and it ends up in the hands of few village officials. Village leaders have often confused the contributions made by hunting companies with the 25% allocation that comes from the Wildlife Division through the District Councils. For example, the Kilimasera village leaders acknowledged to have received in 2005 Tshs 700,000 from GFT, another 700,000 from the District Council as part of 25% for 2006 and 300,000 again from GFT for 2007 (Interview, Mdoo, 21/11/2007). Neither of the two sources is consistent on the amount and time of delivering the funds and, as a result, this research established that Village Councils have poor records of such funds and their uses. Overall, the proportion and sporadic nature of hunting revenues to the villages make it difficult to assess the contribution of wildlife to the local community development.

Critical data for the analysis of the impacts of commercial hunting is also lacking from important sources including the Wildlife Division. However, the five hunting concessionaires in the WMAs in Selous-Niassa area support two main arguments; firstly, that commercial hunting can cause much more damage to wildlife than small-scale farming activities of the local communities. This is more so since, unlike the Makuleke community, that has land and wildlife rights, the communities in the study area have no powers to monitor hunting activities and concessionaires are not responsible to either CBOs or Village Councils. The second argument relates to the fact that once an area of the WMA is leased as a hunting block it becomes a '*no go*

23 The current leases expire in 2009.

area' for community members. In SGR, hunting blocks are utilised by foreign hunting tourists who are mainly from Europe (47.3%) and America (34.2%) (Cauldwell, 2004). Indeed, communal land use is redefined and community rights are reallocated rendering the already marginalised communities powerless and powerful actors more powerful.

Notwithstanding the restricted access to the WMAs, subsistence hunting remains a vital livelihood activity for local communities since game meat is the main source of protein. As observed by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) (2008), the present SGR bisects the traditional lands of the Wangindo tribe who have ever since lived by hunting. Unlike tourists who see wildlife as a world heritage for recreation, local communities see wild animals as a source of meat. For example, a wild animal is called *'mnyama'* in Kiswahili but local people in the study area uses the word '*nyama'* when referring to the same. Under normal circumstances, *nyama* is a Kiswahili word for meat. My interpretation of the use of the word *nyama* to connote both a wild animal and meat is that, for local people in southeastern Tanzania, a wild animal is meat. As it was for most other African societies living near wildlife areas, subsistence hunting in the southeastern Tanzania has been for the pot – to provide food for the families or to sell to other villagers in exchange of different types of food (Bonner, 1993). It is on this basis that local communities in the Selous-Niassa area have high preference for game meat as compared to domestic meat sources (Ashley *et al.*, 2002). The community preference for game meat could also explain the low number of livestock in the area. Surveys indicate, for example, that only 0.6% of respondents own less than ten livestock (particularly sheep and goats) in addition to crop cultivation. This data leads to a conclusion that, with limitations in subsistence hunting, the amount of animal protein available to the local population is overly low. However, subsistence hunting has not been fully acknowledged as an important livelihood activity. Instead, it is labelled as poaching. The conservation project GTZ/SCP formalised subsistence hunting - now known as legal wildlife utilization - to control poaching around the SGR. Nevertheless, the impact of this scheme to the community has remained negligible for reasons supported by the following analysis.

Like tourist hunting, the Wildlife Division regulates subsistence hunting through the allocation of animal quota to the villages that have set aside their lands for wildlife conservation and have registered their land as WMAs. Recalling the different stages of the process of establishing WMAs in the study area, this means that the eleven study villages that form the proposed Kimbanda, Chingoli and Kisungule WMAs have never received quota allocations. In other words, these villages have no legal hunting rights. The analysis of the impact of community hunting is thus limited to the study villages that form Mbarang'andu and Nalika WMAs which are already registered as CBOs. Data from these villages support what Ashley *et al*. (2002) observed that community game meat might not appear of great significance in villages of many inhabitants but it remains a major livelihood issue which is complex and highly politicised. Two main reasons are associated with this observation; firstly, that the GTZ/SCP established claims that through quota allocation, the project achieved the provision of legal supply of game meat for which local people have high preference at lower prices (Baldus, 2008). This way, GTZ/SCP claim acceptability by local people who, in turn, supported ant-poaching and embraced wildlife protection in their village lands by giving in their subsistence hunting practices (GTZ, 1998, SCP, 1990). As such, this became the basis for the confiscation of subsistence hunting weapons. The second reason for the observation made above is that quota hunting is claimed to have provided income to the village governments thereby presenting wildlife conservation as a practical means for poverty alleviation in southeastern Tanzania (Kibonde, 2006, Graham, 2005, Baldus, 2008) .

Typical practices for quota utilization challenge the foregoing arguments. Ideally, the Wildlife Division dispatches quota for District Councils and from there the District Game Officer (DGO) distributes the quota among the WMA member villages. Village government organises for hunting with the support of village game scouts and traditional hunters locally called *Warumba*. As Table 6.3 indicates, the typical village quota is six to eight animals per year. After the animal is hunted the meat is sold either fresh, dried or smoked, depending on the distance to the village. The price for game meat (as of November 2007) was Tshs 1000 per kilogram (approximately USD 0.7), which is about half the price of the domestic meat sources. It is important to note that the money from meat sales is generated when villagers purchase the meat. Thus, the meat sales function as a sort of wildlife business rather than as a source of

individual income. In fact, villagers pay for wild meat taken from their own lands (GTZ/SCP, 1996). It is not surprising, then, that for local people access to quota meat is still restricted because not all have money to buy the meat (particularly the elderly and sick). The money accrued from meat sale is considered *community income* from wildlife. As Hahn and Kaggi (2002) acknowledges, however, over half of the revenues from community meat sales goes toward meeting the recurring costs of protecting wildlife. Typical expenditures include ammunition for patrols and the annual arms license fees. The small proportion of the revenues that remain covers costs for quota hunting (ammunition, food for hunters and transport costs) and in some cases where villages do not own hunting weapons they incur additional cost for hiring.

Table 6.3 District and village hunting quota allocations

Namtumbo District Quota for 2007/08		Allocation for Mbarang'andu WMA member villages						
Species	#	Kitanda	Nambeche	Likuyuseka	Songambele	Mchomoro	Kilimasera	Mtelawamwahi
Buffalo	18	1	3	3	3	3	2	3
Eland	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bush pig	10	3	2	3	-	2		2
Warthog	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Waterbuck	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ostrich	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Reedbuck	6	-	1	-	1	1	1	-
Bushbuck	3	1	-	-	1	-	2	1
Guinea Fowl	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bush Duiker	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**88**	**8**	**7**	**7**	**6**	**7**	**6**	**7**

Source: Author Compilation from official files in Namtumbo District Natural Resources Office, (undated)

The field visit made in November 2007 coincided with the hunting season. As Table 6.3 indicates, village quotas appear to be few animals per annum but most villages are unable to hunt due to a combination of reasons. Firstly, that the quota allocation does not depend on community needs. According to the letter dated 2 July 2007 from the Wildlife Division to the Namtumbo-DGO, which authorised the quota in Table 6.2, the quota allocation is based on species abundance, habitat status, rarity and endemism. Indeed, these are typical of ecological aspects that determine

hunting in reserved areas (Beinart, 1990). Hence, villagers lament that the most destructive species (such as elephants) are never in the quota and so too are the limits for the most palatable species such as eland and reedbuck. In contrary, species such as bush pig and warthog dominate the quota and yet they are preference of few community members due to the religious beliefs. Considering that the quota is utilized on communal lands, its allocation based on ecological aspects rather than community preferences and needs defeat its purposes as an alternative source of protein and income for such communities. Instead, soaring problems such as crop damage and the associated low income and food insecurity continues to grow.

The second constraint for quota hunting relates to the low revenues accrued from quota sale. Lack of funds constrains the maintenance of hunting facilities such as guns and ammunition in addition to the charges for hunters. It is not surprising that some villages could have a gun but they lack funds for buying ammunition (one-bullet costs up to Tshs 20,000, which is equivalent of 20 kilograms of meat). This was the case in Kilimasera village. In other cases such as in Darajambili, the village does not own a gun but it arranges to buy ammunition and hire a gun from the neighbouring village. The third constraint involves a scenario where villages own guns and they have money for ammunition but the District Council runs out of supply for ammunition. Villages such as Mchomoro have experienced desperate times when they have fulfilled all the requirements and yet they cannot utilize the allocated quota. Conceptually, village failures to utilize quota for one or a combination of reasons above is directly related to the deliberate withdrawal of the Wildlife Division in supporting communities to achieve that goal. Notably, the Wildlife Division, which allocates quota, is the same that supplies limited ammunition. This leads one to advise that the existing constraints on quota utilization are created by the central government but are dealt with locally, the result of which, boosts wildlife population in the village lands.

Table 6.4 presents an example of quota utilization for hunting season 2005/06 and 2007/08 for Huria village (member of Nalika WMA), which is singled out by neighbouring villages as a role model in the utilization of the quota. The statistics suggest that three animals (out of six) allocated for 2005/06 were hunted. The total

village revenue for that hunting season was Tshs 817,000 (approximately USD 600). According to the village chairperson, the funds covered the cost of the next hunting season and other development activities. Until the time of the field visit in November 2007 Huria village had hunted two animals for the 2007/08 season (which was to end in December)[24].

Table 6.4 Huria Village quota allocation and hunting

Species	'05/06	Hunted	Revenue	07/08	Hunted (by Nov. 2007)	Revenue
Buffalo	2	2	746,000	2	1	350,000
Eland	1	0	-	1	1	180,000
Bush pig	2	0	-	2	-	-
Warthog	-	-	-	-	-	-
Waterbuck	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ostrich	1	1	71,000	3	-	-
Reedbuck	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bushbuck	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea fowl	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bush Duiker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**6**	**3**	**817,000**	**8**	**2**	**530,000**

Source: Author Compilation from official files in Tunduru District Natural Resources Office and Huria Village Council, (undated)

On 17 November 2007, I observed the selling of the second animal in the 2007/08 quota, which happened to be a buffalo. Many villagers hoping to buy the meat surrounded the village office. However, two obstacles hindered access to meat. Firstly, the amount was not enough for every villager who had the money to buy the meat and, secondly, not every villager had money to buy the meat. As such, almost half of those with money did not get the meat. The visit to the households after meat sale revealed that villagers hated the quota system and they regard it as further imposition on the right to hunt, which they believe is part of their culture. This is an indication that even though subsistence hunting has never been fully acknowledged, it occurred and it served the community subsistence and cash needs. The present wildlife quota provides limited meat supply for better-off villagers and it has generally destroyed subsistence hunting practices. It is in view of this that the widely publicised acceptability and economic benefits derived from wildlife quota seems overrated. A comment of an elderly villager in Huria village suffices;

24 Hunting was still expected for 2007/08 season.

> *…you recorded that there was meat in this village yesterday, didn't you? However, you found me eating grasses like zebra. This is a full cassava meal…cassava ugali* (stiff porridge)*, accompanied by kisamvu (cassava leaves) and cooked by cassava stem. The forest is taken over by powerful hands…* (Interview, *Mnyandika,* 18/11/2007)

6.4 Community enclosures and the quest for voluntary surrender

The analysis of tourist hunting and quota utilization practises as provided in the previous section and, as observed elsewhere in the country, shows that local communities in southeastern Tanzania believe that the government has not fulfilled its promises for better life because they incur more wildlife-related costs than benefits (Ashley et al., 2002, Kideghesho, 2006). Overall, community involvement in wildlife conservation has promoted wildlife welfare over that of the people. As one villager commented;

> *…If you kill a person today, your case will be lesser than killing an animal (whether small or big, in defence or for a hungry child). We ourselves are turned into conservationist…in almost every household there is a village game scout or a member of environmental committee. Your own son can take you to task…* (Interview, Rashidi, 18/11/2007).

Improved wildlife welfare and a total absence of game officers in the study villages signifies a deliberate withdrawal of crop and people protection against wildlife. As noted earlier, the government does not provide compensation for loss of property, injury, or death resulting from wildlife. Particularly, the land and wildlife policies have no provisions for problems related to human-wildlife conflicts. This is particularly so because on the one hand, as intimated in the previous sections, individuals own farm plots but not the land. Thus in case of relocation, compensation is done for physical properties and perennial crops found on the plot (URT, 1999b). Even then, most people in the study area do not qualify for such compensations as they are not physically relocated. If anything, they are considered as models for community participation in wildlife protection. On the other hand, the wildlife policy states that problem animals, and elephants in particular, will be killed only in those cases where there is clear evidence of significant damage to human property or significant threat to human safety or life (URT, 1998b). But even where there is evidence of significant damage the victim cannot be compensated. The policy states clearly that '*the*

government does not intend to introduce a compensation scheme for wildlife damage' (URT, 1998b:22). With this lack of compensation, people are enraged as the damage caused by wildlife is increasingly severe as the clip opines;

> *…Last year no one harvest anything in this village and the government did not care about what we ate… In June 2007, my neighbour's two acres of paddy were destroyed by elephants. The village game scouts who, like most of us do not have weapons to scare elephants, reported to the District Game Officer. The officer came after two days and killed one elephant. The meat was sold in the village, 25% of the money was retained by the Village Council while 75% of the money and the ivory were taken to the district office. My neighbour was left with nothing...I think we have lost this game…I really hope elephants will vote in 2010…* (Interview, Tiriri, 11/11/2007)

The current situation coupled with memories of previous relocation has provoked a sense of despair, disappointment and loss of trust for the government and conservationists. Some people have already abandoned their farm plots in the swampy and fertile soils and are considering relocation. The main reason why many would consider this option is the bleak future associated with living far into the interior of a protected area. Villagers are not convinced that the Selous-Niassa project, which is a brainchild of the GTZ/SCP that has been protecting wildlife against people for the past two decades, could stand for their interest. The discussion with Nicolus Ntatu during the transect walk in Lusewa village captured these concerns;

> *...if I close my eyes and visualise this area in ten years to come, it will be a wildlife land* (refer to Figure 6.8)*. We will have no farms, no freedom to walk in our land and we will have nobody to complain to because we are participating in the conservation project. Conservationists are animal advocates, our government alike. Am sure you (*me*) are also one of them...There will be very limited choices for us. I think we will eventually give up and leave these areas...* (Interview, 12/9/2007)

The common end of many stories about displacement (whether voluntary or involuntary relocation) is that new land uses replace indigenous activities and deny them rights to access important natural resources. The case of this study fits well in this description. The fact that the government has leased all the five WMAs in the Selous-Niassa area to the hunting companies contradicts its own conception of

WMAs as a tool for empowering local people. In fact this raises more questions on whether commercial hunting and well-organised poaching linked with high level of corruption will really protect wildlife outside protected areas (McElwee, 2006, Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006, Bonner, 1993).

Figure 6.8 Transect walk and informal discussions with key informant

Source: Photo taken on 12/9/2007 in Lusewa village

Recently, the Tanzania's Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism declared that in spite of the great commitment in setting aside large proportions of land for wildlife protection, the sector faces growing management challenges, one of which is poaching that causes a loss of about 50,000 wild animals annually (The Guardian, 2008). This outcry came in response to the claims laid by residents of the recently established Wami-Mbiki WMA in northern SGR who reported of the well organised poaching that comes from outside their community. As evidence to their claim, the Wami-Mbiki residents handed over to the ministry a picture of a pick-up loaded with

carcasses of freshly killed wild animals in plea to take serious action against poaching in their village areas (ThisDay, 2009). This rampart poaching in WMAs is allegedly supported by law enforcement departments whose officials facilitate commercial poachers (Baldus, 2006a, *The Guardian*, 2008).

6.5 Conclusion

Community displacement remains an underestimated cost of the development paradigm associated with protected area expansions and conservationists are still in denial about their contributions to the creation of conservation refugees (Geisler, 2003, Dowie, 2009). In comparison to the previous displacements that resulted from forced relocation from national parks and game reserves, local communities experience similar effects today on the accounts that their land has become critical for the expansion of such protected areas and their commercialization. This chapter has presented the challenges that indigenous people in southeastern Tanzania encounters as the Selous-Niassa TFCA evolves. These people are constrained by the restricted access to WMAs, which had once been the main source of fertile lands for agricultural production, forest and wildlife resources. Even though it goes unacknowledged, the option of continuing to reside within a well developed wildlife area without property rights and protection against wildlife seems inconceivable.

Critical to the analysis of the impacts of current practices is the reallocation of resource rights, which empowers the government and private businesses while disempowering communities that have already been marginalised by the wildlife protection policies. Thus, displacement and inequality in rights reallocation should be a central issue in the research that questions the viability of TFCAs as a tool for local community development. Obviously, the continued blame on local threats to biodiversity rather than evident external economic pressures point to the inequality that exist between those struggling to meet basic needs for survival and those supporting nature commodification for capital accumulation. Until local communities have secure property rights to enter into partnerships and enable them to fairly be integrated in the global market, the poor will be further impoverished since the conservation costs are highest for them and lowest for the global actors (Adams and Hutton, 2007).

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

7.0 Introduction

This chapter summarises the main findings of this study. It reflects on the study aim, specific objectives and the research questions that have guided the study. The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section highlights the main conceptual insights from scale analysis and border studies which were used to facilitate the investigation of the process that creates the Selous-Niassa TFCA and the implications of that process on the state and local communities. Two insights are drawn from the scale literature to summarise the main findings of this study. These are, firstly, that scale construction alters the geometry of power and secondly, that the process that constructs scale is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space. Insights from border studies, as used in this study, points to how the creation of scale was accompanied by the reconfiguration of borders in southeastern Tanzania. Furthermore, the section shows how newly created spaces and borders have changed institutions and redefined their functions. This section affirms that scale and border analyses provide avenues for a nuanced understanding of the TFCA process and the consequent inequalities. The second section draws on lessons from Selous-Niassa TFCA process to make general observations about TFCAs.

7.1 Conceptual insights, research findings and the contribution of the study

This study has contributed to the research on TFCA by bring into light the importance of scale and border perspectives in the analysis of the process and the impacts of TFCAs. The purpose of the study is to use these geographic concepts to understand how bioregions become foundations for TFCAs, and the impacts that TFCAs have on the state and local communities. The creation of the SNWC in the Selous-Niassa TFCA in southeastern Tanzania is used as a case study to tease out these processes. The main claim of the study is that scale and border concepts are aspects central to the understanding of the bioregional process and ways in which that process supports the establishment of TFCAs. It is by understanding the process that research can explain inequalities in TFCAs.

The use of scale in political ecology suggests that ecological and social changes occurring in particular places need to be understood as outcomes emerging from the

interaction between political and economic processes at local, national, and international levels (Rangan and Kull, 2009). Large-scale bioregions have thus become the preferred scale at which global biodiversity can be protected effectively. As its proponents argue, bioregions have the potential to protect biodiversity in parks, farms, commercial forests, coastal zones, fishing areas as well as in people's backyards (Batisse, 1993, Breckwoldt, 1995, Brunckhorst, 2002). It is also argued that bioregional scale can promote biodiversity protection across political jurisdictions. This view supports cross-border protected areas such as TFCAs. In particular, TFCAs are advocated as having the potential to remove colonial borders by re-establishing ecological systems, and they can also re-unite local communities and foster political cooperation as well as economic development of states and local communities. Literature on TFCAs, however, challenges these assumptions on the basis that TFCAs have negative consequences on states and local communities such as economic inequalities, loss of communal lands and state sovereignty (Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a, Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg *et al*., 2008). This study suggests that a deeper understanding of these consequences can be achieved through a careful investigation of the process by which TFCAs are created. One such process is the establishment of ecological corridors, which form the link between a mosaic of land required for the establishment of TFCAs. They also provide a platform on which different interest groups and individuals meet in their pursuit of the TFCA ideal.

7.1.1 Scale construction and power implications

Literature on scale asserts that scale construction alters the geometry of power hence power disequilibrium. In fact, McCarthy (2005) and Paasi (2004) verify that the construction of scale is an act of power. More than others, conservation NGOs have variously defined scales and have often engaged with existing scalar fixes and projects (Kurtz, 2003, Masson, 2006) to claim bioregions as the scale at which biodiversity can best be protected. As this study demonstrates, scalar fixes for bioregions have involved multiplicity of actors with diverse interests and ideologies which coincide and diverge from time to time (McShane, 2003, Masson, 2006) but with traces of compromises (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). Other recent studies have also reinforced findings of this study that the bioregional scale has resulted from the

effect of networked practices of ecology, economy and politics (Engel-Di Mauro, 2009, Legg, 2009, Rangan and Kull, 2009).

This study demonstrates that there are two sides of scaling processes in bioregional processes in Tanzania, namely scaling up and scaling down. Scaling up relates closely to the fact that conservationists have used ecology as the object of politics, policy making and political actions to negotiate the meaning and spatial extent of environmental justice, both among themselves and with government decision makers and global financial institutions (Rangan and Kull, 2009, Kurtz, 2003, McAfee, 1999, Levine, 2002). Specifically, this thesis has confirmed that the creation of bioregional scale is the brainchild of IUCN and UNESCO, which have, in different times, developed multiple approaches and practices that have been aligned to the bioregional planning model. Accordingly, the IUCN protected area categories and UNESCO MAB and World Heritage Site programs were the basis for placing national protected areas and their management at the global level and also provided ground for the model for bioregional planning. The model envisages core protected areas that are surrounded by buffer zones/ecological corridors and cooperation zones thus institutionalising the harmonisation of natural protected areas (IUCN categories and UNESCO MAB) and cultural landscapes (World Heritage Sites).

The CBD consolidated the bioregional ideas of international NGOs since it made environmental conservation a global agenda. Essentially, CBD stands as a general framework for the implementation of large-scale conservation projects and bioregional projects of different conservation NGOs have been linked to the GEF portfolio that encompasses representative ecosystems of global biodiversity significance and criteria such as levels of endemism and presence in global lists. It is particularly emphasised that these environmental criteria had been developed by IUCN and UNESCO programs (Boyle, 2003, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004). Connections are drawn, however, that international conservation NGOs such as IUCN, WWF, The Nature Conservancy, WRI, Biodiversity Action Network (BioNET) to mention a few, were insiders in the formation of GEF (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999, McShane, 2003). As Harvey (1996) remarks, the environmental economics has come to be a pragmatic tool for getting environmental issues on the global monetary agenda. Indeed, nature protection and

commodification is currently part of neo-liberal projects and a topic of political and intellectual debate (Castree, 2008, Mansfield, 2007, Igoe and Croucher, 2007). This study concludes, then, that by focussing on efforts to establish nature protected areas across state borders, international conservation institutions are in essence promoting a form of bioregionalism which favours cross-border bioregions as opposed to sub-national bioregions and, by doing so, these actors create a trans-national niche area for private investments.

The analysis of the bioregional processes in general and Tanzania in particular has confirmed that TFCAs are firmly founded on the bioregional planning model. This observation explains why TFCAs extend far beyond designated protected areas to include private and communal lands. As evidence of their basis, the majority of the TFCAs around the world are both in IUCN categories I and II and a number of them are Biosphere Reserves and World Cultural Heritage Sites (Brunckhorst, 2000, Lamb, 2006). In Tanzania, most protected areas which are designated as World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves correspond sharply with bioregional projects of different conservation NGOs, most of which are implemented as cross-border projects such as African heartlands, ecoregions and TFCAs. In fact, there is not one exception for the World Heritage Site or a Biosphere Reserve in Tanzania, which is not part of cross-border projects of one or more international conservation institutions. This trend supports the claims about the scaling up processes in Tanzania and elsewhere. That is, the cross-border nature of bioregions means that nature conservation is no longer limited to the state and its sovereignty but transcends the territory of the state, resulting in nature becoming an international rather than national asset.

Essentially, almost all large-scale conservation areas established so far in Tanzania have used World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves as their pillars. Comparatively, Tanzania hosts the highest number of global ecoregions more than any other country in Africa and its islands (Burgess *et al.*, 2004). The country hosts two African Heartlands in Maasai Stepples and Kilimanjaro (African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), 2000) in addition to TFPs/TFCAs such as Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas Marine TFP (WWF, 2004) and the Selous-Niassa TFCA (Graham, 2005). In relation to this, the current trend of support for conservation in Tanzania has mostly targeted

cross-border regions. For example, the Maasai Stepple Heartland across Tanzania-Kenya border is also part of the East African Acacia ecoregion (Burgess *et al.*, 2004). Both the heartland and ecoregion projects use Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Serengeti National Park (which are both World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves) as core protected areas. Likewise, the Kilimanjaro Heartland across Kenya-Tanzania border forms part of the East African moorland ecoregion (Burgess *et al.*, 2004). The heartland and ecoregion projects use Kilimanjaro and Amboseli National Parks as core protected areas. The former is a World Heritage Site while the later is a Biosphere Reserve (Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006). Furthermore, the Selous-Niassa TFCA across the Tanzania-Mozambique border is within the Central and Eastern Miombo woodland ecoregion, which covers much of southern Tanzania and stretches down through Zambia and Mozambique into Zimbabwe and Angola (Burgess *et al.*, 2004). These projects use SGR and NGR as core protected areas.

Up-scaling processes involve actors and agencies external to the state and their influence on what was considered exclusive national asserts. As this study shows, external influence can be traced from changes in the relevant legislations to the actual design and plans for land required for the establishment of the SNWC as part of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Indeed, the designation of national protected areas as global properties implied scaling up state regulatory functions over such areas thus surrendering the management powers to the global actors. This observation corresponds sharply with other studies which claim that international conservation actors present African natural resources as the world heritage thus making the external expertise and financial assistance as an option agreed upon by scientists and African governments (see Bonner, 1993; Singh and Houtum, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2008; Muthake, 2008).

Scaling down processes in support of bioregions in Tanzania and elsewhere emanate from the fact that the practical implementation of the bioregional planning model necessitates the establishment of a local scale and, for that matter, the re-organisation of local institutions (Ramutsindela, 2007, Chester, 2006). Consequently, the IUCN's Community Conservation Areas program (IUCN-CCA) was used to institutionalise the establishment of local scale that supports the creation of

bioregions. Today land use categories that permit the establishment of buffer zones and wildlife corridors in communal lands are established within the framework of the IUCN-CCA and are currently considered as structural solutions for the complex problem of maintaining ecological connectivity (Goldman, 2009). This study confirms that, in the case of Tanzania, WMAs are a local scale established for this purpose. As such, WMAs are so far the main vehicle by which land is acquired from local communities for the establishment of buffer zones and wildlife corridors around protected areas throughout the country. Due to the importance of WMAs in facilitating bioregional processes, a great deal of effort was placed at the local scale making WMAs in Tanzania a point of intersection at which different actors contest power over natural resources. Specifically, the role of international conservation and development organisations such as AWF, WWF, Africare, GTZ and USAID has been imperative to the creation of the WMA as a new conservation scale. The collective efforts of these and other actors facilitated the creation of WMAs through the rearrangement of existing institutions and the creation of new ones. By doing so, village lands have been obtained for the establishment of wildlife buffer zones and ecological corridors.

The study further demonstrates that WMAs and their governance structures are integrated into the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA and that the TFCA, in turn, forms part of the global goals for creating cross-border bioregions. This means that WMAs occur at the local level but they are part of a network of scales that promote biodiversity protection. WMAs have not only been important for the acquisition of communal land for the expansion and establishment of protected area networks but also constitute a niche area for investors and have provided central government with opportunities for deriving income at the cost of the locals. It is on this basis that this study concludes that scaling processes have empowered the central government and private sector actors while disempowering local communities.

Whereas WMAs remain the main strategy for implementing bioregional planning in Tanzania, the process that created them opened further opportunities for the establishment of private land trusts. In particular, the current laws provide for private trusts to acquire land for wildlife protection and commercialization. The Tanzania Conservation Land Trust (TCLT), which is financed by the international institutions

such as GEF, FFI, AWF, Nature Conservancy, USAID and WWF, was the first such trusts to acquire the Manyara national ranch which is now run as a protected area. Supported by the observation made by Gallo *et al.,* (2009) that private land properties are currently an important strategy for acquiring land for TFCAs in southern Africa, this study asserts that the TCLT has set grounds for this strategy in Tanzania. The study takes the discussion further to argue that both WMAs and private land trusts that emerge in countries such as Tanzania where there is no land restitution will add to the marginalisation of local communities as opposed to the economic development arguments used to promote TFCAs.

7.1.2 Space and the setting of borders

Insights from border studies verify that the production of scale is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space and space creation, in turn, necessitates the setting of new borders (Newman, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2007, Rangan and Kull, 2009, Fall, 2005). The setting of borders cannot be reduced to drawing lines on the map or erecting fences on the ground but serves as an act of power (Fall, 2003, Newman, 2003, Agnew, 1994). Conceptually, this implies that changing of scale, as the bioregional process does, reconfigures spatial borders and the governance functions associated with them thereby reorganizing border institutions and border communities. Thus, when space and borders are created across frontiers, issues of power, control and access to that space and related resources become central to the research seeking to explain inequalities in such areas. This locates concepts of scale and borders at the core of methodological questions pertaining to the explanation of people-environment relations (Engel-Di Mauro, 2009). Hence, by focussing on scale and border concepts, this study has shed light on how the bioregional process in Tanzania has involved institutional re-organisation and re-definition of powers. The study has also provided evidence to confirm that the scaling processes have resulted in new forms of protected areas, borders and institutions charged with their management.

Specifically, the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA has produced three border outcomes, namely, the removal of some borders, the creation of new borders while others have remained uninterrupted. This observation is in line with conclusions

made by Paasi (2004); Fall, (2005); Newman, (2006) and Ramutsindela, (2007). The removal of borders in TFCAs is symbolised by cutting off fences; making colonial borders a physical object while ignoring its non-physical aspects. This way of thinking neglects the fact that borders are only one aspect of Africa's inherited political geography (Griffiths, 1986) and a narrow view of borders as physical lines of separation limits the understanding of African problems (Ramutsidela, 1999). In the case of the southeastern Tanzania where neither the state nor the protected area borders are physically erected fences, the removal of borders has meant different things to the proponents of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. What have changed are the functions of sub-national borders (village and districts) in order to create the wildlife corridor that supports the establishment of the TFCA. Once WMAs are established in the village lands, village borders are rendered immaterial by those of WMAs. Similarly, when WMAs are merged to create the SNWC across the two districts, the district border is played down. This is to say that the TFCA symbolism of the fence is used to promote TFCA even where there are no fences as is the case in southeastern Tanzania.

This study confirms the emergence of new borders as demonstrated by new maps that describe the extent of wildlife land uses in areas that had not had such land uses before. Specifically, WMAs and SNWC in communal lands represent new areas and borders for nature conservation. Evidently, there has been the redefinition of powers over wildlife in these areas that necessitated the reallocation of rights. Consequently, the central government and actors from the private sector retain influence over natural resources while the local communities are denied access and use of land and wildlife resources. Other forms of borders that have emerged as the Selous-Niassa TFCA reflect territorialisation with the German government predominantly facilitating the Selous-Niassa TFCA on Tanzanian side and, for that matter the East African region, the FFI in Mozambique while the PPF remains the overall TFCA facilitator in southern African region.

The position of Tanzania and the Selous-Niassa TFCA offers a new perspective on borders in TFCA research. The country is geographically in East Africa but it has political attachments with southern Africa countries. Thus, Tanzania holds a membership of both SADC and EAC. There are two main conclusions that can be

drawn from this observation; firstly, that in practice the Tanzania-Mozambique border is not only a colonial border set during the Berlin Conference but also is also a regional border for East Africa, which was set in the 1960s when the EAC was first, established. What this observation implies is that the Selous-Niassa TFCA does cross not only state colonial borders but it also does so to the East African regional border. As such, the Selous-Niassa is placed as the first terrestrial TFCA in East Africa, which makes Tanzania the point of departure for other TFCAs in the region. The second conclusion relates to the fact that the proponents of TFCAs advocate for the removal of state political borders but they do not temper with the Tanzania-Mozambique as a border for the East African region because they do not promote TFCAs, which are trans-regional. The study goes further to question the cross-border nature of bioregions in general. The question is; *why are most bioregions found in cross-border areas even though the idea of having the core areas surrounded by buffer zones/ecological corridors and cooperation zones does not necessarily require the creation of cross-border zones?* Whereas this question is pertinent to the analysis of the interests of the proponents of bioregional planning model in cross-border areas, the scope of a site-specific case as it was for this study limits such analysis.

7.2 The impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state and local communities

Different phases in the conversion of communal land to conservation were accompanied by a series of impacts on the local community's livelihoods and natural resource institutions. This study affirms therefore that the impacts of TFCAs are felt long before the TFCAs are in place. The Selous-Niassa TFCA is not yet operational but its design, which is fully dependant on WMAs, challenges the TFCA claims for community development. As an anonymous source holds, the communal land is a critical component of the TFCA project and its acquisition requires careful planning and indoctrination of ideas through community participation (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 4/8/2008). The source confirms further that the SNWC project uses WMAs but it does not mean that it is a community-based project; *'… the design and implementation of the project is almost 100% top-down…Large percentage of the project funds are controlled from Frankfurt, executed through the Wildlife Division and implemented by foreign consulting agencies which are based in Namtumbo and*

Tunduru districts...'. While the top-down cash flow is the nature of most donor-funded projects, both cash and ideas are derived from personal and corporate interests. These interests ranges from bank charge, salaries for external expatriates, consultancy fees for implementing agencies and per diems for project officials to investment opportunities in equipment supplies, hunting and other related activities. Thus, the substantial amount of project funds circulates among key project actors while a small fraction is spent on training a few community representatives who are specifically prepared to facilitate the smooth implementation of the project. Therefore, the community involvement in the SNWC comes indirectly through the WMA process. However, since communities are not within the circles that generate ideas and funds, their understanding of the scope of the project and the future impacts is limited.

Conceptually, the overall process of creating bioregions and TFCAs in particular, entails redefinition and reallocation of rights and access to the natural resources. Hence, the discussion on the impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the local communities is based on the issue of land and wildlife ownership. As examples of communities in Botswana and South Africa as well as the experiences in other TFCAs in southern Africa indicate (see Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a, Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg *et al*., 2008), land ownership is the pre-requisite that local communities in Tanzania will need to engage in a meaningful negotiation of their rights in the wake of bioregional projects. Thus wherever local communities lack property rights as is for the case of Tanzania, the TFCA process is likely to disempower such communities while empowering other actors. Indeed, rather than the increasing commercial activities, local communities and their subsistence life in the Selous-Niassa area are still targeted as major threats to biodiversity thus their relocations cannot be ruled out;

…S*erious bottleneck for biodiversity protection in Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor is the obstruction of wildlife migration routes by agricultural activities, settlements along Songea-Tunduru road as well as poaching for local market. The MtDC will stimulate economic activities but it will not as such be a serious threat to the ecological linkage. The obstruction of wildlife movement will be caused by villages* (Hahn, 2001).

The analysis of the process that creates the Selous-Niassa TFCA supports the conclusion that scale construction and reordering of space in southeastern Tanzania has economic and political motives that have historically marginalised local communities. This thesis has presented challenges that local communities encounter as WMAs evolve as part of protected areas and an important component of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. As in the past, local people are currently relocated and have restricted access to WMAs, which are the main source of fertile lands for agricultural production, forest and wildlife resources. Recent accounts of indigenous relocations from areas considered core for wildlife migration and leasing of the same areas as hunting blocks for tourists implies that the government not only retains powers over resources but it does reallocate indigenous rights as wildlife commercialization becomes the economic use of such areas. The case of the private land trust (TCLT) reinforces that further displacements of local communities for nature protection in Tanzania are yet to come. Since the land ownership system leaves local communities without secure property rights while supporting private investments, the possible future scenario is that local communities in areas identified as important for nature conservation will continuously be displaced and their rights reallocated to private sector actors on the basis that communities can neither afford to acquire such properties through trusts and nor can the land laws provide for their compensations. This implies, then, that unlike others such as the Makuleke community of South Africa who owns the land and wildlife and can negotiate benefits in the GLTFP, communities in Selous-Niassa and elsewhere in Tanzania have no constitutional grounds for negotiating benefits in TFCAs and other bioregional projects.

This study concludes that since the process of creating bioregions and TFCAs in particular involves the redefinition and reallocation of rights and access to natural resources, local communities that lack property rights as in Tanzania are likely to be incapacitated by the TFCA process. As argued by others, nature as defined and valued by its local dependents will continue to undergo transformation to satisfy the preferences of its distant well-meaning consumers (Dowie, 2009, Ficklin, 2008). The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the broader political and economic perspective of the Selous-Niassa TFCA will foster the neo-liberalization of nature, which is well known to be inherently unequal (Harvey, 2001, Shivji, 2006, Castree,

2008). Therefore, this study calls for a radical change in land and wildlife laws, especially in communal areas, if nature protection and TFCAs in particular are to foster local community development in Tanzania. These changes should focus on enabling local communities to negotiate the benefits of nature conservation and utilization in their communal lands.

The scaling processes that seek to re-organize the local to create new spaces of conservation and new institutions for natural resource management have created an environment for conflict. Since these processes are not limited to the local level, conflicts of power have emerged at different levels. At the village level, conflicts prevail as processes advance to transfer natural resource management responsibilities from Village Councils to the supra-village institutions. At the higher levels, there are indications that the facilitators of the SNWC have concerns that the Wildlife Division has not fully supported the project in acquiring the land necessary for the development of the wildlife corridor. Some sections of the SNWC reports opine, for example, that;

> *...the entire area of the SNWC project was divided into hunting blocks and allocated to four hunting companies in March 2005 despite the fact that the project plans were available at the Wildlife Division…Alien hunting investors in village areas have led to unrest and definitely to a negative attitude towards conservation and the SNWC project* (Hahn, 2005).

> *…what we see is a complete negation of both the spirit and the wording of the Wildlife Policy of 1998. GEF/UNDP is aware of pressures exerted by hunting concessions…Wildlife in village lands continue to be controlled by the Wildlife Division in Dar es Salaam and district and village institutions are by-passed, which is in contravention of the policy. GEF/UNDP investment may be compromised if the beneficiaries continue to be tourist hunting entrepreneurs from the Wildlife Division. The current conflict and policy dilemma in SNWC area is but one symptom of a wider problem* (Lyaruu and Rodgers, 2006).

7.3 Questions arising from the study

Having presented how and why bioregions are constructed, the main actors and the implication of the bioregional process in southeastern Tanzania, more questions arise from the study. These questions relate to, firstly, the various interests that are embedded in bioregional planning and the methodological approaches required to understand them. This study found that biodiversity conservation is the focus of

actors in the Selous-Niassa area. However, the interest in biodiversity opens up opportunities for people who want to pursue other interests such as hunting. These additional interests have led to the concentration of actors in the area. The consequence has been the marginalization of local people whose interests are at variance with powerful actors including the Wildlife Division in Tanzania. Secondly, the ways in which research on TFCAs can investigate the various ways in which nature conservation becomes a platform on which various goals can be pursued by different actors with different backgrounds. More importantly, the study points to the need to understand the root of inequalities associated with TFCAs. I argue that investigating these inequalities after the establishment of TFCAs miss the opportunity to understand pre-TFCA conditions that lead to these inequalities.

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Appendix 1: Transfrontier Conservation Areas in conceptual phase

No.	Name	Countries involved
1	Ndumo Tembe-Futi Transfrontier Conservation and resource area	Mozambique and South Africa
2	Songimvelo-Malolotja	South Africa and Swaziland
3	Kagera TFCA	Rwanda and Tanzania
4	Vwaza-Lundazi	Malawi and Zambia
5	Nyika	Malawi and Zambia
6	Kasungu-Lukusuzi	Malawi and Zambia
7	Lichinga-Liwonde	Malawi and Mozambique
8	Zimoza transborder natural resource management project	Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe
9	Zimoza TFCA	Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe
10	Maiombe forest	Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo

Source: Author compilation

Appendix 2: List of informants and their institutional affiliation

Study Phase	#	Name	Institution & position held	Date and Place of interview
	1	Dr. P.M Maheshwary	Technical Advisor – National Development Cooperation	20 May 2006 in Dar es Salaam
	2	Mr. Rudolf Hahn	GTZ - SNWC Technical Advisor	20 June 2006 in Namtumbo
	3	Mr. Andrew Mhelela	District Natural Resources Officer - Tunduru	20 June 2006 in Tunduru
	4	Mr. Samwel Mgela	District Natural Resources Officer - Namtumbo	20 June 2006 in Namtumbo
	5	Dr. John Hanks	Conservation International - Director	11 May 2007 in Cape Town
	6	Ms. Melissa de Kock	Peace Parks Foundation –Socio-economic Project Coordinator	21st June 2007 in Stellenbosch
	7	Mr. Noel de Velliers	Open Africa - Chief Executive	22 June 2007 in Cape Town
2nd phase (August – November 2007)	8	Mr. Lota Melamari	CEO – Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST) - CEO	3 Sept. 2007 in Dar es Salaam
	9*	Mr. Gabriel Kimolo	District Commissioner - Namtumbo	11 Sept. and 27 Nov. 2007 in Namtumbo
	*	Mr. Rudolf Hahn	GTZ - SNWC Technical Advisor	10 Sept. in Songea and 27 Nov. 2007 in Namtumbo
	10	Mr. Nalimi Madata	District Game Officer - Namtumbo	27 Nov. 2007 in Namtumbo
	11	Mr. Yves Hausser	Association of Development of Protected Areas (ADAP) - CEO	27 Nov. 2007 in Namtumbo
	*	Mr. Samwel Mgela	District Natural Resources Officer - Namtumbo	12 and 19 Sept. 2007 in Namtumbo
	*	Mr. Andrew Mhelela	District Natural Resources Officer - Tunduru	13 Sept. 2007 in Tunduru
	12	Mr. Brown Kanjenje	Agricultural officer – Tunduru District	13 Sept. 2007 in Tunduru
	13	Mr. Eberhard Hallar	Bee Keeping Officer – Tunduru district	13 Sept. 2007 in Tunduru
	14	Mr. Charles Shawa	Assistant Game officer - Tunduru	14 Sept. 2007 in Tunduru
	15	Mr. Dicson Koishwa	District Game Officer - Tunduru	14 Sept. 2007 in Tunduru

	16*	Mr. Ngomelo	Project Manager - SNWC	25 Sept. and 27 Nov. 2007 in Namtumbo
	17*	Mzee Swedi Sanangula	Historian - Songea Museum	5 and 10 Sept. 2007 in Songea Museum
	18	Mr. Famimu Ntatu	Villager - Lusewa village	12 Sept. 2007 in Lusewa village
	19	Sheikh Manyanga Komakoma	Villager - Milonji	5 Nov. 2007 in Milonji village
	20	Mzee Abraham Cosmas	Villager - Milonji	5 Nov. 2007 in Milonji village
	21	Mzee Said Mohammed Kwizombe	Villager - Lusewa	6 Nov. 2007 in Lusewa village
	22	Mzee Issa Mbarak	Villager - Lusewa	6 Nov. 2007 in Lusewa village
	23	Mzee Abas matomora	Villager - Matepwende	7 Nov. 2007 in Matepwende village
	24	Mzee Shaibu Zuberi Azizi	Villager - Matepwende	7 Nov. 2007 in Lusewa village
	25	Mzee Rashid Said Kajela	Villager - Msisima	8 Nov. 2007 in Msisima village
	*	Sheikh Mohammed Ilali Mikonga	Villager - Msisima	8 Nov. 2007 in Msisima village
	26	Mzee Bernat Nyanguru	Villager - Ligunga	10 Nov. 2007 in Ligunga village
	27	Mzee Fundi Omari Tolela	Villager - Amani	11 Nov. 2007in Amani village
	28	Mzee Kasmiri Tiriri	Villager - Ligunga	11 Nov 2007 in Ligunga village
	29	Mzee Pangisi Nyanguru	Villager - Ligunga	11 Nov. 2007 in Ligunga village
	30	Mzee Yazidu Mtuma	Villager - Likunsanguse	13 Nov. 2007 in Likusanguse village
	31	Mzee Ali Musa	Villager - Marumba	14 Nov. 2007 in Marumba village
	32	Mzee Zuberi Ali Ndendeuke	Villager - Marumba	14 Nov. 2007 in Marumba village
	33	Mzee Said Ali Likokwa	Villager - Misiaji	15 Nov. 2007 in Misiaji village
	34	Mzee Isa Kitowelo	Villager - Huria	18 Nov. 2007 in Huria village
	35**	Mzee Thomas Chone Mzee Peter Alois Mzee Jerome Chone Mzee Galos	Villagers - Huria	18 Nov. 2007 in Huria village

		Mnyandika Mzee Aidan Mnyandika		
	36	Mr. Adam Mdoo	Chairperson – Kilimasera village	21 Nov. 2007 in Kilimasera
	37	Mr. Mohammed Adam	Villager game scout - Kilimasera	21 Nov. 2007 in Kilimasera village
	38**	Mr. Rajabu Mtiko Ms. Fatuma Ali Mr. Akida Abdalah Mr. Seleman Bila Mr. Stephan Nchimbi	Members of Mbarang'andu CBO committee	21 Nov. 2007 in Kilimasera village
3rd Phase (Jan-Sept. 2008)	39	Mzee Issa Hussein Mpoto	Villager - Mchomoro	20 Nov. 2007 in Mchomoro village
	40	Dr. Alan Rodgers	UNDP/GEF representative - Eastern Africa	25 Jan. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	41	Mr. Inyasi Lejora	Ecological Monitoring Manager - TANAPA	30 Jan. 2008 in Arusha
	42	Mr. Emmanuel Severe	Former Director of Wildlife/Currently Principle, College of African Wildlife Management - Mweka	31 Jan. 2008 in Kilimanjaro
	43*	Mr. Paul Sarakikya	Former Secretary – Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF)/Currently in Policy and Planning Unit	4 and 19 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	44*	Dr. Axel Dorken	GTZ Tanzania Country Director	19 Feb. and 18 Sept. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	45	Mr. Leornad Mayeta	Eastern Selous Conservation Project - Project Manager	21st Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	46	Mr. Zakaria Bongola	Geologist – Ministry of Energy and Minerals	21 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	47	Mr. Peter Sumbi	WWF Forest Program Officer	25 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	48	Mr. Cryspin Malima	WWF Executive Officer - Ruvuma Wilderness – Selous-Niassa Eastern Corridor project	26 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	49	Mr. Joh Salehe	WWF - East African Ecoregional Project Coordinator	28 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	50	Mrs. Tibasana	National Land Use Planning Commission	29 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam

	51	Mr. Julius Shilungushela	National Land Use Planning Commission	29 Feb. 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	52	Mr. Francis Sekibaha	President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government	3 March 2008 in Dodoma
	53*	Ms. Miriam Zakari	Assistant Director of Wildlife - Wildlife Division	10 and 15 March 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	54*	Captain W. Minja	Senior Game Officer - Wildlife Division	10 and 17 March 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	55	Mr. Abdallah Mwanalusa	Project Coordination Unit - Wildlife Division	11 March 2008 in Dar es Salaam
	56	Mr. Wayner Lotter	Representative of Gauff Ingenieure GmbH, the consulting agency for the SNWC-KfW funds	4 Aug.2008 in Songea
	*	Mzee Kasmiri Tiriri	Villager - Ligunga	5 Aug. 2008 in Ligunga village
	*	Mzee Abraham Cosmas	Villager - Milonji	5 Aug. 2008 in Milonji village
	*	Sheikh Mohammed Ilali Mikonga	Villager - Msisima	5 Aug. 2008 in Msisima village
	*	Famimu Ntatu	Villager - Lusewa	4 Aug. 2008 in Lusewa village
	*	Mzee Issa Mbarak	Villager - Lusewa	4 Aug. 2008 in Lusewa village
	57	Mr. Atumu Ambuje	Villager - Likusanguse	13 Aug. 2008
	58**	Mzee Issa Yasini Mzee Rashid Mdwanga Mzee Omari Alois Mzee Zuberi Rajabu	Villagers - Huria	8 Aug. 2008 in Huria village
	*	Mr. Eberhard Hallar	Bee Keeping Officer – Tunduru district	7 Aug. 2008 in Tunduru
	59	Dr. Steven Kiruswa	AWF - Maasai Stepples Heartland Director	12 Sept. 2008 in Arusha
	60	Dr. Hussein Sosovele	WWF-Dar es Salaam	22 Sept. 2008 in Dar es Salaam

* Multiple interviews that are registered once in this list
** Group interviews

Appendix 3: Guiding questions for qualitative interviews and the questionnaire

Semi-structure guiding questions for government officials	
Set 1: Ministry level	What are the overall responsibilities of the government in nature conservation?
	What are the specific roles of the Wildlife Division?
	What are the specific roles of the district council?
	What progress has been made with governance reforms?
	How do these reforms affect natural resources management?
	How is the WMA project progressing so far?
	Could I get a map of WMAs in the country?
	What are the long term management plans for Selous game reserve?
	Would you help me to understand the S-N wildlife corridor project?
	Where did the idea come from?
	What are the main objectives of the project?
	How does the government support/facilitate the project?
	Who else supports the project and how?
	What plans/agreements are there between the government of Tanzania and Mozambique for the management of cross-border resources? (Could I get a copy?)
	In your opinion, what will be the future of the people living in the Selous-Niassa area?
Set 2: District and village levels	What are the specific roles of the district/village council in nature conservation?
	What are the future land use plans for the district/village?
	How would you describe the progress of WMA projects in the district/village?
	How are these WMAs linked with the neighboring areas?
	How would you describe the SNWC project? (where does the idea come from?)
	What are the main objectives of the project?
	How does the project fit into the district land use plans?
	How does the district council support/facilitate the project?
	Who are the other facilitators of the project and at what capacity?
	What plans/agreements are there between the government of Tanzania
	and Mozambique for the management of cross-border resources? Could I get the copy of agreements (if any?)
	What are the expected impacts associated with the implementation of the SNWC project?
	How are the local communities involved in the project implementation?
Semi-structure guiding questions for donors, experts and consultants	
Set 1: Informants in South Africa	Based on your experience/perspective, where did the idea of TFCAs come from?
	Why didn't this idea come before?
	How did your experience on nature conservation helped to shape the idea of TFCAs?
	How does your institution participate in the establishment of the TFCAs?
	Where do you draw funds from?

	Where is your institution involved in facilitating TFCAs and where is it not involved? Why?
	How are the TFCAs in southern Africa linked?
	Which other institutions do you cooperate with in facilitating TFCAs?
	Which specific activities do they facilitate?
	What remarks can you make on the relevance/viability/future of TFCAs in Africa?
Set 2: Informants in Tanzania	Based on your experience/perspective, where did the idea of SNWC project come from?
	Why didn't this idea come before?
	What are the main motives for you/your institution's involvement in facilitating the SNWC project?
	What specific activities do you facilitate/sponsor? Why?
	Which other sponsors do you work with on the project?
	Are there sponsors that you would not like to work with on the same project? Why?
	How would you describe the progress of the project so far?
	What are the expected impacts associated with the implementation of the project?
	What other projects are you/your institution facilitate in Tanzania and other East African countries?
	Why did you choose to sponsor these projects?
	How are these projects linked?
	How is your institution involved in nature conservation activities globally?
	These projects are very expensive, how do you raise the funds?
	Why all this trouble?
	What are your expectations from the government of Tanzania?
Stimulant questions for narratives	
Key narrators	Could you give me a sense of what boundaries have been there?
	What did these boundaries mean?
	Who participates in the border making/changing?
	How have these boundaries changes over the years?
	What changes have there been in boundaries? (river, village and wildlife migration routes)
	How would you compare the past with the present boundaries?
	Where/How far have you been using your land?
	Could you share with me what you remember about wild animal movements in the area?
	What changes have there been in the animal routes since then?
	What, in your view, are the reasons for these changes?
Qualitative Questionnaire	

Introduction and consent: This questionnaire is one of the research tools for collecting data for the research on the creation and consequences of Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor. The researcher is a student and the information collected will only be used for academic purposes. Your participation will be optional and your name will only be used in this research when necessary on your consent. Are you willing to participate in answering this questionnaire?

a) Yes ( ) (Continue) b) No ( ) (Don't continue)

Section A: Socio-economic information

1. District ……..Village……..

2. Main livelihood activities

Activity	√	Elaborate (what, where)
a. Crop cultivation		
b. Livestock keeping		
c. Mining		
d. Fishing		
e. Hunting		
d. Any other (specify)		

Section B: Land ownership and use

3. Do you have land? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

4. Do you own the land you use? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

Explain ……

5. If yes, how did you get the land you use?

Method of acquisition	√	Size	Main uses of the land
Inheritance			
Bought			
Given by the government			
Cleared the forest			
Any other (specify)			

6. What do you use the land for now? a)…… b)……c) ……..

7. What would you use the land for in future?

a)…… b)……

c) ……..

Section C: Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor and livelihood issues

8. Do you know the animal migration routes from Selous to Niassa?

a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) I don't know ( )

9. If no/I don't know, explain why……

10. If yes, explain how many routes you know and where they are?

……

11. Have the wildlife routes changed from when you first knew them?

a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) I don't know ( )

12. If yes, what changes have you noticed?

a)…… b)……

13. In your opinion, what do you think influenced the changes?

a)……b)……

c)……

14. Are you aware of Selous Conservation Program (SCP)?

a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) Don't know ( )

15. If yes, what are your views about the project?

……

16. What impacts did the project make on the wildlife in the area?

a)……b)……

17. What impacts did it make on your livelihood?

a)……b)……

18. Are you aware of Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor project?
    a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) Don't know ( )
19. Do you know the boundaries of the proposed wildlife corridor?
    a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) Don't know ( )
20. If no/I don't know, why?
……
21. If yes, could you describe it?
……
22. How far is your land from the propose wildlife corridor? _____(kms)
23. In your opinion, do you think the corridor is necessary?
    a) Yes ( ) b) No ( ) c) I don't know ( )

Explain……

24. What impacts do you think the project will have on the livelihood of the villagers?
    a)……b)……..
    c)……

Appendix 4: Examples of SPSS output

Study Villages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Milonji	37	5.6	5.6	5.6
	Matepwende	48	7.2	7.2	12.8
	Msisima	46	6.9	6.9	19.7
	Lusewa	51	7.7	7.7	27.4
	Ligunga	51	7.7	7.7	35.1
	Amani	38	5.7	5.7	40.8
	Magazini	63	9.5	9.5	50.3
	Likusanguse	50	7.5	7.5	57.8
	Marumba	51	7.7	7.7	65.5
	Molandi	31	4.7	4.7	70.2
	Misyage	50	7.5	7.5	77.7
	Hulia	51	7.7	7.7	85.4
	Darajambili	37	5.6	5.6	91.0
	Mchomolo	32	4.8	4.8	95.8
	Kilimasela	28	4.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

How did you get the land you own/have?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Inheritance	197	29.7	29.7	29.7
	Bought	6	.9	.9	30.6
	Given by government	42	6.3	6.3	36.9
	Self clearance	415	62.5	62.5	99.4
	No response	4	.6	.6	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

What are the major uses of your land since you got it?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agriculture	661	99.5	99.5	99.5
	No response	3	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Do you know the animal migration routes from Selous to Niassa?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	363	54.7	54.7	54.7
	No, I don't know	297	44.7	44.7	99.4
	No response	4	.6	.6	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Have the wildlife routes changed from when you first knew them?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	73	11.0	11.0	11.0
	No	229	34.5	34.5	45.5
	I don't know	86	13.0	13.0	58.4
	No response	276	41.6	41.6	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

What changes in wildlife routes have you noticed?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Overpopulation of animals in our farms	68	10.2	10.2	10.2
	No response	11	1.7	1.7	11.9
	Depopulation of animals	2	.3	.3	12.2
	Not applicable	583	87.8	87.8	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Do you know the boundaries of the proposed wildlife corridor?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	184	27.7	27.7	27.7
	No, I don't know	465	70.0	70.0	97.7
	No response	15	2.3	2.3	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

How far is your land from the proposed wildlife corridor?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Within (no distance)	27	4.1	4.1	4.1
	1-5 km	224	33.7	33.7	37.8
	6-10 km	125	18.8	18.8	56.6
	11-15 km	65	9.8	9.8	66.4
	16-20 km	55	8.3	8.3	74.7
	21-25 km	11	1.7	1.7	76.4
	Above 25 km	85	12.8	12.8	89.2
	Don't know	45	6.8	6.8	95.9
	No response	27	4.1	4.1	100.0
	Total	**664**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Appendix 5: Research permits and clearances

UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM
OFFICE OF THE VICE-CHANCELLOR
P.O. BOX 35091 • DAR ES SALAAM • TANZANIA

Ref. No: AB3/3(B)
Date: 30th January, 2008
To: The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism,
Dar es Salaam.

UNIVERSITY STAFF AND STUDENTS RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you **Ms Christine Noe** who is a bonafide student of the University of Dar es Salaam and who is at the moment conducting research. Our staff members and students undertake research activities every year especially during the long vacation.

In accordance with a government circular letter Ref.No.MPEC/R/10/1 dated 4th July, 1980 the Vice-Chancellor was empowered to issue research clearances to the staff and students of the University of Dar es Salaam on behalf of the government and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, a successor organization to UTAFITI.

I therefore request you to grant the above-mentioned member of our University community any help that may facilitate her to achieve research objectives. What is required is your permission for her to see and talk to the leaders and members of your institutions in connection with her research.

The title of the research in question is **"Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Ecological Discourse in South-East Africa: A Case study of Selous-Niassa Transfrontier Conservation Area"**.

The period for which this permission has been granted is **February, 2008** to **August, 2008** and will cover the following areas/offices: **Ministries of Natural Resources and Tourism.**

Should some of these areas/offices be restricted, you are requested to kindly advise her as to which alternative areas/offices could be visited. In case you may require further information, please contact the Directorate of Research and Publications, Tel 2410500-8 Ext 2067 or 2410743.

Prof. Rwekaza S. Mukandala
VICE-CHANCELLOR

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JAMHURI YA MUUNGANO WA TANZANIA
OFISI YA WAZIRI MKUU
TAWALA ZA MIKOA NA SERIKALI ZA MITAA

MKOA WA RUVUMA:
SIMU NA. 025 - 2680015
FAX NA. 025 - 2680208

OFISI YA MKUU WA WILAYA,
S.L.P. 6,
TUNDURU.

Kumb.Na.E.2/7/100

14 Septemba, 2007

Afisa Mtendaji Kata,
MARUMBA.

Afisa Mtendaji Kata,
NAMPUNGU.

YAH: KIBALI CHA UTAFITI WILAYANI TUNDURU NDUGU CHRISTINE NOE – WA CHUO KIKUU DAR ES SALAAM KATIKA KATA YA MARUMBA NA NAMPUNGU

Ndugu mtajwa hapo juu amewasili hapa Wilayani kwa lengo la kufanya utafiti katika baadhi ya Vijiji vilivyoko ndani ya ushoroba wa Wanyamapori (Wildlife Corridor) uhusuo "Bioregional Planning in South-East Africa: The creation and Consequences of Selous-Niassa Transfrontier Conservation Area".

Akiwepo hapa Wilayani atafanya utafiti katika Kijiji cha Mbatamila – Kata ya Nampungu, Kijiji cha Marumba, Molandi na Misyaje – Kata ya Marumba.

Kwa nakala ya barua hii, Watendaji wa Vijiji husika **mnapaswa kutoa ushirikiano** kwa Ndugu mtajwa hapo juu ili zoezi la utafiti liwe na ufanisi mkubwa.

Shukrani.

(S.I.M. Mlowe)
KATIBU TAWALA WA WILAYA
TUNDURU

Nakala:- Afisa Mtendaji Kijiji,
Marumba, Molandi, Misyaje na Mbatamila. - Zingatieni maelezo yaliyotolewa hapo juu.

" Bi Christine Noe.

" Makatibu Tarafa – **Nampungu na Nalasi.** – Kwa taarifa.

JAMHURI YA MUUNGANO WA TANZANIA
OFISI YA WAZIRI MKUU
TAWALA ZA MIKOA NA SERIKALI ZA MITAA

MKOA WA RUVUMA:
Simu Namba ri 025-2600137

OFISI YA MKUU WA WILAYA,
S.L.P. 1,
NAMTUMBO.

Kumb. Na. DC/NAMT/M.70/5/156: 11.09.2007

KWA YEYOTE ANAYEHUSIKA.

YAH:- KIBALI CHA UTAFITI WILAYANI NAMTUMBO.

Tafadhali husika na mada tajwa hapo juu.

Bi. Christine Noe ni Mtafiti kutoka Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam aliyekuja hapa Wilayani kufanya utafiti uhusuo "Bioregional Planning in South-East Africa: The Creation and Consequences of Selous - Niassa Wild life Corridor.

Utafiti huo ni wa mweka mmoja kuanzia 1 Agosti, 2007 hadi 1 Agosti, 2008.

Naomba umpokee na umwezeshe afanikishe utafiti huo.

JOHN J. KOMBA
KAIMU KATIBU TAWALA WILAYA,
NAMTUMBO.

KATIBU TAWALA WA WILAYA
NAMTUMBO

Nakala:- Mkurugenzi Mhendaji (W),
S.L.P. 55,
NAMTUMBO.

" :- Makatibu Tarafa wote,
Wilayani Namtumbo.

Appendix 6: Summary of the Arusha Declaration and Tanganyika African National Union's Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance

Source: Nyerere, (1967)

PART ONE

The TANU Creed

The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state. The principles of socialism are laid down in the TANU Constitution and they are as follows:

WHEREAS TANU believes:

(a) That all human beings are equal;

(b) That every individual has a right to dignity and respect;

(c) That every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national level;

(d) That every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law;

(e) That every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life and of property held according to law;

(f) That every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour;

(g) That all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants;

(h) That in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production; and

(i) That it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens, and so as to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society.

NOW, THEREFORE, the principal aims and objects of TANU shall be as follows:

(a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;

(b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(c) To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people;

(d) To co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa;

(e) To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;

(f) To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations;

(g) to see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country;

(h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status;
(i) To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
(j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country;
(k) To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity;
(l) To see that Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.

PART TWO
The Policy of Socialism
(a) Absence of Exploitation
A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does not have two classes of people, a lower class composed of people who work for their living, and an upper class of people who live on the work of others. In a really socialist country no person exploits another; everyone who is physically able to work does so; every worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from different types of work are not grossly divergent. In a socialist country, the only people who live on the work of others, and who have the right to be dependent upon their fellows, are small children, people who are too old to support themselves, the crippled, and those whom the state at any one time cannot provide with an opportunity to work for their living.

Tanzania is a nation of peasants but is not yet a socialist society. It still contains elements of feudalism and capitalism--with their temptations. These feudalistic and capitalistic features of our society could spread and entrench themselves.

(b) The Major Means of Production and Exchange are under the Control of the Peasants and Workers.
To Build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their Government and their co-operatives. Further, it is essential that the ruling Party should be a Party of peasants and workers.

The major means of production and exchange are such things as: land; forests; minerals; water; oil and electricity; news media; communications; banks, insurance, import ;and export trade, wholesale trade ; iron and steel, machine tool, arms, motor-car, cement, fertilizer, and textile industries; and any big factory on which a large section of the people depend for their living, or which provides essential components

of other industries; large plantations, and especially those which provide raw materials essential to important industries.

Some of the instruments of production and exchange which have been listed here are already owned or controlled by the people's Government of Tanzania.

(c) The Existence of Democracy

A state is not socialist simply because its means of production and exchange are controlled or owned by the government, either wholly or in large part. If a country to be socialist, it is essential that its government is chosen and led by the peasants and workers themsclvcs. If the minority governments of Rhodesia or South Africa controlled or owned the entire economies of these respective countries, the result would be a strengthening of oppression, not the building of socialism. True socialism cannot exist without democracy also existing in the society.

(d) Socialism is a Belief

Socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society cannot simply come into existence. A socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practice, the principles of socialism. A committed member of TANU will be a socialist, and his fellow socialist – that is, his fellow believers in this political and economic system – are all those in Africa or elsewhere in the world who fight for the rights of peasants and workers. The first duty of a TANU member, and especially of a TANU leader, is to accept these socialist principles, and to live his own life in accordance with them. In particular, a genuine TANU leader will not live off the sweat of another man, nor commit any feudalistic or capitalistic actions.

The successful implementation of .socialist objectives depends very much up the leaders, because socialism is a belief in a particular system of living, and it is difficult for leaders to promote its growth if they do not themselves accept it.

PART THREE
The Policy of Self-Reliance

We are at War

TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; the struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a whole) from a state of poverty to a State of prosperity.

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution – a revolution which brings an end to our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.

A Poor Man does not use Money as a Weapon

But it is obvious that in the past we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons or the economically strong – weapons which in fact we do not possess. By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we are aiming at. It is as if we have said, 'Money is the basis of development. Without money there can be no development.'

That is what we believe at present. TANU leaders, and Government leaders and officials, all put great emphasis and dependence on money. The people's leaders, and the people themselves, in TANU, NUTA, Parliament, UWT, the co-operatives, TAPA, and in other national institutions think, hope and pray for MONEY. It is as if we had all agreed to speak with one voice, saying, 'If we get money we shall develop, without money we cannot develop.

In brief, our Five-Year Development Plan aims at more food, more education, and better health; but the weapon we have put emphasis upon is money. It is as if we said, 'In the next five years we want to have more food, more education, and better health, and in order to achieve these things we shall spend £250,000,000'. We think and speak as if the most important thing to depend upon is MONEY and anything else we intend to use in our struggle is of minor importance.

When a Member of Parliament says that there is a shortage of water in his constituency; and he asks the Government how it intends to deal with the problem, he expects the Government to reply that it is planning to remove the shortage of water in his constituency – with MONEY.

When another Member of Parliament asks what the Government is doing about the shortage of roads, schools or hospitals in his constituency, he also expects the Government to tell him that it has specific plans to build roads, schools and hospitals in his constituency – with MONEY.

When a NUTA official asks the Government about its plans to deal with the low wages and poor housing of the workers, he expects the Government to inform him that the minimum wage will be increased and that better houses will be provided for the workers – WITH MONEY.

When a TAPA official asks the Government what plans it has to give assistance to the many TAPA schools which do not get Government aid, he expects the Government to state that it is ready the following morning to give the required assistance – WITH MONEY.

When an official of the co-operative movement mentions any problem facing the farmer, he expects to hear that the Government will solve the farmer's problems – WITH MONEY in short, for every problem facing our nation, the solution that is in everybody's mind is MONEY.

Each year, each Ministry of Government makes its estimates of expenditure, i.e. the amount of money it will require in the coming year to meet recurrent and development expenses. Only one Minister and his Ministry make estimates of revenue. This is the Minister for Finance.

Every Ministry puts forward very good development plans. When the Ministry presents its estimates, it believes that the money is there for the asking but that the Minister for Finance are being obstructive. And regularly each year the Minister of Finance has to tell his fellow Ministers that there is no money. And each year the Ministers complain about the Ministry of Finance when it trims down their estimates.

Similarly, when Members of Parliament and other leaders demand that the Government should carry out a certain development, they believe that there is a lot of money to spend on such projects, but that the Government is the stumbling block. Yet such belief on the part of Ministries, Members of Parliament and other leaders does not alter the stark truth, which is that Government has no money.

When it is said that Government has no money, what does this mean? It means that the people of Tanzania have insufficient money. The people pay taxes out of the very little wealth they have; it is from these taxes that the Government meets its recurrent and development expenditure. When we call on the Government to spend more money on development projects, we are asking the Government to use more money and if the Government does not have any more, the only way it can do this is to increase its revenue through extra taxation.

If one calls on the Government to spend more, one is in effect calling on the Government to increase taxes. Calling on the Government to spend more without raising taxes is like demanding that the Government should perform miracles; it is equivalent to asking for more milk from a cow while insisting that the cow should not be milked again. But our refusal to admit the calling on the Government to spend more is the same as calling on the Government to raise taxes shows that we fully realize the difficulties of increasing taxes. We realize that the cow has no more milk – that is, that the people find it difficult to pay more taxes. We know that the cow would like to have more milk herself, so that her calves could drink it, or that she would like more milk which could be sold to provide more comfort for herself or her calves. But knowing all the things which could be done with more milk does not alter the fact that the cow has no more milk!

EXTERNAL AID

One method we use to try and avoid recognition of the need to increase taxes if we want to have more money for development is to think in terms of getting the extra money from outside Tanzania. Such external finance falls into three main categories.

(a) *Gifts*: This means that another government gives our Government a sum of money as a free gift for a particular development scheme. Sometimes it may be that an institution in another country gives our Government, or an institution in our country, financial help for development programmes.

(b) *Loans*: The greater portion of financial help we expect to get from outside is not in the form of gifts or charity, but in the form of loans. A foreign government or a foreign institution, such as a bank, lends our Government money for the purposes of development. Such a loan has repayment conditions attached to it, covering such factors as the time period for which it is available and the rate of interest.

(c) *Private Investment*: The third category of financial help is also greater than the first. This takes the form of investment in our country by individuals or companies from outside. The important condition which such private investors have in mind is that the enterprise into which they put their money should bring them profit and that our Government should permit them to repatriate these profits. They also prefer to invest in a country whose policies they agree with and which will safeguard their economic interests.

These three are the main categories of external finance. And there is in Tanzania a fantastic amount of talk about getting money from outside. Our Government, and different groups of our leaders, never stop thinking about methods of getting finance from abroad. And if we get some money or even if we just get a promise of it, our newspapers, our radio, and our leaders, all advertise the fact in order that every person shall know that salvation is coming, or is on the way. If we receive a girt we announce it, if we receive a loan we announce it, if we get a new factory we announce it – and always loudly. In the same way, when we get a promise of a gift, a loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement of the promise. Even when we have merely started discussions with a foreign government or institution for a gift, a loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement – even though we do not know the outcome of the discussions. Why do we do all this? Because we want people to know that we have started discussions which will bring prosperity.

DO NOT LET US DEPEND UPON MONEY FOR DEVELOPMENT

It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign

financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. It is stupid for two reasons.

Firstly, we shall not get the money. It is true that there are countries which can, and which would like to, help us. But there is no country in the world which is prepared to give us gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent that we would be able to achieve all our development targets. There are many needy countries in the world. And even if all the prosperous nations were willing to help the needy countries, the assistance would still not suffice. But in any case the prosperous nations have not accepted a responsibility to fight world poverty. Even within their own borders poverty still exists, and the rich individuals do not willingly give money to the government to help their poor fellow citizens.

It is only through taxation, which people have to pay whether they want to or not, that money can be extracted from the rich in order to help the masses. Even then there would not be enough money. However heavily we taxed the citizens of Tanzania and the aliens living here, the resulting revenue would not be enough to meet the costs of the development we want. And there is no World Government which can tax the prosperous nations in order to help the poor nations; nor if one did exist could it raise enough revenue to do all that is needed in the world. But in fact, such a World Government does not exist. Such money as the rich nations offer to the poor nations is given voluntarily, either through their own goodness, or for their own benefit. All this means that it is impossible for Tanzania to obtain from overseas enough money to develop our economy.

GIFTS AND LOANS WILL ENDANGER OUR INDEPENDENCE

Secondly, even if it were possible for us to get enough money for our needs from external sources, is this what we really want? Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for Its development. Even if there was a nation, or nations, prepared to give us all the money we need for our development, it would be improper for us to accept such assistance without asking ourselves how this would effect our independence and our very survival as a nation. Gifts which increase, or act as a catalyst, to our own efforts are valuable. Gifts which could have the effect of weakening or distorting our own efforts should not be accepted until we have asked ourselves a number of questions.

The same applies to loans. It is true that loans are better than ‘free’ gifts. A loan is intended to increase our efforts or make those fruitful. One condition of a loan is that you show how you are going to repay it. This means you have to show that you intend to use the loan profitably and will therefore be able to repay it.

But even loans have their limitations. You have to give consideration to the ability to repay. When we borrow money from other countries it is the Tanzanian who pays it back. And as we have already stated, Tanzania’s are poor people. To burden the

people with big loans, the repayment of which will be beyond their means, is not to help them but to make them suffer. It is even worse when the loans they are asked to repay have not benefited the majority of the people but have only benefited a small minority.

How about the enterprises of foreign investors? It is true we need these enterprises. We have even passed an Act of Parliament protecting foreign investments in this country. Our aim is to make foreign investors feel that Tanzania is a good place in which to invest because investments would be safe and profitable, and the profits can be taken out of the country without difficulty. We expect to get money through this method. But we cannot get enough. And even if we were able to convince foreign investors and foreign firms to undertake all the projects and programmes of economic development that we need, is that what we actually want to happen?

Had we been able to attract investors from America and Europe to come and start all the industries and all the projects of economic development that we need in this country, could we do so without questioning ourselves?

Could we agree to leave the economy of our country in the hands of foreigners who would take the profits back to their countries? Or supposing they did not insist upon taking their profits away, but decided to reinvest them in Tanzania; could we really accept this situation without asking ourselves what disadvantages our nation would suffer? Would this allow the socialism we have said it is our objective to build?

How can we depend upon gifts, loans, and investments from foreign countries and foreign companies without endangering our independence? The English people have a proverb which says, 'He who pays the piper calls the tune'. How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to those governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot.

Let us repeat. We made a mistake in choosing money – something we do not have – to be the big instrument of our development. We are making a mistake to think that we shall get the money from other countries; first, because in fact we shall not be able to get sufficient money for our economic development; and secondly, because even if we could get all that we need, such dependence upon others would endanger our independence and our ability to choose our own political policies.

WE HAVE PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON INDUSTRIES

Because of our emphasis on money, we have made another big mistake. We have put too much emphasis on industries. Just as we have said, 'Without money there can be no development', we also seem to say, 'Industries arc the basis of development, without industries there is no development'. This is true the day when we have lots of money we shall be able to say we are a developed country. We shall

be able to say, when we began our development plans we did not have enough money and this situation made it difficult for us to develop as fast as we wanted. Today we are developed and we have enough money. That is to say, our money has been brought by development. Similarly, the day we become industrialized we shall be able to say we are developed. Development would have us to have industries. The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries. It is a mistake because we do not have the means to establish many modern industries in our country. We do not have either the necessary finances or the technical know-how. It is not enough to say that we shall borrow the finances and the technicians from other countries to come and start the industries. The answer to this is the same one we gave earlier, that we cannot get enough money and borrow enough technicians to start all the industries we need. And even if we could get the necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our policy on socialism. The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our country might succeed in giving us all the industries we need but it would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism.

LET US PRAY AND HEED TO THE PEASANT

Our emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban development. We recognize that we do not have enough money to bring the kind of development to each village which would benefit everybody. We also know that we cannot establish an industry in each village and through this means erect a rise in the real incomes of the people. For these reasons we spend most of our money in the urban areas and our industries are established in the towns.

Yet the greater part of this money that we spend in the towns comes from loans. Whether it is use it to build schools, hospitals, houses or factories, etc., it still has to be repaid. But it is obvious that it cannot be repaid just out of money obtained from urban and industrial development. To repay the loans we have to use foreign currency which is obtained from the sale of our exports. But we do not now sell our industrial products in foreign markets, and indeed it is likely to be a long time before our industries produce for export. The main aim of our new industries is 'import substitution' – that is, to produce things which up to now we have had to import from foreign countries.

It is therefore obvious that the foreign currency we shall use to pay back the loans used in the development or the urban areas will not come from the towns or the industries. Where, then, shall we get it from? We shall get it from the villages and from agriculture. What does this mean? It means that the people who benefit directly from development which is brought about by borrowed money are not the ones who will repay the loans. The largest proportion of the loans will be spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers.

This fact should always be borne in mind, for there are various forms of exploitation. We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters of those who live in the rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit only a small section of the people of Tanzania. Yet if we had built them with loans from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants' produce which provides the foreign exchanges for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of the hospital thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, too, are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to the motor-car owners. Yet if we have built those roads with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the goods which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign exchange with which the car was bought also came from the sale of the farmers' produce. Again, electric lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans, and most of them do not benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce. We should always bear this in mind.

Although when we talk of exploitation we usually think of capitalists, we should not forget that there are many fish in the sea. They eat each other. The large ones eat the small ones, and small ones eat those who are even smaller. There are two possible ways of dividing the people in our country. We can put the capitalists and feudalists on one side, and the farmers and workers on the other. But we can also divide the people into urban dwellers on one side and those who live in the rural areas on the other. If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants.

THE PEOPLE AND AGRICULTURE

The development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development. The four prerequisites of development are different; they are (i) People; (ii) Land; (iii) Good Policies; (iv) Good Leadership. Our country has more than ten million people1 and is are; is more than 362,000 square miles.

AGRICULTURE AS THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT

A great part of Tanzania's land is fertile and gets sufficient rain. Our country can produce various crops for home consumption and for export.

We can produce food crops (which can be exported if we produce in large quantities) such as maize, rice, wheat, beans, groundnuts, etc. And we can produce such cash crops as sisal, cotton, coffee, tobacco, pyrethrum, tea, etc. Our land is also good for grazing cattle, goats, sheep, and for raising chickens, etc.; we can get plenty of fish from our rivers, lakes, and from the sea. All of our farmers are in areas which can produce two or three or even more of the food and cash crops enumerated above, and each farmer could increase his production so as to get more food or more money. And because the main aim of development is to get more food, and more

money for our other needs our purpose must be to increase production of these agricultural crops. This is in fact the only road through which we can develop our country – in other words, only by increasing our production of these things can we get more food and more money for every Tanzanian.

THE CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

(a) Hard Work

Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work. Let us go to the villages and talk to our people and see whether or not it is possible for them to work harder.

In towns, for example, wage-earners normally work for seven and a half or eight hours a day, and for six or six and a half days a week. This is about 45 hours a week for the whole year, except for two or three weeks leave. In other words, a wage-earner works for 45 hours a week for 48 or 50 weeks of the year.

In or a country like ours these are really quite short working hours. In other countries, even those which are more developed than we are, people work for more than 45 hours a week. It is not normal for a young country to start with such a short working week. The normal thing is to begin with long working hours and decrease them as the country becomes more and more prosperous. By starting with such short working hours and asking for even shorter hours, we are in fact imitating the more developed countries. And we shall regret this imitation. Nevertheless, wage earners do work for 45 hours per week and their annual vacation does not exceed four weeks.

It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours a day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of their lire. The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations.

We would be doing something very beneficial to our country if we went to the villages and told our people that they hold this treasure and that it is up to them to use it for their own benefit and the benefit of our whole nation.

(b) Intelligence

The second condition of development is the use of intelligence. Unintelligent hard work would not bring the same good results as the two combined. Using a big hoe instead of a small one; using a plough pulled by oxen instead of an ordinary hoe; the use of fertilizers; the use of insecticides; knowing the right crop for a particular season or soil; choosing good seeds for planting; knowing the right time for planting, weeding, etc.; all these things show the use of knowledge and intelligence. And all of them combine with hard work to produce more and better results.

The money and time we spend on passing this knowledge to the peasants are better spent and bring more benefits to our country than the money and great amount of time we spend on other things which we call development.

These facts are well known to all of us. The parts of our Five-Year Development Plan which are on target, or where the target has been exceeded, are those parts which depend solely upon the people's own hard work. The production of cotton, coffee, cashew nuts, tobacco and pyrethrum has increased enormously for the past three years. But these are things which are produced by hard work and the good leadership of the people, not by the use of great amounts of money.

Furthermore the people, through their own hard work and with a little help and leadership, have finished many development projects in the villages. They have built schools, dispensaries, community centres, and roads; they have dug wells, water channels, animal dips, small dams, and completed various other development projects. Had they waited for money, they would not now have the use of these things.

HARD WORK IS THE ROOT OF DEVELOPMENT

Some Plan projects which depend on money are going on well, but there are many which have stopped and others which might never be fulfilled because of lack of money. Yet still we talk about money and our search for money increases and take nearly all our energies. We should not lessen our efforts to get the money we really need, but it would be more appropriate for us to spend time in the villages showing the people how to bring about development through their own efforts rather than going on so many long and expensive journeys abroad in search of development money. This is the real way to bring development to everybody in the country.

None of this means that from now on we will not need money or that we will not start industries or embarks upon development projects which require money. Furthermore, we are not saying that we will not accept, or even that we shall not look for, money from other countries for our development. This is not what we are saying. We will continue to use money; and each year we will use more money for the various development projects than we used the previous year because this will be one of the signs of our development.

What we are saying, however, is that from now on we shall know what the foundation is and what the fruit of development is. Between money and people it is obvious that the people and their hard work are the foundation of development, and money is one of the fruits of that hard work.

From now on we shall stand upright and walk forward on our feet rather than look at this problem upside down. Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is the people and their hard work, especially in AGRICULTURE. This is the meaning of self-reliance.

Our emphasis should therefore be on:
(a) The Land and Agriculture
(b) The People
(c) The Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance, and
(d) Good Leadership.

(a) *The Land*
Because the economy of Tanzania depends and will continue to depend on agriculture and animal husbandry, Tanzanians can live well without depending on help from outside if they use their land properly. Land is the basis of human life and all Tanzanians should use it as a valuable investment for future development. Because the land belongs to the nation, the Government has to see to it that it is being used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people.

It is the responsibility of TANU to see that the country produces enough food and enough cash crops for export. It is the responsibility of the Government and the co-operative societies to see to it that our people get the necessary tools, training and leadership in modern methods of agriculture.

(b) The People
In order properly to implement the policy of self-reliance, the people have to be taught the meaning of self-reliance and its practice. They must become self-sufficient in food, serviceable clothes and good housing.

In our country work should be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness and idleness should be things to be ashamed of. And for the defense of our nation, it is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us. The people should always be ready to defend their nation when they are called upon to do so.

(c) Good Policies
The principles of our policy of self-reliance go hand in hand with our policy of socialism. In order to prevent exploitation it is necessary for everybody to work and

to live on his own labour. And in order to distribute the national wealth rairly, it is necessary for everybody to work to the maximum of his ability. Nobody should go and stay for a long time with his relative, doing no work, because in doing so he will be exploiting his relative. Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives.

TANU believes that everybody who loves his nation has a duty to serve it by co-operating with his fellows in building the country for the benefit of all the people of Tanzania. In order to maintain our independence and our pcople's freedom we ought to be self-reliant in every possible way and avoid depending upon other countries for assistance. If every individual is self-reliant ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the cells are self-reliant the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-reliant the District will be self-reliant. If the Districts arc self-reliant, then the Region is self-reliant, and if the Regions are self-reliant, then the whole nation is self-reliant and this our aim.

(d) Good Leadership

TANU recognizes the urgency and importance of good leadership. But we have not yet produced systematic training for our leaders; it is necessary that TANU Headquarters should now prepare a programme of training for all leaders – from the national level to the ten-house cell level – so that every one of them understands our political and economic policies. Leaders must set a good example to the rest of the people in their lives and in all their activities.

PART FOUR
TANU Membership

Since the Party was founded we have put great emphasis on getting as many members as possible. This was the right policy during the independence struggle. But now the National Executive feels that the time has come when we should put more emphasis on the beliefs of our Party and its policies of socialism.

That part of the TANU Constitution which relates to the admission of a member should be adhered to, and if it is discovered that a man does not appear to accept the faith, the objects, and the rules and regulations of the Party, then he should not be accepted as a member. In particular, it should not be forgotten that TANU is a party of peasants and workers.

PART FIVE
THE ARUSHA RESOLUTION

Therefore, the National Executive Committee, meeting in the Community Centre at Arusha from 26.1.67 to 29.1.67 resolves:

(a) The Leadership

1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices or capitalism or feudalism.
2. No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company.
3. No TAN U or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned enterprise.
4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.
5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.
6. For the purposes of this Resolution the term 'leader' should comprise the following:

Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers; Members of Parliament; senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU; senior officers of par-statal organizations; all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU Constitution; councilors; and civil servants in the high and middle cadres. (In this context 'leader' means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her husband.)

(b) The Government and other Institutions

1. Congratulates the Government for the steps it has taken so far in the implementation of the policy of socialism

2. Calls upon the Government to take further steps in the implementation of our policy of socialism as described in Part Two of this document without waiting for a Commission on Socialism.

3. Calls upon the Government to put emphasis, when preparing its development plans, on the ability of this country to implement the plans rather than depending on foreign loans and grants as has been done in the current Five-Year Development Plan. The National Executive Committee also resolves that the Plan should be amended so as to make it fit in with the policy of self-reliance.

4. Calls upon the Government to take action designed to ensure that the incomes of workers in the private sector are not very different from the incomes of workers in the public sector.

5. Calls upon the Government to put great emphasis on actions which will raise the standard of living of the peasants, and the rural community.

6. Calls upon NUTA, the co-operatives, TAPA, UWT, TYL, and other Government institutions to take steps to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance.

(c) Membership

Members should get thorough teaching on Party ideology so that they may understand it, and they should always be reminded of the importance of living up to its principles.

Summarised by (Madyibi, www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere)